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Summary 
 
 
This thesis examines how constitutional reforms relating to the right to 
water in Bolivia have affected water provision in peri-urban Cochabamba. 
This multi-sited ethnography explores how the right to water has framed 
reforms to the Bolivian water sector, how and why the right to water has 
been contested in Bolivia, the impact of reforms to the water sector on 
peri-urban water committees and emerging challenges and opportunities 
for sustainable water provision in peri-urban Bolivia. 
 
It demonstrates that despite the high profile role played by Bolivia in 
advancing the right to water at the international and national level, in 
practice the right to water continues to be a fairly nebulous concept. 
There is a disconnect between Bolivia’s international stance on the 
human right to water and national reforms around the right to water. This 
thesis contends that the right to water is a banner under which the water 
sector has been reformed since the election of Evo Morales in 2006. 
Even though the constitution states that everyone has the right to water, 
in practice water often continues to be provided through community 
providers such as drinking water committees (DWCs), largely due to the 
failure of municipal water provision. Reforms and policy have focussed on 
(re)nationalising the sector and establishing new institutions to regulate 
and develop diverse water providers such as peri-urban DWCs. 
 
Through detailed ethnographic examination of peri-urban Cochabamba, 
the thesis demonstrates that activists and community-water providers in 
rural and peri-urban areas have contested reforms linked to the right to 
water. They have contended that reforms have the potential to undermine 
community water systems, and furthermore, that the state has failed to 
guarantee basic human rights and service provision. To date, the state 
and non-state initiatives to enhance the sustainability of DWCs have 
focussed on certain elements of sustainability, specifically protecting the 
aquifer and enhancing institutional sustainability of DWCs. By drawing on 
the experience and development of one DWC, this thesis also explores 
further elements that present challenges and opportunities to enhance 
sustainable water provision in peri-urban areas, namely building equitable 
access, and the reconciling of local power relations. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
In Bolivia during the 2000s men and women from the city, the country and 
marginalised peri-urban settlements, earned themselves an international 
reputation as the world’s Water Warriors (Finnegan 2002). At the 
beginning of the decade Bolivians rejected neoliberal reforms focussed 
on restructuring the water sector, which in turn threatened the autonomy 
of local water providers. This rejection manifested itself in a series of 
uprisings against the privatisation of water services and the 
commodification of water across the country, most notably the 
Cochabamba Water War in 2001 (Assies 2003; Crespo 2003; Shultz 
2003; Bustamante 2004; Olivera and Lewis 2004). In 2006, the people of 
Bolivia elected Evo Morales, their first indigenous president. Morales was 
himself involved in the Water War and has presided over a government 
that has played a key role in the international water justice movement by 
lobbying against the privatisation of water services and in favour of the 
right to water (Bustamante, Crespo et al. 2011).The right to water was 
never a central demand of the Bolivian social movements involved in the 
Water War or any of the uprisings in other parts of Bolivia. Nonetheless, 
domestically the government has overhauled the Bolivian water sector 
based on the idea of the human right to water. Speaking in a press 
conference on March the 22nd 2010, International Water Day, President 
Morales outlined his commitment to the recognition of the right to water 
internationally and in Bolivia. 
Water is essential for life and for humanity as a whole, there 
can be no life without water and without life there are no 
human rights… the UN must consider incorporating access 
to safe water and basic sanitation as a universal human 
right… the United Nations system can adopt progressive 
measures to promote and ensure national and international 
recognition of the right, making it universal and 
effective…Bolivia has knowledge and expertise on this topic 
since it has recognised that basic services like water (are) a 
human right and not a commodity.(Los Tiempos 2010) 
 
Several months after Evo Morales made this statement, the Bolivian 
Ambassador to the UN, Pablo Solon, presented a resolution to the 
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General Assembly that led to the recognition of the human right to safe, 
clean water and sanitation. This was in fact the product of at least a 
decade of campaigning and lobbying by the international water justice 
movement. 1  The UN has since called upon all member states and 
international organisations to provide financial resources, capacity 
building and technology transfer to help countries, in particular developing 
countries, to recognise this right (UNGA 2010). Unsurprisingly, two years 
after the resolution was passed, progress has been limited. Not all 
member states have backed the resolution and there are extensive 
challenges in developing an international legislative framework that is 
justiciable (Deen 2012). Meanwhile domestically, since the election of 
Evo Morales in 2006, the Bolivian government has implemented 
extensive reforms to the water sector under the banner of the human right 
to water. These reforms have focussed on improving access to water and 
sanitation, but they also set out to recognise the role, uses and customs 
of community water providers in rural and peri-urban areas (Estado 
Plurinacional de Bolivia 2008).  
 
But what does the right to water mean for access to water in previously 
neglected areas such as the peri-urban interface? Take the case of Barrio 
15 de Febrero, 2  where there is a disconnect between Bolivia’s 
international commitments and on the ground realities. In the southern 
peri-urban fringes of Cochabamba known locally as the Zona Sur, the 
city’s poorest residents have settled in informal barrios that began 
emerging during the 1980s as a result of multiple waves of economic 
migration. These communities have always relied on water from informal 
providers, namely vendors and communal water systems. Barrio 15 de 
Febrero was founded in the early 1980’s and has a Drinking Water 
Committee (DWC), established by the community with the support of the 
                                                
1 International network of diverse social justice organizations, indigenous peoples,  trade 
unions, environmental groups, farmers, writers, academics, human rights advocates, 
community activists and networks which share a vision of water as a fundamental 
human right 
2 Pseudonym 
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church, Agua Sur,3  that is managed by the community according to 
principles of mutual aid and local uses and customs. The water provided 
by the DWC is more expensive than that provided by the public utility in 
the centre of the city, furthermore, the committee extracts water from the 
aquifer that is contaminated, saline and depleted (Ghielmi, Mondaca et al. 
2008). The community, however, continues to develop their DWC under 
challenging conditions. The reason for this is that they have been let 
down by the state on numerous occasions and they have little faith in the 
idea of the right to water and state reforms to improve access to water. 
The president of Agua Sur explained:  
We have a very beautiful constitution, which talks about the 
right to water and says that we all have the right to water, it is 
very pretty. So they say, ‘In Bolivia you must all be so happy 
they have recognised the right to water,’ but the reality is 
something else… What is written is one thing, but the reality is 
different. People say ‘We have the right to water!’ but there is 
no water! We would like to be able to see the right to water in 
action, but how can we when there is no water…The Bolivians 
have all fought and blockaded for water, and now we have The 
Right, but now what do we do, and what does it mean? There is 
no water here, the state has not brought it, so we have to do 
something ourselves.4 
 
This thesis explores the disjuncture between the Bolivian reforms under 
the banner of right to water and the reality of water provision in peri-urban 
barrios like Villa 15 de Febrero. It further probes the role and capacity of 
community providers in peri-urban areas and the challenges and 
opportunities to enhance sustainable water provision in these areas. In 
principle, reforms to recognise the right to water aim to ensure that 
everyone has access to sufficient, clean water and, in turn, recognise the 
role that DWCs can play in this endeavour. Questions remain about how 
policies around the right to water have been implemented; how access to 
water in peri-urban areas can be improved and what impact these 
policies have had on water provision in practice. The right to water has 
been a potent call to arms internationally, but how has it shaped policy 
and legislation in Bolivia since 2006; how has the discourse of the right to 
                                                
3 Pseudonym 
4 Water Committee President, Cochabamba, May 30th 
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water developed over time, and what the challenges associated with 
developing the concept into a justiciable human right. These are all 
questions that will be considered in this thesis. 
 
Constitutional amendments and reforms to the water sector after 2006 at 
first appear progressive. In principle the state has prohibited private 
sector participation. It protects local rights to provide and access water 
sources and is committed to improving access to water across the board 
(Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia 2008). However, the right to water and 
associated reforms to the water sector have received a lukewarm 
reception from some actors with an interest in the Bolivian water sector 
(CGIAB 2010; Crespo 2010). Despite the extensive constitutional reforms 
that have been undertaken, water activists, academics and some DWC 
representatives have been cautious about state-led developments in the 
water sector, often using a discourse of community-led provision as an 
alternative method for recognising the right to water (Bustamante, Crespo 
et al. 2011). Even though government policies appear to support the role 
of community water providers, some community providers and activists 
have voiced concerns encroachment of the state and the universalization 
of water services in peri-urban areas. This research probes why and how 
these diverse actors have contested the overarching aim of recognising a 
human right to water in the Bolivian context. 
 
It is estimated that there are over 28.000 formal and informal water 
providers in Bolivia (SENASBA, 2009) but only 27 are comprehensively 
regulated (MMAYA, 2012). Many of these unregulated providers in rural 
and peri-urban areas are community-led water systems. Consequently, 
while social movements and organisations promote the idea of 
community management, the state also has to engage with community 
providers. Community-led water providers and the discourse of 
community provision are especially potent in Cochabamba because of 
the vacuum left by the public municipal provider SEMAPA (Municipal 
Potable Water and Sanitation Service), and also due to the uprisings 
against the privatisation of water services and in defence of community 
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water systems in 2000 known as the Water War. In Cochabamba, formal 
barrios in the city are served by SEMAPA, whereas drinking water 
committees (DWCs) and/or private vendors serve peri-urban and 
suburban communities. It is estimated that there are between 500 and 
600 (Lavrilleux and Compere 2006) community water systems in the 
metropolitan area of Cochabamba, 149 of these are in the peri-urban 
region known locally as the Zona Sur (Duran 2007). 
 
Community provision or community participation in the co-production of 
water services is often posited in opposition to state-led provision and a 
universal system (CGIAB 2010). This dichotomy materialises in the 
conflicting solutions to water provision that have been proposed for the 
peri-urban Zona Sur of Cochabamba. On the one hand, the state and the 
public utility SEMAPA continue to promote large-scale technocratic fixes 
to water provision in Cochabamba, specifically the Misicuni dam 
(discussed in chapter 5) and the expansion of public provision by 
SEMAPA in Zona Sur. On the other hand, community providers continue 
to lobby in defence of the right and capacity of DWCs to produce and co-
manage/produce water services (ASICASUDD-EPSAS). In this thesis I 
explore to what extent reforms to the water sector under the banner of the 
right to water actually support DWCs as viable water providers in the 
Zona Sur. 
 
Partnerships for the co-production of water services between the 
community and the state are often considered as a viable opportunity to 
improve access to water in peri-urban areas (Allen 2012) . In the peri-
urban Zona Sur, DWCs and NGOS supporting community water 
providers contend that established DWCs could efficiently meet the water 
needs of local communities through such co-production partnerships, 
known locally as co-gestion (co-management). In this thesis, I explore 
some factors that provide challenges to, and opportunities for, enhancing 
the sustainability of peri-urban DWCs. This includes an analysis of the 
environmental and institutional sustainability of DWC-led water provision 
but also extends to consider some of the lesser-explored social dynamics 
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that can affect the sustainability of DWCs. I specifically explore 
challenges and opportunities around achieving equitable water provision 
within and beyond the community, and also how power relations between 
the community and the state, and within the community, can affect the 
sustainability of water provision. 
 
Research objectives and questions 
I began the research for this thesis a decade after the Cochabamba 
Water War in 2000. Ten years on, some of the anti-establishment water 
warriors were now part of the state and some seemingly radical 
constitutional articles had the potential to reforms the water sector. I was 
interested to understand how the right to water was being translated into 
policy in Bolivia and the effect it has had on water provision in some of 
the most marginalised communities; the poor peri-urban communities that 
are often un-served by the state. This thesis endeavours to understand 
why the right to water has been so central to reforms to the water sector 
and how the discourse of the right to water is translated into policy and 
what its implications are for the sustainability of communal water 
provision in peri-urban areas. 
 
Developing comprehensive, universal water provision in peri-urban areas 
is technically challenging (Marshall, Waldman et al. 2009). Local water 
resources can be undermined by over-use or contamination, while public 
or private utilities tend not to provide to informal peri-urban settlements 
(Allen, Davila et al. 2006). Over time it becomes increasingly challenging 
to expand mainline water services into sprawling informal settlements. 
Planners are faced with installing infrastructure for a region that has 
already urbanised. Developing a water policy based on human rights 
based approaches has been critiqued for having limited potential in 
marginalised communities such as those in the peri-urban interface, 
because of its informal nature. The right to water, like all human rights, is 
dependent on a functioning relationship of rights and obligations between 
citizens and the state. In peri-urban areas, this relationship is not 
necessarily established and functioning and informal communal 
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institutions serve the needs of communities too. Men, women and 
children in the peri-urban regions are often un-served by the public or 
private water and sanitation utilities. State-citizen relations here are 
contested and weak because populations here are often not fully 
recognised as citizens (Allen, Davila et al. 2006).The state may not 
provide comprehensive basic services, while communities may be 
informal and individuals may not pay taxes or have formal jobs. 
Consequently, tackling water provision in the peri-urban interface 
becomes more than just a technical challenge; there are also political and 
social hurdles to negotiate. The capacity of DWCs and diverse communal 
providers that have emerged to meet the needs of peri-urban 
communities are poorly understood. This research explores the role and 
capacity of DWCs, and the role they may play in the recognition of the 
right to water. 
 
Understanding the capacity of DWCs is pertinent not only in Bolivia but 
also across Latin America. Privatisation is no longer universally billed as 
the panacea for improving access to water; some states have reverted to 
public provision, public-private partnerships, or are experimenting with 
more complex configurations that incorporate the community and DWCs 
(Hall, Lobina et al. 2010). This is increasingly the case in peri-urban 
regions across Latin America, such as La Sirena in Cali and parts of 
Caracas, where communities are playing an active role in the production 
or co-production of water services (Spronk, Crespo et al. 2012). 
Meanwhile, Latin American NGOs and regional coalitions of communal 
providers such as The Latin American Confederation of Communitarian 
Water and Sanitation Services (CLOCSAS) and The Platform of 
Agreements for Public and Communitarian Cooperation (PAPC) (PAPC 
2012) have started drawing attention to how communal water providers 
are not merely coping mechanisms for water provision. Instead, they 
argue that these institutions have the potential to operate as legitimate 
water providers or to co-produce services with the state in peri-urban and 
rural areas (ibid). Some contend that they should play a role in the 
realisation and implementation of the right to water. This thesis considers 
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the capacity, role and institutional sustainability of DWCs in the peri-urban 
interface, furthermore, this research considers how DWCs relate to state-
led initiatives to universalise access to water in peri urban areas and 
recognise the human right to water. Specifically this thesis considers how 
the discourse of the right to water fits with the discourse of community-led 
water provision and the tensions that exist between the two discourses. 
Indeed, the complex reality of water provision in the peri-urban interface, 
specifically the juridical plurality that characterises water provision in this 
region is often absent from policy debates surrounding the right to water.  
 
This thesis endeavours to explore not only the challenges facing DWCs 
as water providers, but also the opportunities that exist within the 
emerging partnerships for more sustainable water provision in the peri-
urban interface. Arguments for co-production or the co-gestion of water 
services in the Zona Sur are often based upon the premise that water or 
infrastructure will be supplied by the state and the communities will 
manage water provision. I consider how sustainable community-led water 
provision is in the Zona Sur, specifically focusing on the partnerships and 
projects for the co-production of water services that are already 
underway. 
 
There is a tendency to focus on the environmental impact of peri-
urbanisation, specifically on the impact that informal communities and 
informal basic services such as DWCs have on local environmental 
integrity. This thesis principally explores the institutional sustainability of 
DWCs and their emerging co-production partnerships with the state. It 
further considers how these co-production partnerships might provide 
opportunities or challenges to build local environmental integrity and 
social justice in the form of equitable water provision in relation to other 
water providers in the municipality. Finally, the peri-urban interface is 
characterised by institutional plurality. State and non-state actors exist 
side-by-side, power relations between the two tend to be in a state of flux. 
Meanwhile communities are dynamic and heterogeneous and can be 
fragmented and subject to sudden change. This thesis explores how 
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these dynamics can shape the institutional sustainability of DWCs and 
also how they present challenges or opportunities to build local 
environmental integrity and social justice in the peri-urban. 
 
Research questions  
This study examines how constitutional reforms relating to the right to 
water in Bolivia have affected water provision in peri-urban Cochabamba, 
specifically:  
a. How the right to water has been developed and implemented 
in Bolivia. 
b. How and why different actors in the peri-urban interface have 
contested the right to water. 
c. How have reforms since 2006 affected the operations of 
DWCs in peri-urban Cochabamba. 
d. What are the challenges and opportunities to enhance 
sustainable water provision in peri-urban Cochabamba. 
 
In order to understand how reforms around the right to water affect peri-
urban communities, this research was undertaken on multiple levels 
aiming to build on the body of literature relating to the development and 
implementation of the right to water. I spoke to policy makers in central 
government, planners in municipalities and also social movement 
leaders, activists, NGOs and academics who had played a role in the 
Water War, or the growing politics of water provision and post Water War 
era. In particularly those who had been engaged since reforms to the 
sector were opened up to be influenced by popular participation in 2006. 
Social movement leaders, community representatives, leaders of 
communal water providers and activists who were engaged in the politics 
of local water provision in the peri-urban interface provided a politicised 
insight into water provision in the peri-urban interface that reflected the 
aims and objectives of their movement or organisation. It was during 
these conversations that I began exploring how and why reforms to 
recognise the right to water were often contested, with alternative 
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proposals relating right to water, and improving access to water, based 
on the role and capacity of community providers. 
 
Context and approach 
In order to understand how reforms to the water sector affect peri-urban 
communities, I focused on the experiences of one peri-urban barrio 
almost 8km south of the city centre called Villa 15 de Febrero. I began by 
researching the historical development of this barrio and its water supply. 
I was able to do this because it was founded in 1980 and many of the first 
settlers still lived in the settlement. Then, using ethnographic and 
participatory methods, I explored the social challenges that affected 
communal water systems in the peri-urban interface. Here I explored how 
people have accessed and used water over time, their relationship with 
the local water committee and how they participate in the development 
and management of the DWC. This was then supplemented by data 
gathered using institutional ethnography of the DWC, looking at how it 
operates, relates to its members and facilitates government and NGO 
initiatives to improve access to water in the peri-urban interface. The 
ethnographic data that I gathered in the Zona Sur was then 
complemented with further interviews with engineers and academics that 
have been undertaking research into the physical and environmental 
challenges for water providers and water provision in the peri-urban 
interface. 
 
Personal motivation  
Before beginning this fieldwork, I did not have an established link with 
Bolivia. I was drawn to the country because I was looking to undertake a 
multi-sited ethnography that explored the impact of the right to water in 
the peri-urban interface. Water provision is at the core of this thesis and, 
as an essential liquid for life, it provides a pertinent and interesting lens 
by which to explore social relations. Adopting the human right to water 
means re-ordering established social relations according to a 
commitment to ensuring that everyone has the right to water. Bolivia 
provided an interesting and feasible case study: it is a large and diverse 
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country, but the population is relatively small, at less than 10 million. After 
some preliminary research it appeared that I would be able to explore and 
undertake research with actors in the central state, the municipality, 
within social movements and that I would also be able to undertake in-
depth ethnographic work with a peri-urban community. Most importantly 
the state had made vocal commitments to the human right to water both 
nationally and internationally. 
 
My focus on the peri-urban interface developed out of my interest in the 
fringes of cities and the informal and community organisations that 
emerge here. My first attempt at ethnographic fieldwork was on the edges 
of Kiev and Lviv in the Ukraine where I explored how communities used 
their homes as sites of resistance against the soviet state and a space to 
maintain and develop the Ukrainian identity for almost 50 years. As part 
of my Master’s Degree I undertook fieldwork with railway slum-dwellers’ 
associations in Mumbai who were involved in the design and 
development of housing as part of re-housing projects on the edge of the 
city, and investigated the political leverage embedded therein. I also 
spent two years with an NGO facilitating and evaluating the sustainability 
of community-led regeneration projects with community organisations and 
residents associations in north London. The idea of the ‘community’ in 
urban settings seemed fairly nebulous to me, but I remained interested in 
developing a better understanding of how the community organises in 
highly dynamic and challenging settings, such as the peri-urban interface. 
As this thesis developed, I wanted to move beyond assessments of the 
community based on its capacity to achieve local social justice and to 
consider broader ideas of sustainability. As a STEPS centre student I 
have had the opportunity to discuss and develop my understanding of 
sustainability over time and the STEPS centre approach is reflected in my 
thesis. 
 
While I did not have an established link with Bolivia when I left the UK to 
embark on my fieldwork in September 2009, I ended up extending my 
fieldwork and re-visiting Cochabamba in the autumn of 2011. The initial 
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months in the field were challenging, the terrain, the language, the 
culture, the people are unique, and it takes time to immerse yourself in 
that and to even begin to understand the significance of some of those 
differences. As a result of the extensive support and friendships I 
developed with informants and other researchers in Bolivia, I now have a 
strong affinity with the country, and intend to pursue further work and 
research in the Andes.  
 
Contribution 
There has been extensive theoretical discussion about the potential and 
limitations of a human-rights approach to water provision (Bakker 2007. 
Sultana and Loftus 2012, Mehta 2005, Castro 2003). This thesis set out 
to undertake in-depth empirical research into how the right to water is 
translated from rhetoric into policy and practice in peri-urban 
Cochabamba, which is largely un-served by the municipal utility water 
provider. It explores the potential of the right to water in a country where 
water providers are highly heterogeneous, and where informal and 
community provision dominates rural and peri-urban areas. Specifically, 
this thesis makes an original contribution to knowledge by exploring how 
the right to water can be implemented in peri-urban areas, and 
significantly how it has been received in peri-urban areas. This thesis 
explores how reforms are implemented in light of the institutional and 
juridical plurality that characterises Bolivia (Assies, Haar et al. 2000; 
Regalsky 2009).  
 
Community-led water provision has been the subject of extensive 
research in rural areas particularly in the Andes. The focus has tended to 
rest on rural irrigation systems and specifically how the state has 
negotiated institutional plurality, but also how irrigation systems have 
reconciled local water rights, uses and customs with national water 
reforms (Boelens, Dávila et al. 1998; Beccar, Boelens et al. 2002; 
Trawick 2003; Roth, Boelens et al. 2005; Boelens 2008). There has been 
limited research investigating communal potable water providers in the 
Andes or elsewhere. Communal drinking water providers in peri-urban 
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areas are a relatively new phenomenon for research. This thesis 
contributes to a growing body of literature that recognises that there is a 
broad spectrum of communal arrangements that have emerged in 
unserved peri-urban areas. Research relating to these water committees 
has tended to focus on gathering quantitative data, or is focussed on 
interviews with committee leaders (Terhorst 2003; Wutich 2006). This 
thesis endeavours to develop an in-depth understanding of the capacity 
and role of DWCs in peri-urban areas and how local water rights, uses 
and customs are reconciled in light of reforms to universalise access to 
water. This thesis recognises that the exclusion of peri-urban 
communities from mainline water provision is the product socio-economic 
inequalities as well as infrastructural and physical water deficits (Castro 
2003). It also reflects on the long history of exclusionary practices by 
Latin American states that have led to social conflicts in reaction to 
undemocratic reforms to the sector, particularly under neoliberalism 
(Castro 2008).  This thesis explores to what extent Morales’ apparently 
leftist reforms to the sector have been contested by activists, and also by 
DWCs in peri-urban areas. 
 
The peri-urban interface has been subject to extensive research into the 
processes that define and characterise it, but the voices of those living in 
peri-urban zones are rarely heard. This thesis uses ethnographic 
methods to present the history and voices of one peri-urban community in 
an attempt to colour and enliven the debate and literature relating to 
informal water providers in peri-urban zones. This doctoral research was 
carried out in Cochabamba, a city that became famous through the Water 
War and which is prone to water shortages (Marvin and Laurie 1999). 
Furthermore, I found few in-depth ethnographies of the peri-urban 
southern zone of Cochabamba, aside from Goldstein (2004) who 
explores violence and the rule of law in peri-urban zones, in contrast, El 
Alto, which is technically a city that is closely tied to the capitol La Paz 
and has many peri-urban characteristics, had been the subject of several 
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enlightening ethnographies (Gill 2000; Lazar 2008)5. This thesis develops 
a qualitative understanding of peri-urban areas and contributes to 
literature relating to water provision in peri-urban zones (Allen, Davila et 
al. 2006; Marshall, Waldman et al. 2009; Allen 2012).  
 
The water committees of Cochabamba have been explored to some 
extent (Terhorst 2003; Zibechi 2009) however, I found that this research 
often had an ideological bent and had been mediated by the federation of 
water committees or by international NGOs working to promote public-
public partnerships.6 Furthermore, it did not reflect on the experiences of 
committee members and how the service worked in practice. I was keen 
not to affiliate myself with any organisation or research institution, 
because of the alliances that exist between different research institutions, 
NGOs, social movements and the state or certain civil servants and the 
tendency to direct researchers towards well-trodden field sites and well-
versed informants. Maintaining my independence made the process 
somewhat longer, but it allowed me to map out for myself the actors that I 
wanted to interview and maintain neutrality. This research also 
contributes to a growing body of literature that is concerned with moving 
beyond analysis of the anti-neoliberal rebellions such as the Water War, 
to explore the extent to which reforms undertaken since the election of 
Morales in 2006 mark a significant departure from the neoliberal 
governments of the past (Webber 2011). 
 
Finally, this thesis considers the challenges and opportunities to enhance 
sustainable water provision in peri-urban Cochabamba. Specifically it 
explores how efforts to realize and promote reforms since 2006 may have 
supported or undermined various aspects of sustainable water provision. 
In addition to considering environmental and institutional sustainability, 
                                                
5 In this thesis I suggest that this is because El Alto presents a more culturally homogenous 
region, built around a shared Aymara identity, while the southern zone of Cochabamba historically 
has been subjected to more fragmented migration and development. 
6 Apart from Wutich’s work on water and reciprocity and Cielo and Cespedes’ work on migratory 
patterns who take a quantitative survey based approach to understand the region and others such 
as Terhorst 2003 who focus on the water committees but from the perspective of the federation 
and NGOs that represent and work with them. 
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there is an emphasis in this thesis on factors that affect the sustainability 
of community-led water provision in peri-urban zones, such as equity and 
the impact of local power relations. This is a significant contribution to 
knowledge as these issues are generally not included in established 
frameworks and associated plans for sustainable water provision 
(WaterAid 2011, Unicef-WHO 2011).  
 
Argument 
In this thesis I attempt to demonstrate that there is a disconnect between 
Bolivia’s international stance on the human right to water and domestic 
reforms around the right to water, arguing that activists and social 
movements in Bolivia contest the right to water because the idea of a 
universal state-sanctioned human right to water is perceived to threaten 
the autonomy of community-water providers. Furthermore, weak bonds 
between citizens and the state, the inability of the state to guarantee 
basic human rights and service provision in practice and inherent mistrust 
has led to a tendency towards community-led solutions in rural and peri-
urban areas. 
 
In practice the right to water remains nebulous in Bolivia. There is no 
justiciable legislative framework surrounding it and draft proposals for 
water laws do not appear to be focussed on developing a justiciable right. 
I demonstrate that the right to water is thus a banner under which the 
water sector has been reformed since the election of Evo Morales. The 
constitution states that everyone has the right to water, in practice this 
means water provision is now the responsibility of the state, but can be 
provided through public utilities, cooperatives, community providers, like 
drinking water committees or mixed entities. 
 
Reforms and policy have thus focussed on consolidating state control 
over the sector, thus (re)nationalising the sector and establishing an 
extensive state bureaucracy and institutionality around water provision. 
While the state was streamlined under the neoliberalism era it has now 
been extended to expand state influence and control over the water 
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sector, alongside other sectors. In this thesis I demonstrate that 
community water providers in peri-urban areas are often precarious and 
rarely autonomous, that is they are dependent on the support of state and 
non-state interventions. State reforms embody an attempt to amalgamate 
a sector that has never been consolidated and also to support and 
capacity-build informal providers so that they can effectively provide 
water. 
 
The state faces an enormous task as it sets about improving access to 
water and consolidating control in peri-urban areas:  the failure of the 
state in this respect means that informal water providers are widespread 
in the region. DWCs rarely exist autonomously and often rely on the 
support of NGOs and more recently state initiatives; some have started 
organising collectively to overcome problems that exist on a large scale, 
galvanized by a discourse of co-gestion. To date, attempts by DWCs, 
NGOs and the state to enhance the sustainability of DWCs have 
focussed on certain elements of sustainability, specifically the institutional 
sustainability of water provision. By drawing on the experience and 
development of one DWC I demonstrate that there are different elements 
that impact on the sustainability of community-led water provision in peri-
urban areas, some of which have been more explored than others. Each 
of these elements presents different challenges and opportunities to the 
enhancement of sustainable water provision in peri-urban areas. 
 
Chapter outlines 
This thesis has nine chapters including this one. Chapter two sets out the 
theoretical framework in which this research is grounded. I explore the 
diverse theoretical reflections on the right to water and reflect on some of 
the empirical work that has been undertaken to date. I discuss contested 
ideas of community, community water management and the potential of 
co-production. I then consider conceptualisations of the peri-urban 
interface and how peri-urban dynamics might affect the sustainability of 
community-led water provision. Finally, I set out my research design, 
methodology, and data analysis. I consider some of the ethics of 
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undertaking a multi-sited ethnography in Bolivia, specifically working in 
the southern zone of Cochabamba. 
 
Chapter three provides a brief introduction to Bolivia today. I examine the 
country’s current socio-economic situation. I also set out the historical, 
cultural and political context which has led to circumstances that have 
created the current reforms around water, and the informal providers that 
have emerged in peri-urban areas 
 
Chapter four explores the development of the right to water in Bolivia 
from discourse to policy. It contends that the right to water is a fairly 
nebulous discourse that acts as a banner under which the sector has 
been reformed. This is principally a process of (re)nationalisation which in 
turn has led to the development of a new institutionality to capacity build 
and regulate informal providers. It has been contested by some because 
it threatens to undermine or potentially co-opt the informal providers. 
 
Chapter five focuses on the municipality of Cochabamba; it reveals that 
within and beyond the established formal municipal waterscape there 
exists a range of smaller informal waterscapes with diverse community 
water providers. It sets out how diverse community water providers can 
be. It demonstrates that the idea of community-managed water is 
ambiguous and often refers to collective action for water provision. 
Furthermore it reveals how the poorest communities do not instigate 
community-led water provision and that the relatively affluent suburban 
potable water committees are the most efficient. 
 
Chapter six focuses down to the level of the peri-urban Zona Sur of 
Cochabamba, it explores the idea of community management or co-
gestion, by the association of DWCs; ASICASUDD-EPSAS (The 
Association of Communitarian Water Systems and EPSAS of the Zona 
Sur and the department), as an alternative to the municipal model of 
water provision. It considers how ASICASUDD-EPSAS has developed 
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and how it has facilitated the state reforms linked to the right to water, 
and non-state interventions and policies aimed at DWCs in the Zona Sur. 
 
Chapter seven focuses down to the level of one community, the Villa 15 
de Febrero. Ideas of co-gestion are based on the idea that DWCs can 
continue to provide water in peri-urban areas with some support (financial 
or provision of water sources) from the state. I explore the historic 
development of one barrio and its water committee and then explore 
some of the elements that offer up challenges or opportunities for the 
sustainability of water provision in the barrio. 
 
Chapter eight concludes the thesis, and considers my findings in light of 
my research questions. I then consider potential areas for further 
investigation. 
 
Limitations and caveats 
This thesis is a multi-sited ethnography, but much of the detailed 
ethnographic work was undertaken in peri-urban areas. As previously 
discussed there is a shortage of ethnographic data on peri-urban zones 
and this thesis aims to build on the pre-existing peri-urban ethnographic 
accounts. However, the peri-urban interface is dynamic and subject to 
rapid social and environmental change. During the time that I was in the 
field, community leaders in the barrio were replaced and NGOs moved 
on. Like all ethnographies that have come before mine, the ethnography 
presented is a snapshot and a moment in time, but as it is located in the 
peri-urban interface, that snapshot is all the more fleeting.  
 
Furthermore, Villa 15 de Febrero is one barrio and one water system; it is 
one barrio amongst 100s in the Zona Sur of Cochabamba. This thesis 
has endeavoured to contextualise the experiences in the barrio by 
providing further information on diverse types of communal water 
providers in Cochabamba (see chapter 5) and others that are more akin 
to the barrio and members of the same association of DWCs 
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ASICASUDD-EPSAS (The Association of Communitarian Water Systems 
and EPSAS of the Zona Sur and the department), discussed in chapter 6.  
 
As the world becomes increasingly urban, so the peri-urban interface 
becomes a more pertinent challenge to planners and researchers. It is 
often an unknown quantity, this becomes increasingly evident the more 
research one undertakes in peri-urban areas. There was very limited 
demographic and cartographic data available on the Zona Sur of 
Cochabamba and so I have relied on satellite images and maps that I 
updated from the community and the municipality. Demographic data on 
the whole region was out-dated, as the last census was undertaken in 
2001. As a doctoral researcher, I did not have the scope to undertake 
extensive regional data collection. Some of the data presented is thus 
out-dated or projected, often rather conservatively. I have highlighted 
where data presented might be unreliable and this is discussed in more 
detail in chapter 6 and 7. 
 
Having introduced the rationale behind my research, and presented a 
brief overview of my thesis, the following chapter moves on to present the 
theoretical framework upon which my research draws.  
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Chapter 2: Theoretical framework and methodological approach 
 
This chapter begins by exploring the theoretical implications of the right to 
water. It considers some of the challenges in implementing human rights, 
specifically the human right to water, with reference to the socio-political 
realities of peri-urban Bolivia and the proliferation of community water 
providers. It deliberates the role and viability of community water 
providers in light of reforms to the Bolivian water sector that seek to 
incorporate informal providers. Peri-urban DWCs are poorly understood, 
and so this chapter reflects on ideas of the commons and community-led 
resource management to understand these emerging institutions. It 
contends that while communities might be framed as sites of resistance 
to the state, community-based organisations are often the product of 
state or NGO initiatives, or can be strengthened through co-production 
initiatives.  
 
In the final section of this chapter, I reflect on conceptualisations of the 
peri-urban interface and water provision here. I demonstrate that the peri-
urban situation is characterised by deep set socio-spatial inequalities, that 
are the products of on-going socio-political processes. I suggest that 
these processes can undermine the sustainability of DWCs. I then 
consider some of the elements that present challenges and opportunities 
for sustainable DWC-led water provision in the peri-urban interface, 
specifically relating to institutional sustainability, local environmental 
integrity, equitable access and local power relations.  
 
The limitations of social and economic rights 
When established and functioning, social and economic rights provide 
justiciable tools that citizens can use to make claims on the state. Rights 
have historically been the product of struggle, and so negotiating and 
legislating rights so that they can be enacted coherently is often 
challenging. Since the 1949 covenant on human rights was agreed by the 
United Nations there has been an increasing emphasis by states, non 
state actors and scholars on the role that human rights play in 
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deliberative democracy and global development (Sen 2009). The 
mainstreaming of social and economic rights has been advocated by 
development agencies and NGOs as a recourse by which citizens can 
make claims on the state, according to accountable, legislative 
frameworks (SLSA, 2003: 1).  This is significant in as much as it works 
against neoliberal notions that predict the market can provide for the 
social and economic needs of a population (Mehta 2005), furthermore, it 
suggests that recognising social and economic rights requires more state 
intervention than political and civil rights (Salman and McInerney-
Lankford 2004). Social and economic rights have been demonstrated to 
be effective calls to arms for social movements and NGOs representing 
marginalised groups. More often than not, human rights are truly 
recognised through struggle (Eckstein 2002), as citizen groups fight to 
make governments accountable, so that their rights are realised. 
Implementing political, social and economic rights in the Global South has 
been demonstrated to be particularly challenging. Uvin (2007) has 
highlighted how southern states often do not have the capacity to 
recognise human rights. Further, rights are often gradually implemented 
over time, this means that governments can be liable to dragging their 
heels and that policy and legislation is developed piecemeal.  
 
Mehta (2005) sets out how states can be culprits of sins of omission or 
sins of commission that undermine social and economic rights. Sins of 
omission happen when states deny social and economic rights, this may 
happen because the states lack the capacity or will, or because citizens 
are unaware of their rights or unable to mobilise to claim them. Sins of 
commission, on the other hand, refer to when states and non-state actors 
deliberately undermine social and economic rights for broader political or 
development initiatives.  It has thus been argued that human rights are 
only truly justiciable if the state demonstrates accountability: 
accountability can be achieved through appropriate legislative 
frameworks, and if the state has the capacity and political will to 
recognise the rights (Newell and Wheeler 2006). This thesis builds on the 
foundations established in the literature relating to social and economic 
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rights, and acknowledges the limitations that have been briefly discussed 
here, specifically, the potential for human rights to be undermined within 
poorer and politically marginalised communities, if the state is weak or 
unaccountable.  
 
The right to water has been enshrined in the Bolivian constitution, and the 
Bolivian government under Evo Morales has been a key advocate of 
reforms to recognise an international human right to water, but this is 
challenging in Bolivia because numerous formal and informal providers 
undertake water provision. Agua Sustentable contend that if small-scale 
rural systems are considered its more likely that there are 28,772 
providers (Campanini 2007:1). Rolling out the right in these regions is a 
delicate and on-going process, and has the potential to succumb to many 
of the pitfalls that have been linked to human rights-based approaches to 
development. 
 
Theoretical and empirical understandings of the human right to 
water 
The international campaign to recognise the human right to water has 
had a particular political trajectory, and its capacity to improve access to 
water has been contested from a theoretical perspective from the outset. 
The international campaign for the adoption and recognition of a global 
human right to water emerged during the 1990s out of the anti-
privatisation movement and became part of the Global Water Justice 
Movement. The Global Water Justice movement has its roots in the anti-
dam building movement that targeted the World Bank initiatives that 
bolstered dam building during the 1980s (D'Souza 2008). The 
international campaign focus then shifted towards the failures of 
privatising water services, and was further fuelled by uprisings such as 
those seen in Cochabamba in 2000, and the solution proposed was an 
international and legally binding human right to water. In 2002 the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights was 
amended to include The General Comment No 15 on articles 11 and 12. 
This stated that the human right to water “…is indispensable for leading a 
 28 
life in human dignity. It is a prerequisite for the realization of other human 
rights" (UN 2002) and outlined that everyone had the right to safe, 
sufficient, acceptable, accessible and affordable water for personal and 
domestic uses. This embodied a commitment by UN member states to 
ensure that an undisclosed amount of water for productive uses be 
provided to each person but this did not mark a radical departure from the 
status quo; it did not prohibit the participation of other actors, including 
the private sector in water provision (Bakker 2007). Ultimately it was a 
small concession to campaigns by the Global Water Justice movement 
that had been working to highlight water deprivation in developing 
countries, but it did not halt the on-going privatisation of water services or 
the General Agreements on Trade (GATs), which led this process 
(D’Souza, 2008:5). The global campaign intensified and the human right 
to water was then formally recognised by the UN General Assembly in 
2010. The political and legal implications of this… are still being debated, 
but the role of the state as guarantor of the human right has been 
established. This is undoubtedly a marked shift away from discourses 
that promoted the management of water as an economic good and the 
intensive neoliberalisation of water services (Mirosa and Harris 2011). 
 
Global initiatives to recognise the human right to water are premised on 
achieving social justice, and tend to be in opposition to the 
commodification of water and private sector participation in the water 
sector. However, the implications and practicalities of implementing the 
human right to water, as promoted by the Global Water Justice 
Movement, have been the subject of much debate by several scholars 
(Gleick 1999; Salman and McInerney-Lankford 2004; Mehta 2005; Anand 
2007; Bakker 2007; Winkler 2008), which I will discuss in this chapter. 
Bakker (2007, reprinted 2012) clearly sets out how private sector 
participation is not incompatible with the human rights approaches, and 
further that the right to water does not prohibit the commodification of 
water (ibid, 27). Bakker’s concern with the focus on rights equating to 
public provision is that it is has further entrenched public-private binaries, 
and does not recognise the role and capacity of informal providers. This 
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thesis recognizes this, and further, demonstrates that the right to water 
has been equated with public provision in Bolivia. This has led to the 
alienation of the social movement leaders and activists in Bolivia (as 
discussed in chapters 4 and 6). Bakker’s reflections on the limitations of 
the right to water have been developed and contested (Mirosa and Harris 
2011; Sultana and Loftus 2011) and have been echoed by Bolivian 
scholars. In rural and peri-urban areas of Bolivia state-citizen relations 
are often weak. Historically the state has tended not to provide water 
services and has developed a reputation for compromising local water 
sources and systems for the needs of industry and elites (Comisión para 
la Gestión Integral del Agua en Bolivia 2009). Local groups have 
interpreted the right to water and communal providers to mean state led 
provision or at least state intervention in provision. In light of the track 
record of the state in failing to provide basic services to marginalized 
communities in Bolivia these groups have raised concerns. Bustamante 
et al (2012), contend that adopting the human right to water in Bolivia 
means that the state has been mandated with, “the power to undertake 
something that historically, it has been unable to do: to define, then grant 
or deny these rights under their own terms and laws. This may seem 
logical in other countries, but this is not the case in Bolivia, where the 
autonomous management of resources has long operated without state 
intervention” (237). Thus, in countries like Bolivia where autonomous and 
informal water provision in widespread, state-led reforms to recognize the 
right to water imply the re-ordering of social and political control over, and 
the production of, water services previously held by the informal sector.  
While this is necessary, particularly in peri-urban areas, where local 
community based water services can be compromised by a host of 
physical, institutional and economic challenges, it can lead to opposition 
to this re-ordering process. In this thesis I build on these theoretical 
reflections, specifically the role and capacity of an institutionally weak 
state to implement a human right to water and provide basic water 
provision to poor and marginalized communities where informal providers 
dominate the sector.  
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Castro (2006) sets out how the relationships between citizenship rights 
and water are multiple and change over time. Civil rights to property can 
simultaneously mediate property rights over water and while political 
rights linked to citizenship can also shape how water is governed and by 
whom (6). In countries like Bolivia where indigenous rights have been 
recognised by the state over time, there is an extra layer of rights to 
access and protect that can be invoked by certain groups, which can 
come into conflict with property rights or water governance arrangements 
protected through citizenship. The development of a universal human 
right to water is in principle an attempt to extend the social rights provided 
and protected through welfare systems developed by the state. In 
practice this means extending the remit of citizenship rights to include 
welfare mechanisms, but also developing governance structures that can 
incorporate marginalised sections of society. This in principle involves 
addressing the power relations that have underpinned unequal access to 
water and sanitation services by extending the remit and reach of 
citizenship rights (ibid). In settings where water governance is 
fragmented, and the state and non-state actors control access to water 
sources and services, the introduction of a universal right to water means 
that certain civil and indigenous water rights can be contested and 
change over time. The role of certain non-state, indigenous and collective 
water providers and their relationship with the state may also change over 
time, as they resist, negotiate or are incorporated into reforms that seek 
to universalise access to water.  
 
Reflections to date on the practical difficulties of implementing the right to 
water have been largely theoretical. This thesis reflects on the realities of 
implementing state-led reforms in the peri-urban interface, specifically in 
the Bolivian context, using empirical data. By drawing on Bakker, this 
thesis does not endeavour to discredit the achievements and potential of 
the concept of the human right to water. Mirosa and Harris (2011) have 
highlighted the political weight of the human right to water, at a local, 
national and international level (ibid: 7). Further, as previously highlighted, 
rights are achieved through struggle, and with time members of the global 
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water justice movement have reflected on some of the changing 
challenges linked with implementing the human right to water. Barlow 
(2011), sets out how now that the right to water has been recognized by 
the UN, the challenges lie in developing coherent legislative frameworks 
in light of local social and cultural realities (xvii).  
 
A growing body of literature has emerged which explores how the right to 
water can be translated into coherent, accountable legislative frameworks 
in different contexts. Discussions have tended to focus on western case 
studies and EU legislation (Rijswick and Keesen, 2011), or on 
international legislative frameworks (McCaffrey 1992). There has been 
less research into the sort of legislation that could be developed in the 
global south to improve access to water across the board (Anand 2007). 
Some legislative frameworks governing Latin American been eroded by 
private sector participation over time, This is very much the case in 
Bolivia, where legislation governing the water sector is out-dated and 
utilities and informal providers operate to all intent and purpose, without a 
robust legal framework (Campanini 2007). This thesis explores the 
legislative and policy frameworks that have emerged as a result of 
reforms around the right to water, and seeks to contribute to the debate 
around challenges and opportunities linked to this process.  
 
South Africa is often cited as an example of a country in the global south 
that has developed legislation for the water sector based on the human 
right to water. It has been subject to several investigations since the 
country included the right to water as part in their 1996 constitution (SLSA 
2003; Mehta 2005; Winkler 2008; Movik 2009). The state adopted a 
policy of funding the provision of Free Basic Water in 2001 of between 25 
and 40 litres of water per person per day. The impact of these reforms 
have been mixed. While reforms guarantee everyone with water for their 
basic needs, insufficient funding and institutional capacity have 
undermined the initiative. Further, the premise that water should only be 
used for productive uses has meant that the potential of reforms to 
reduce poverty have been limited (Mehta 2005:8). This example 
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highlights both the difficulty of developing robust legal frameworks for the 
effective allocation of water but also the challenges of the practical 
implementation of these laws. 
 
The South African case study reflects a trend that equates the right to 
water with a right to a certain amount of water. This has been part of 
debates relating to the right to water since the 1990s. Gleick (1996) 
famously made the case that the nations of the world should guarantee 
that all citizens had access to 50 litres per person per day. Glick 
contended that 50 litres per day would be the minimum required to meet 
an individuals basic domestic needs. Over many years discussions have 
continued amongst NGOs and development agencies about what the 
‘magic number’ should be, but the objective has remained the same. 
Developing a right to water and sanitation has tended to focus on 
securing “…access to minimum essential supplies of safe water and 
basic sanitation as a legal entitlement” (WaterAid, Bread for the World et 
al. 2012). Reforms around the right to water in Bolivia have not focussed 
on granting rights to sums of water for reasons that will be discussed in 
Chapter 4. This thesis draws on the work of Staddon et al (2012), and 
contends that granting rights to minimum quantities of water may not 
necessarily lead to water equity (ibid: 70).  
 
Reflections on implementing the right to water 
Generally, attempts at legislating for the right to water such as those 
seen in South Africa have tended to focus on individual rights to water. 
Legislation has failed to recognise the social, cultural, and economic role 
that water plays in every day life, and the difficulties in ring-fencing water 
for ‘basic needs’. This is seems is the next big challenge, and this has 
been recognised by academics and the international water justice 
movement (Barlow, 2007, reprinted 2012). One of the principle 
challenges in implementing the human right to water, or any sort of 
universal water reform, is how it can be implemented in light of varied 
local political and cultural realities (Cowan, Dembour et al. 2001).  
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Bolivia demonstrates how the cultural and political realities of a state, 
can challenge reforms to recognise a universal human right to water (see 
chapter 4). Universal reforms to recognise the right to water may be less 
challenging in a country like Uruguay where the state has established 
legitimacy as the principal water provider, but in countries like Bolivia 
where informal providers are widespread, and the state does not 
regulate the whole sector, reforms become more complex. This process 
of incorporating and developing community providers has gained 
momentum in several Latin American countries, particularly since the 
demise of the aggressive privatisation initiatives that were rolled out in 
various Latin American cities during the 1990s and 2000s. This process 
has been institutionalised in some settings, as seen with the Mesas 
Technicas of Caracas in Venezuela (see Allen 2013), but in other 
instances incorporating and developing community providers is more 
challenging. In Bolivia social movements and communal providers have 
resisted the idea of the right to water because they fear the 
encroachment of the state. The challenges of implementing the right to 
water in regions where collective rights exist have been well-documented 
(Sultana and Loftus 2011) and laws can be created that incorporate, 
recognise and protect collective rights. This has been the rationale for 
reforms to the water sector in Bolivia, as demonstrated in chapter 4. 
 
The right to water: More than a technocratic discourse? 
Reflecting on debates and reforms to date, it has been contended that 
the idea of right to water often runs the risk of becoming part of a hollow 
technocratic discourse (ibid: 8). While the global water justice movement 
continues with its struggle, the right to water has simultaneously become 
mainstreamed. NGOs, development agencies and governments have all 
adopted it, while private water utilities and businesses such as Pepsi-
Cola7 have also made commitments to recognising the right. Arguably, 
the right to water has thus become something of a ‘universalising 
                                                
7 In 2009, PepsiCo became one of the first companies of our size to publish public 
guidelines in support of water as a fundamental human right, in the context of the United 
Nations/World Health Organization guidance 
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populist discourse’ not dissimilar to the discourse that surrounds climate 
change that Swyngedouw (2011) critiques. Such universalising 
discourses leave little room for what Ranciere terms ‘dissensus’ 
(Ranciere 2010). That is the interruption of political consensus by a 
usually silent or invisible group; the dissensus is thus a political act.  In 
Cochabamba, the consensus of neoliberal reforms to water services in 
the form of private concession was broken by the dissensus of the Water 
War, and the protesters on the streets which chose to defend their water 
rights. Swyngedouw argues that politics is increasingly reduced to policy 
making, which is dictated by international frameworks, global NGOs and 
civil society groups (2011). A universal discourse leaves less room for 
dissensus and the voices of often-marginalised groups. It obscures the 
‘difference’ and the potential in the diverse institutions that have 
developed around water.  
 
Reforms around the right to water have not been marred by dissensus, as 
of yet, but there is by no means consensus yet on how the right to water 
should be implemented. Indeed, the implementation of a universal right to 
water will be heavily dependent on local context and established water 
governance structures. The Bolivian case demonstrates some of the 
challenges in taking up a universal right at a national and local level as 
local actors who have endeavoured to develop water governance 
structures that reflect their needs and struggles are confronted with 
international frameworks and discourses. In Bolivia activists feel that their 
principles are different principles to those originally posited by the global 
water justice movement (Crespo 2010). Indeed, rights are recognized 
through struggle but these struggles are often local struggles, and my 
research examines how the struggle for the right to water in Bolivia 
reflects the social and cultural realities of that country (see chapter 3). 
This is not based on the opposition to state provision but on incorporating 
communal provision (this is discussed in more detail in the following 
section of this chapter). Bakker has suggested something similar, drawing 
on alter-globalization ideas of the commons, these, in turn “adopt a 
twofold tactic: reforming rather than abolishing state governance, while 
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fostering and sharing alternative local models of resource management.” 
(2007: 446), thus creating a more integrated relationship between 
structures of water governance and the hydro-social cycle (ibid:448). This 
idea pre-empts some of the more recent commentary on the right to 
water, which considers the emancipatory potential of reforms around the 
right to water.  
 
While securing access to sufficient water to meet the basic needs of 
communities is important, several commentators have argued that, ‘the 
right to water has the potential to mean far more than achieving access to 
sufficient volumes of safe water’ (Sulatana and Loftus: 2012:8). Linton 
(2011) argues that the right to water has more potential if we move away 
from the traditional conceptualisation of the right to water, which is 
premised on the fixed relation between an individual or a households, a 
quantity of water and the state. Instead, we need to consider the role that 
communities play in the production of the hydro-social cycle and why they 
might defend that right, as observed during the Cochabamba Water War. 
By participating in the production of water services, society re-asserts its 
role within the production of water services and water governance 
structures, and has the potential to lessen Harvey’s accumulation by 
dispossession. David Harvey famously argued that the enclosure of water 
resources by the private sector is symptomatic of the capitalist system 
venturing into new frontiers in the search for profit, terming it 
accumulation by dispossession (2003). Seemingly building on the work of 
Bakker (2007), Linton argues that involving society in the production of 
the hydro-social cycle has an emancipatory potential. This thesis builds 
on these theoretical reflections using empirical data, reflected in the 
findings in chapters 6 and 7 of this thesis.  
 
The political realities of states like Bolivia where the government’s 
jurisdiction over the water sector is limited undermines the potential of a 
human rights approach. D’Souza (2008) argues that because the legal 
human right to water is the product of western capitalist history and 
politics, and liberal individual theory it cannot produce a dramatic re-
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ordering or transformation of society, or any form of emancipatory politics 
of the faceless ‘global poor’ (3). More recently the emancipatory potential 
of human rights-based approaches to development have been 
interrogated. Questions have been raised around whether human rights 
serve to preserve the status quo for marginalised communities; what 
discourses and strategies should be adopted that endeavour to meet 
more than the basic needs of marginalised communities, and to what 
extent human rights can frame more emancipatory strategies?  May 
(2008) has argued that we must consider the political foundation of 
human rights-based approaches and their potential to achieve equality. 
He then considers to what extent citizens who are the subject of policies 
can ever be equal to those who are formulating policy and the broader 
implications of this approach; “It is no longer in their role as people or as 
citizens that they participate in the creation or maintenance of equality… 
as citizens they remain recipients, rather than agents of change” (143). In 
this thesis, I demonstrate that some Bolivian activists and social 
movements in Bolivia have contested reforms around the right to water, 
because reforms are premised on these state-citizen relations that don’t 
function, or that have the potential to be disempowering.  
 
Community water management  
The preceding pages have highlighted some of the challenges in 
implementing the human right to water, particularly in light of local political 
and cultural realities. It has been argued that marginalised groups might 
be the subjects of sins of omission (Mehta 2005), as governments 
overlook their rights or communities are unaware of their rights. This 
thesis demonstrates that in Bolivia (and more broadly in other parts of 
Latin America) the right to water has been contested and debated by 
social movements because it has the potential to undermine or affect the 
autonomy of community-managed water systems and how they function. 
It is not necessarily that these organisations have been overlooked by the 
state. Instead they are looking to influence the on-going reforms under 
the right to water. In the following pages I reflect on some literature that 
that has helped me frame and understand community water providers in 
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peri-urban areas. I then reflect on some of the literature on the processes 
that have forged and entrenched community provision in peri-urban 
areas, and reflect on how and why DWCs might contest state-led reforms 
to the water sector. 
 
Drinking water committees are flourishing in Bolivia and more broadly 
across Latin America, often as a result of the absence of water utilities, 
and in some instances, in the wake of the prohibition of private sector 
participation in water provision (PAPC 2012). They are still poorly 
understood institutions. Communal irrigation systems across the Andes 
have been the subject of extensive research exploring the local role and 
relationship with the state (Beccar, Boelens et al. 2002; Cremers, 
Ooijevaar et al. 2005; Roth, Boelens et al. 2005; Boelens 2008; Perreault 
2008). However, the experiences of rural irrigation systems are far 
removed from emerging potable water providers in peri-urban areas. 
Rural water providers tend to have abundant, enclosed water sources 
and entrenched usos y costumbres or uses and customs around water 
that have evolved over decades (Bustamante and Gutierrez 1999). 
Perreault (2008) frames uses and customs as “the mutually agreed-on 
norms of water rights and management practices that govern communal 
irrigation systems” (ibid: 835). Perreault sets out the material and 
symbolic significance of usos y costumbres for Bolivia’s irrigators, who 
have successfully mobilized the discourse usos y costumbres. In this 
thesis I will consider how and to what extent the idea of uses and 
customs has been mobilized in the peri-urban interface. 
 
Recently, communal water providers have been mobilising and the 
discourses of community-led water provision and usos y costumbres 
have been promoted locally and by regional Latin American networks 
including Red Vida, PAPC and CLOCSAS. Despite this, there has been 
limited empirical research into the range of diverse communal drinking 
water systems in peri-urban settings and their relationship with the state.  
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The commons and community water management 
In Bolivia, communal water providers and community water management 
is often advocated using a discourse that is loosely and often romantically 
based on the commons and ideas of the common good (el bien comun). 
Reflecting on debates relating to reforms around the right to water in 
Bolivia, the CGIB (Integrated Commission for Water in Bolivia)8 states, 
Partly in reaction to the idea of water as a human right, there is 
the proposal to treat the water as part of what is called 
"commons" in the sense of resources constituted, managed and 
used through community control. That is in the broad sense, not 
just by indigenous, peasant or native communities also in urban 
and peri-urban areas. This in turn, refers to a sense of 
commonality and community that goes beyond the national 
model. (CGIAB 2010) 
 
The idea of the commons was used interchangeable with ‘el bien comun’ 
was alluded to in meetings with water activists and DWC leaders while I 
was in the field, as an alternative model to universal state-led water 
provision. But the idea has not been clearly defined in relation to 
communal potable water providers in the Bolivian context. 
 
Conceptualisations of the commons are complex, and often poorly 
understood (Berge and van Laerhoven 2011), and hence the classic ideal 
of the commons is often conflated with community management, as 
seems to be the case in Bolivia. But this is hardly surprising; the 
commons is notoriously difficult to apply to local and community water 
systems (Mehta 2006: 4). Classic ideals of the commons were 
established by Hardin who famously argued in The Tragedy of the 
Commons, (Hardin 1968) that when a group has access to a common 
property resource, individuals will act on an individual basis, and exhaust 
the resource instead of working together to ensure its sustainability for 
the whole group. Hardin’s theory led to a stream of work counter-arguing 
that group members cooperated to regulate resource use through 
common property regimes (CPRs). These are often theorised around 
systems based on clearly delineated resources, which are excludable and 
                                                
8 CGIAB brings togethr NGOs and research organisations with an interest in water in 
Bolivia to undertake research and host events and forum on water in Bolivia 
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governed by sets of norms and rules negotiated by the group (Ostrom 
1990). Based on a theory of rational economic choice, it is more 
beneficial in the long-term for groups to co-operate over resource 
management and use. The idea of incorporating commons and 
community systems of management has become popular, particularly in 
Andean countries where the participation of the private sector has been 
prohibited or where community providers are prolific. This thesis 
demonstrates that classic ideas of the commons do not apply to the 
communal water providers that are emerging in peri-urban regions (see 
chapters 6 and 7). Water resources are difficult to delineate, and access 
to water services may be governed loosely by norms and rules, but water 
is also sold in most instances. 
 
The idea of community management in Bolivia often romanticises the 
capacity of the community to manage resources. Literature relating to 
community- led resource management (CBNRM 2012) has warned 
against this (Agrawal 1999; Blackie 2006). Theories of CBNRM, which 
emerged out of the commons literature during the 1990s, advocated the 
role of the community in natural resource management in rural settings. 
The literature draws on ideas of new institutional economics and argued 
that locally managed resource systems and service provision would 
match local needs, that they could be empowering for local communities, 
and provided an alternative to traditional public or private service 
providers (ibid). CBNRM was a concept that guided development 
interventions in rural areas, and so the approach was top down. It is also 
not an approach that was rolled out in informal peri-urban communities, 
where resources were scarce and contaminated, and populations are 
transient and unstable. However, some of the critiques that emerged in 
relation to the capacity of the community to manage natural resources are 
noteworthy for this thesis. CBNRM allowed little space to accommodate 
the heterogeneity between and within communities, and tended to 
romanticise the capacity of the community, not dissimilarly to the ideas of 
‘el bien comun’. Further, and as highlighted in chapter 7 of my thesis, it is 
often difficult to guarantee or enforce the participation of community 
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members in the management of natural resources. The idea of CBNRM, 
like most models of community-led resource management is dependent 
on the willingness of the community. This is particularly pertinent in peri-
urban settings, where populations have been demonstrated to be 
dynamic and, as I demonstrate in this thesis, urban aspirations develop 
with time. Beyond the traditional CBNRM literature there are extensive 
examples that reveal how community water provision does not necessary 
lead to equal access to water, and that social dynamics dictate access to 
water (Cleaver, Cooke et al. 2001; Mosse and Sivan 2003). 
 
More recently the idea of the commons has been re-invoked and 
adapted to understand emerging communal systems and structures in 
peri-urban areas. These ideas have been useful to inform my 
understanding of emerging collective organisation for basic service 
provision in peri-urban settings. Bakker and The Forum on Privatisation 
and the Public Domain developed a categorization of eight types of 
commons. This spectrum of commons includes a whole range of 
different communal organisation that display different characteristics 
traditionally associated with the commons. The category Residual 
Commons is a useful concept to understand communal peri-urban water 
providers. Residual Commons are categorised as,  
Poor communities [that] resort to commons-type arrangements 
for basic services (often in collaboration with NGOs because 
nothing else is available). (Bakker, 2010:181)  
 
These organisations have emerged in the absence of the state, initially 
as coping mechanisms, as suggested by Bakker. My thesis suggests 
that the commons-type arrangements that have emerged in Bolivia also 
serve a social function. DWCs leaders have used their organisations for 
political leverage and influence (see chapter 6). This is not dissimilar to 
Harvey’s commentary that revives the idea of the commons as he 
discusses the organisations that emerge in informal urban and peri-
urban settings when the state fails marginalised communities. In his 
rather polemic work Rebel Cities he argues that in settings such as 
neoliberal Bolivia, where the state did not provide public goods and 
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services, communities begin to work together collectively to provide local 
solutions for the provision of public goods (Harvey 2012), and these can 
be loosely associated with ideals of the commons. Harvey frames the 
rekindling of the commons as being a feature of an anti-capitalist 
struggle. He draws on literature relating to the neighbourhood 
associations of El Alto – La Paz, and their role in the anti-capitalist 
rebellion of 20039. DWCs have emerged under similar conditions and 
continue to persist under the socialist government of Evo Morales, and 
thus it is difficult to categorise these informal commons-based 
organisations as being oppositional products of neoliberalisation. These 
are organisations that have used their control over water resources for 
broader political endeavours. DWCs have thus emerged to loosely 
resemble residual commons, but they have social and political potential 
beyond their (often compromised) capacity to provide water in the peri-
urban interface.  
 
The autonomous community?  
Ideas of the residual commons present an autonomous ideal of the 
community. In practice there are various processes and actors that have 
forged and galvanized drinking water committees in peri-urban areas 
over time. Some of these processes can help to understand why the idea 
of communal water management is used to contest reforms around the 
right to water. Indeed, several Latin American academics have cast 
community-based water providers broadly as autonomous sites of 
resistance not only against the neoliberal state, but also the socialist 
state of Evo Morales (Crespo 2011), even framing them as anti-state 
forces (Zibechi 2007). This discourse is heavily politicised, and masks 
the diverse processes and partnerships with the state and NGOs that 
have forged community-managed water services in peri-urban zones.  
 
Some community-led water systems are the products of decentralising 
policies during the 1990s that worked to develop the role of the 
                                                
9 See Lazar, 2010 for further discussion of theis process and rebellion 
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community in basic service provision in Bolivia, and other countries in 
the global south. Harvey (2012) has critiqued the decentralisation, 
arguing that ‘decentralisation and autonomy are primary vehicles for 
producing greater inequality through neoliberalisation’, and that the 
community systems that were forged are not built on the same premise 
as the commons-based community organisations of El Alto. In other 
instances, the advance of church and NGO-led development during the 
1990s and 2000s formed part of the neoliberal agenda worked to nurture 
community level institutions in rural and peri-urban areas (Bebbington, 
2004). These are not grass-roots initiatives; instead they reflect top down 
initiatives to encourage community-led development or basic service 
provision. Often community- driven projects for water and sanitation in 
peri-urban and rural areas are more complex and are driven by 
community or NGO initiatives, and may even eventually receive funding 
from the state (see McGranahan and Satterthwaite 2006). It thus 
appears that there is a wide spectrum of community providers that have 
emerged as a result of different state and non-state processes and 
initiatives over time. To frame peri-urban DWCs as products of the failure 
of neoliberalism or as autonomous anti-state forces obscures the diverse 
institutions and processes that have forged and entrenched the 
community’s role in water governance over time. In principle, reforms to 
the Bolivian water sector since 2006 set out to recognise and incorporate 
community water provision. This thesis will explore to what extent these 
reforms really enhance and develop community-led water provision.  
 
The community as a site of resistance 
The purpose and impact of state interventions with community water 
providers in peri-urban Bolivia has been controversial. Indeed, universal 
water reforms that threaten local water systems have historically been 
contested in Bolivia, most famously during the Water War (Olivera 2004). 
In light of these rebellions, it would now be politically unviable to adopt 
reforms that openly appropriated communal providers. Instead reforms to 
the Bolivian water sector now appear to be willing to engage with and 
develop the capacity of community water providers across the board. 
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Nonetheless, for some, attempts by the state to nurture the community as 
a provider, through decentralising policies or public-public partnerships 
for water provision in peri-urban and rural areas have been greeted with 
mistrust, and judged to be symptomatic of the encroachment of the state 
(Crespo 2010, Crespo 2012, Bustamante et al 2012).   
In countries like Bolivia, where the state is weak and community 
managed water system, in their diversity and complexity 
implicitly question established public/private dichotomies. It is 
useful to consider the function of the right to water as part of the 
politics of the Bolivian state. In this regard, I argue that the 
principle of the human right to water serves to legitimize, in a 
new context, the long history of the destruction of the commons 
of water by the Bolivian state. (Crespo 2010: 2, author’s 
translation) 
 
The right to water has thus been framed as part of a broader struggle for 
power as the state seeks to exert influence and control over water 
providers that have historically been beyond the remit of the state. 
Reforms that seek to incorporate community water provision within water 
provision and governance are thus framed as part of a political endeavour 
to co-opt non-state providers. This reflects the long history of water 
governance in Latin America more generally, which has over time been 
critiqued as exclusionary, and part of a socio-political process whereby 
certain actors exercise power over others (Castro 2008: 75). This has led 
to conflict between the state and different groups, particularly under 
neoliberalism (Castro 2003). However, there are evidently concerns that 
reforms linked to the right to water in Bolivia have the potential to 
continue processes that have historically been observed under previous 
governments. 
 
Others have argued that encouraging community participation in water 
provision is a method by which the state can shun its responsibilities to its 
citizens. Swyngedouw has argued fervently that government approaches 
that advocate community-led water provision can serve to re-enforce 
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socio-spatial inequalities10, creating a two-tired system where the state or 
a private sector provides water in the centre of the city, but which lets the 
state off the hook, particularly in poor peri-urban and urban communities. 
Crespo and Laurie (2006) have further critiqued pro-poor approaches led 
by the Bolivian state that have developed the role of the community in 
water provision and small-scale technology, but without sufficient 
resources. In practice this has worked to re-enforce regional inequalities 
and has led to calls from social movements for increased autonomy for 
pre-existing community water providers. This highlights the difference 
between state-led community development initiatives to develop water 
systems, and the rights of pre-existing community water systems and the 
uses and customs that have developed around these systems. 
 
Community- state relations 
Across the Andes, states including Bolivia have adopted a policy of 
formalising communal irrigation systems through licensing and registering 
water rights, thus legitimising informal providers. This process has only 
recently started with potable water providers in Bolivia. Some have 
argued that reforms to incorporate the commons and protect the water 
rights of rural communal irrigation systems in Bolivia is tantamount to the 
creation of private property rights over water (Bustamante 2007). In this 
sense, therefore, they are no different to the private concessions granted 
over large areas in Bolivia in the late 1990s and early 2000s. In practice 
Bustamante has demonstrated that granting legal water rights to 
communities has increased incidences of conflict between communities 
that share the watershed and further, between domestic, agricultural and 
industrial sectors11. There has been limited research into the impact of 
                                                
10 Erik Swyngedouw H2O does not exist? Retooling the Washington Consensus. 
Presentation at STEPS Water and Sanitation Symposium: Some for All? IDS, March 23 
2011 
	  
11 Rocio Bustamante Presentation Normativas Hídricas y Autonomías, Cochabamba, 
April 15th 2010 
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formalising the rights of potable water providers in peri-urban areas, and 
the broader impact this might have on relationships between communal 
water providers, particularly when water resources are scarce.  
 
The potential of co-production  
Licences and registries are one method by which the state has started to 
engage with peri-urban DWCs to improve access to water. The state has 
also engaged with DWCs to co-produce water services, this has also 
been done with the support of development agencies or NGOs. Co-
production has been defined as when “citizens can play an active role in 
producing public goods and services of consequence to them” (Ostrom 
1996: 1073).  Theories of co-production suggest that state – citizen 
partnerships can be enhanced through cooperation for the development 
of service provision, which in turn can be empowering for the citizen 
groups involved by enhancing their political capabilities (Mitlin 2008). 
This is particularly pertinent in peri-urban regions where communities 
have historically been marginalised by the state. 
 
There is extensive literature that demonstrates how communal 
participation and management of water resources can help communities 
tackle wider social inequalities (Swngedouw and Heynen 2004; Roth et 
al 2005). However, there is a fine-line between community-led provision 
that is empowering, and that which serves to re-enforce socio-spatial 
inequalities, which in turn further marginalises already marginalised 
communities. Satterthwaite et al (2005) have argued that for co-
production strategies to be effective, they cannot fall into the trap of 
relationships between citizens and the state based on patronage. 
Partnerships for co-production in peri-urban areas offer an alternative to 
the established public-private dichotomy that dominated the water sector 
during the 1990s and 2000s. This thesis considers how DWCs have 
lobbied to co-manage and co-produce water services in the Zona Sur 
through an association of DWCs, and whether partnerships for the co-
production of water services could help improve access to water in peri-
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urban areas and ultimately contribute to the recognition of the right to 
water. 
 
Peri-urban processes and sustainable water provision 
This thesis also examines some of the implications that the promotion of 
the right to water by the Bolivian government has had on the 
sustainability of water provision in peri-urban areas. In the following 
section I reflect on conceptualisations of peri-urbanisation and 
sustainable water provision. I then argue that there are important aspects 
of sustainability that have been considered but which are often 
underexplored in peri-urban areas. These present specific challenges and 
opportunities to enhance sustainable water provision in peri-urban zones. 
My focus on the sustainability of water provision in peri-urban areas 
emerges over the course of my thesis, and is developed empirically in 
chapter 7 and 8. It further, serves to bind together several strands of 
research. 
 
To date the international campaign to recognise the right to water have 
not directly addressed issues of sustainability goals. The primary focus of 
the campaign has been on enhancing social justice, specifically to 
improve access to water. Some commentators have highlighted how the 
right to water might even have negative implications for the environment, 
and how anthropocentric human rights might undermine the ‘rights of 
nature’ (Bustamante et al 2012). Drawing on the work of the STEPS-
centre, this research recognises that enhancing environmental integrity 
and social justice are the core elements for building sustainability (Leach 
et al 2010). This understanding forms the foundation for this thesis’ 
exploration of sustainable water provision in peri-urban areas. Enhancing 
local environmental integrity and social justice is dependent on social 
processes and power relations, which in the case of this thesis are the 
product of distinctive peri-urban dynamics. These processes dictate what 
is important to sustain and for whom.  
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There are specific social processes and power relations that define peri-
urban areas and that have shaped how people access water in the 
region. The historical and political context that recognised the health 
benefits of providing water and sanitation in the North, embodied in the 
‘bacteriological city’ (Gandy 2006). Political and technical reforms to 
deliver universal water and sanitation provision was developed in the 
North during the 19th century in response to cholera outbreaks and 
illnesses related to poor sanitation that affected the rich and poor equally. 
This model has not been replicated in the south provision has thus been 
uneven as the state has tended to develop water and sanitation services 
for the wealthy and middle-classes, these in turn reproduce socio-spatial 
inequalities (Swyngedouw 2005); these are particularly pronounced 
between urban and peri-urban areas.  
 
The process of urban expansion in the global south has meant the 
extension of the urban into rural areas. On the surface the peri-urban 
interface is characterised by its heterogeneity; it has urban and rural land 
uses, employment opportunities and housing types (McGregor, Simon et 
al. 2006). It is also characterised by complex informal and formal 
processes. The peri-urban interface is a dynamic, transitional space 
(Douglas 2006) that facilitates flows of people and resources between 
urban and rural zones (Tacoli 2006), populations are changeable and 
transitory. Conceptually it is the product of political process, specifically, 
globalisation and economic liberalisation that drives urbanisation (Roy 
2002). It is a service zone that supports burgeoning urban centres; it 
provides an informal and unregulated sink and a source that has been 
intrinsic to urban development during recent decades (Tacoli, 2006). The 
peri-urban interface is often characterised by environmental degradation, 
poverty and social injustices, many of which are pushed to the 
peripheries by the city centre. Peri-urban settlements often emerge as 
informal, illegal communities, to begin with at least; and are thus often 
not formally recognised as citizens (Allen et al 2006). In practice this 
means populations don't have access to the same rights as those living 
in the centre of the city (Swyngedouw 2005; Harvey 2006).  
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Unregulated and unplanned peri-urbanisation, and the absence of state 
provision leads to the manifestation of urbanisation without infrastructure 
in the peri-urban interface12. Informal water provision in the peri-urban 
interface has thus been characterised as overlapping and archipelago-
like (Bakker 2003 ) or fragmented, ad-hoc and disjointed (McGregor, 
Simon et al. 2006). Communal water providers operate individually or in 
cooperation with others, they can work alongside private vendors and 
often share water sources such as aquifers. This thesis endeavours to 
build on some of the literature relating to communal water providers in the 
peri-urban interface, with in-depth ethnographic research on the 
development, role and capacity of informal water systems in peri-urban 
communities Peri-urban dynamics are distinctive, and they affect the 
institutional sustainability of local water providers. Institutional 
sustainability is one of the elements of sustainable water provision that I 
explore in chapter 7. 
 
Until recently, peri-urban communities in Bolivia have existed with little 
contact with the state; indeed it was common for peri-urban regions to be 
marginalised by the state and criminalised as a result of their illegality 
(Goldstein 2004). More recently, as the outlook of governments has 
changed, it has been contended that the peri-urban interface is a 
somewhat fuzzy (Arabindoo 2005)  and intangible zone for planners. As 
there is limited demographic and cartographic data available, and the 
informal providers are often poorly understood by the state, this makes it 
particularly difficult to tackle water provision. Informal water providers 
have continued to develop over time with the support of the community, 
local NGO initiatives or entrepreneuring individuals. This has also been 
the case in peri-urban Cochabamba. Bakker and Kooy (2008) have 
drawn on the Splintering Urbanism thesis (Graham and Marvin, 2001) to 
argue that water provision is not splintered in the global south simply 
                                                
12 Adriana Allen, Lecture Urbanisation without Infrastructures in African Cities: Who Fills 
in the Gap? SOAS Feb 23 2012 
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because of the privatisation of water provision. Instead they demonstrate 
that water provision has always been splintered because there has never 
been a universal water provider for urban regions. Indeed, community-led 
providers often pre-date privatisation (as is the case in peri-urban 
Cochabamba), and have, in some cases, proven to be effective in 
meeting localised needs (Allen et al, 2006), but their capacity and role in 
the community has not been fully explored. The above processes can 
clearly be identified in peri-urban Cochabamba. 
 
The idea of sustainability is often absent from debates about the peri-
urban interface. Marshal et al (ibid) have challenged the widespread idea 
that peri-urban regions are “inherently unsustainable” (ibid: 2), and 
propose a sustainability agenda for the peri-urban interface that attempts 
to marry the brown agenda of the urbanists and development planners 
and green agenda of the environmentalists. This builds on STEPS centre 
ideas of sustainability that promote sustaining systems with enhanced 
environmental integrity and increased social justice (ibid). 
 
There is a long literature on sustainability and sustainable development 
since Bruntland (1987) and before. The debate on sustainability has 
been chequered (see Leach et al, 2010, Adams 2001), and this thesis 
has limited scope does to discuss the history of the debate in any  
length. Scoones, Leach et al (2007), posit that sustainability must be 
recognised as a boundary term. Current discourses around sustainability 
have become normative; while sustainability is associated with certain 
social, environmental and economic principles they are often poorly 
defined and are adapted to context (ibid: 34). In taking this approach, 
this thesis acknowledges the complexity of sustainability which can be 
challenging but also useful (Adams 2001). Recognizing the contested 
meanings of sustainability confirms its politicised nature; different actors 
will frame sustainability and sustainable development accordingly 
(Scoones, Leach et al. 2007).  
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Mehta et al (2007), recognise that the sustainability of water provision 
generally relates to the durability of the water system over time, but also 
contend that normative ideals of Sustainability exist, and these often 
relate to developing and meeting the environmental and social goals of 
particular groups (Leach et al 2010:21). General definitions relating to 
sustainable water provision have remained broad, but several NGOs and 
development agencies have developed frameworks that reflect their 
experiences in the field and to structure on-going interventions (UNICEF 
and WHO 2011; WaterAid 2011). Water Aid define sustainable water 
provision as follows, 
…Whether or not WASH services and good hygiene practices 
continue to work and deliver benefits over time. No time limit is 
set on those continued services, behaviour changes and 
outcomes. In other words, sustainability is about lasting benefits 
achieved through the continued enjoyment of water supply and 
sanitation services and hygiene practices. (WaterAid 2011) 
 
This broad statement on sustainability does not outline what lasting 
benefits should be achieved for whom, but it is often defined by more 
definite criteria such as those outlined in the following pages, these are 
often used to develop frameworks for sustainable water provision. 
 
NGOs and development agencies working on water provision have 
developed frameworks for exploring the sustainability of water provision 
at the level of the community. The focus of these frameworks has tended 
to be on rural community water systems that are developed with outside 
assistance. These are not necessarily programs that work to support 
pre-existing community systems; instead they have developed water 
systems from scratch. Further these frameworks have been developed in 
relation to systems that have been developed in rural settings, and not 
the peri-urban interface. They often consider institutional sustainability, 
environmental sustainability, financial sustainability, and social 
sustainability which is often loosely defined (Unicef and WHO 2011, 
WaterAid 2011).   As highlighted in the preceding pages, the peri-urban 
interface throws up specific challenges and opportunities for 
sustainability that should be recognised. This thesis will explore four 
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particular issues that affect the institutional sustainability of DWC-driven 
water provision in peri-urban areas. Building on established water 
provision sustainability frameworks, and because of their pertinence in 
peri-urban zones, I consider challenges and opportunities linked to 
institutional sustainability and enhancing local environmental integrity. I 
also explore challenges and opportunities linked to equitable access to 
water and the shaping impact of local power relations.  
 
Institutional sustainability 
It has been contended that community led water provision is never truly 
autonomous, and that communities are prone to losing interest in 
managing water systems (Shaw for WaterAid, 2012). The communities, 
in turn, become dependent on institutional support from outside actors to 
develop and maintain the management and infrastructure of the 
community-led system (Carter 2009; Shaw for Water Aid 2012). In this 
thesis I argue that some of the specific peri-urban social dynamics can 
undermine or present opportunities to build the institutional sustainability 
of water providers in peri-urban zones. The impact of these dynamics on 
water provision in peri-urban zones is often underexplored. Furthermore, 
the power relations and political leverage of maintaining community 
control of water systems in urban settings is often overlooked. This 
thesis argues that these power relations have the potential to affect the 
institutional sustainability of water providers, 
 
Enhancing environmental integrity 
This thesis explores the potential that emerging partnerships between 
DWCs and the state have to build local environmental integrity in the peri 
urban, although the focus is specifically on water sources. Water Aid 
(2011) suggests that the environmental sustainability of water provision 
is dependent on an integrated focus that promotes water systems that 
protect both the quality and quantity of a water sources, and also 
addresses sanitation. This contention reflects the experiences that Water 
Aid has had working with rural water providers. In peri-urban areas 
where water sources such as aquifers are shared with other 
 52 
communities, industry and/or farmers (see Allen et al 2006), protecting 
the quality and quantity of the source is challenging. In broader literature 
relating to environmental sustainability in peri-urban areas there has 
been a tendency to focus on the spread of illegal settlement and their 
inhabitants as principle causes of environmental degradation here 
(Aguilar 2008). This tendency to blame the poor for environmental 
degradation does not account for the physical and socio-economic 
linkages between peri-urban areas and the urban centre, and sources of 
contamination and degradation therein. Marshall et al (2010) argue that 
“informal coping strategies… may result in a worsening situation of 
marginalisation and environmental degradation or may be potential new 
pathways to Sustainability” (50). This thesis explores the socio-economic 
relationship between the zona-sur and the centre and the affect that has 
on sources of and types of environmental degradation in peri-urban 
areas. 
 
Equitable provision 
Building equity as an element of sustainable water provision has been 
central to the work of several NGOs working to improve water provision 
(Unicef and WHO 2010). This idea has not been extensively developed 
in relation to community water providers in peri-urban areas. Instead the 
focus is often on ensuring that there is equitable access within the 
community, and that the most marginalised groups have access to water 
(Water Aid 2011). The capacity of drinking water providers to provide 
equitably is explored in this thesis, but it also goes a little further. It 
argues that community-led water provision can provide marginalised 
peri-urban communities with the political leverage to challenge broader 
inequities that exist between peri-urban areas and the city centre. 
 
 
 
 
 
Power relations 
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The power relations that define how people access water are often 
missing from debates relating to sustainable water provision. Who has 
power over and control of water resources and services and how to they 
maintain or attain it, and how do the often asymmetric power relations 
between diverse state and non-state actors affect water provision? In this 
thesis I highlight how communities have struggled to retain control and 
influence over water services and provision over time. An estimated 
67% 13  of water provision comes from informal and community-level 
providers in Bolivia, and on-going power struggles between communities 
and the state continue to shape structures of water governance. This 
thesis considers how power relations linked to the juridical plurality that 
characterises the peri-urban interface and much of Bolivia affect water 
provision in the peri-urban. There is a wide range of indigenous, union 
and collective organisations that operate at the level of the community to 
manage many aspects of everyday life alongside the state. They operate 
according to diverse rules and laws and range from indigenous councils 
that control all aspects of community life, to newly emerging Drinking 
Water Committees that manage water provision in the peri-urban. The 
continued presence of community-led institutions in any form is a result of 
the weakness of the state, but also a consequence of policies that have 
deliberately incorporated indigenous and collective institutions. Both state 
and non-state institutions have borrowed institutional norms from each 
other over time, and have thus come to resemble one another. This has 
led to a sort of ‘interlegality’, that is when the state borrows from the 
juridical elements of non-state actors, and vice versa (Assies, Haar et al. 
2000). These processes embody the interplay and impact of these 
dynamic power relations between state and non-state actors. 
 
 
This chapter has set out the theoretical framework in which my research 
is located. I have engaged with discussions relating to the 
conceptualisation and implementation of the right to water, the 
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development and potential of community-led water providers; 
conceptualisations of the peri-urban interface and peri-urban water 
provision, and ideas of sustainable water provision in the peri-urban. I 
build on these foundations throughout my thesis and as I address my 
research questions, however, I begin by setting out my methodological 
approach. 
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Chapter 2.2: Research Methods 
 
In this chapter I set out my methodological approach. In early October 
2008, I travelled to Bolivia to begin my fieldwork. It takes at least 35 
hours to reach Cochabamba from London if you are on a budget. My 
journey zigzagged from Heathrow to Madrid, then from Madrid to Miami. 
Then, after a nine-hour wait in Miami airport, I caught the overnight flight 
to the capitol La Paz. Six hours later, just as the sun started to rise in 
Bolivia, the aeroplane began ascending into the world’s highest airport, 
El Alto-La Paz. El Alto is on the edge of the Altiplano, the plateau to the 
west of the Bolivian Andes, and the enormous Andean Peaks of 
Chacaltaya and Huayna Potosi. As I stepped off the aeroplane, the sight 
of the surrounding snow-capped mountains, along with the altitude of 
over 4000 meters, took my breath away. I shuffled through immigration, 
haggled for an open-ended visa, collected my bags and took a taxi down 
town to the bus station. Despite feeling tired and breathless, I found the 
view on descending into this city nestled in the Andes awesome (see 
figure 1). 
 
Figure 1 La Paz from El Alto 
 
Forty-five minutes later, the taxi dropped me at the bus station. As I 
struggled to buy a bus ticket I realised that my Spanish would need some 
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tweaking, and that I would have to learn some Quechua14 and Aymara15. I 
missed one bus, because in a typically British fashion, I observed what I 
thought was a queue.  In fact, I quickly learnt that in Bolivia bus seats go 
to those who push their way on board first. I finally got on the bus and 
found a seat next to a woman who offered me a plastic cup of Coca-Cola 
and some coca leaves for the altitude. This experience set the chaotic 
and contradictory tone that would characterise my fieldwork. 
 
By the evening I had arrived in Cochabamba, the city located in the 
eastern slopes of the Andes that would become my fieldwork base. I 
decided to take a room with a family to begin with as I settled into the city 
and ended up renting a room from the Pacheco family in a suburb a few 
kilometres outside the centre of the city. The Pacheco household had a 
modest but sprawling house that accommodated members of their close 
and extended family and the occasional lodger. They became good 
friends and a surrogate family who really supported me as I set about 
establishing myself in Cochabamba and planning the task ahead of me.  
 
After spending a few days in the city I began revising my research 
schedule and decided to divide my research into three phases, in order to 
make the somewhat daunting task ahead seem more manageable. Each 
phase would inform the next with some obvious and intentional overlap. 
The first phase involved extending my theoretical framework to include 
some of the extensive literature relating to my thesis that is only available 
in Bolivia; I simultaneously began mapping actors and institutions relating 
to my thesis. The second phase focussed on interviewing the identified 
representatives from the state, public utilities, NGOs and social 
movements that were relevant to my research and to map their role, 
relationships and influence in the water sector; I also began observing 
meetings and workshops for communal water providers and activists. 
During the third phase I undertook a peri-urban ethnography with a 
                                                
14 Indigenous language spoken in Cochabamba and further south 
15 Indigenous language spoken in La Paz and the highlands 
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community and its drinking water committee on the peri-urban Zona Sur 
of Cochabamba. 
 
I adopted a predominantly qualitative approach to fieldwork. Qualitative 
methods “allow us to know people personally and to see them as they are 
developing their definitions of the world” (Taylor and Bogdan 1985:8). I 
tended to rely on ethnographic methods, although I recognise the 
limitations of the ethnographic approach, specifically that “Power and 
history work through ethnographies” (Clifford and Marcus 1986:7). I 
recognise that I have interviewed selected civil servants, gathered the life 
stories and observed the day-to-day activities of some members of one 
community. I have then sifted through the data collected and presented 
some of these stories to construct this thesis.  In that sense, I 
acknowledge that “ethnographic truths are thus inherently partial, 
committed and incomplete” (ibid) and thus there are histories and views 
that are not revealed by this thesis. Nonetheless, I chose to undertake an 
ethnographic approach in an attempt to provide a rarely undertaken, in-
depth account of how people manage and access water in peri-urban 
areas and why.  
 
There are many different processes that have led to the unequal water 
access that characterises Cochabamba today. There are various reasons 
why the peri-urban poor receive dirty water from informal providers and 
people living in the urban centre receive cheap, clean water from the 
state, but you will not find all of these reasons in one place. I therefore 
undertook a multi-sited ethnography (Marcus 1995) which gave me the 
scope to conduct research on different scales and in different settings, 
and to interview civil servants, activists, NGO workers, community 
leaders and peri-urban residents. In the following pages I set out the 
three phases of my fieldwork in more detail, and the diverse processes 
that shaped my methodological approach over time. 
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Extended literature review, institutional and actor mapping  
October 2009 – January 2010  
I began my fieldwork with some classes to improve my Spanish language 
skills and to learn a little Quechua. I simultaneously began developing my 
literature review to make it more inclusive of academic and grey literature 
from Bolivia that is unavailable or difficult to access from abroad. Libraries 
such as CEDIB (The Centre for Information and Documentation in 
Bolivia) had extensive newspaper archives, old short run books and 
social research and commentary on Bolivia that has been undertaken in-
house. Meanwhile the collections maintained by NGOs, such as Agua 
Sustentable, and public institutions, such as the Misicuni dam, were also 
invaluable. Furthermore, Bolivian publishers such as Plural, published 
short runs of Bolivian books that are only available in Bolivia. This initial 
period was enriched by discussions with Bolivian academics, researchers 
and NGO workers who became informal advisors throughout my 
fieldwork and ultimately partners in papers, panels and projects.  
 
During this first phase I set out to develop a general understanding of the 
factors that shape water provision in the municipality of Cochabamba. 
While my focus was on peri-urban areas I felt it was important to 
understand the development of the various communal providers that have 
evolved in the municipality and how they provide water. While 
undertaking my fieldwork I deliberately lived in three different barrios in 
the municipality, two of which were supplied by community water 
providers (albeit very distinctive community providers), while the third 
barrio was in the centre and received water from the public municipal 
utility SEMAPA. During the initial period of fieldwork I was living with the 
Pacheco family in an ex-mining barrio where water was supplied by an 
efficient DWC (Drinking Water Committee) that was incorporated into the 
local Residents’ Association. This barrio was home to teachers, shop 
owners and professional classes. These people were not poor but neither 
were they wealthy like those living in the north and the centre of the city. 
Living in this barrio provided me with the opportunity to understand how 
an urban community can manage water effectively. It also gave me the 
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opportunity to hone the ethnographic method that I would use more 
extensively in the Zona Sur, namely participant observation in community 
and water meetings, conversations and semi-structured interviews with 
barrio elders, community leaders and vecinos (barrio residents) and 
attendance at municipal meetings for communal water providers. Through 
these methods and by living in the barrio, I was able to develop an 
understanding of how a middle class suburban communal water provider 
operated and to what extent it could meet the water needs of its vecinos. 
This barrio was not, however, the focus of my investigation, but it 
provided a case study to contextualize the experiences of poorer barrios 
in peri-urban areas: my findings are documented in chapter 5. 
 
I undertook my first of many interviews in this barrio; the very first 
interview was behind a shop counter with the then president of the 
Resident's Association. Interviews take different forms according to the 
data one is looking to gather, the informant and the setting, (Rubin and 
Rubin 2011). In this thesis there are ethnographic interviews, oral 
histories, life histories, academic interviews and investigative interviews 
that have been undertaken in front rooms and backyards, on porches, at 
universities, on marches, at the back of meetings, in the backs of cars 
and in the various cafés in the centre of Cochabamba. Each interview 
requires a different approach, a different agenda and often a different tact 
and tone. 
 
In order to understand the development of the ‘human right to water’ in 
Bolivia, I wanted to map out the diverse actors have influence, or seek to 
have interest in the water sector. I came to focus on the role of four 
different types of actor: state actors, NGOs, social organization and 
community leaders and community members. I did this by speaking to 
local water activists and academics and by observing and participating in 
public meetings and protests about the state of water provision in the 
region. I planned to engage with these actors during the second and third 
phases of my fieldwork. The second part of my research would focus on 
interviewing state actors, NGOs and social organisations, while the third 
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phase focussed on engaging with community leaders and community 
members in peri-urban areas. In practice there was some overlap 
between these phases. 
 
Understanding state and non-state actors in the water sector 
February – April 2009 
In order to understand the development of reforms to the water sector, I 
began the process of reviewing documents and interviewing state actors, 
namely members of the Ministry for the Environment and Water 
(MMAYA) and affiliated governmental institutions, and NGOs that focus 
on the water sector. Most of these semi-structured interviews were 
conducted in Cochabamba or La Paz. La Paz is the administrative capital 
of Bolivia and where most governmental departments and many NGO 
offices are located. It was always difficult to predict whether or not I was 
going to be able to secure an interview with a civil servant. First, it was 
difficult to arrange formal meetings in advance and I would often be told 
to simply visit the Ministry for Water and the Environment (MMAYA) when 
I was in town, or call a day in advance of our meeting to firm up a time.  
There is no widespread culture of email use amongst civil servants in 
particular. Some had personal Hotmail or Gmail accounts, but tended not 
to use email frequently and responded better to phone calls or face-to-
face meetings. Having said that, civil servants in central government 
would rarely commit to meet weeks in advance. This would often lead to 
last minute cancellations or no-shows, other times I could turn up for a 30 
minute appointment and be asked to spend the day at the ministry or 
department and introduced to a whole host of staff who ‘wanted’ to be 
interviewed. Conversely public institutions such as the public water utility 
SEMAPA who have had much bad press over the years are unwilling to 
be ‘cold-called’ for an interview. It took me over a year to secure an 
informal interview with the director of SEMAPA for the southern zone, 
which only came about though a recommendation from a friend.  
 
I was always aware of my positionality as a young, single, foreign woman; 
this was equally as important when interviewing civil servants as in the 
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barrios of the southern zone. The impact of the gender and age of 
researchers on fieldwork, specifically ethnographic research has been the 
subject of extensive anthropological and feminist commentary 
(Whitehead and Conaway 1986; Bell 1993). Male civil servants were 
often keen to meet at the end of the day at a restaurant, as opposed to in 
their offices, or would suggest a meeting at the cinema, something that 
none of the male researchers I came across in Bolivia had experienced. 
While I am sure being a foreign woman gave me more access to male 
civil servant and longer interview slots, boundaries had to be established 
from the outset; meetings at the cinema crossed those boundaries. 
Meanwhile in the barrios of the southern zone, residents were bewildered 
as to why I was on my own and childless. Men tended to be thrown by the 
fact I had been ‘allowed’ to come to Bolivia on my own; one local taxi 
driver asked me why my father and partner had let me travel 
unaccompanied. Meanwhile, the women in the barrio were concerned 
that I didn't have children, I was told several times that, at the age of 
twenty eight, I had left it too late to have children, or needed to rush back 
to my partner to have babies as I was getting too weak to have children. 
While being a woman made it easy to undertake household interviews 
with women who stayed at home during the day, at times, not having a 
family and being single made women in the barrio more wary of me. 
 
Interviews with NGOs and social movement representatives working on 
water were easy to arrange and here I was less of an oddity. While some 
people were obviously suffering from Water War fatigue, having 
described the events to so many students and activists over the space of 
ten years, most were happy to talk after hearing that I did not want to 
discuss the events of 2000-2001. There are alliances between certain 
NGOs and social movements, with some more partisan to the state than 
others, which only become apparent after spending some time in the 
field. I was often asked whether other NGOs or social movements were 
‘working’ on my project or how they had responded to certain questions. 
Some NGO workers and activists became friends, and it was typical to 
find that the views and opinions on water reforms can vary depending on 
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whether they are talking on behalf of their organisation or as an 
individual. The difficulties of informants who become friends and the 
impact that has on the data collected, is often discussed by 
anthropologists, some have argued that the roles of friends and 
informants are ultimately incompatible (Hendry 1992). I found that this 
was inevitable, and by reminding informants and friends of boundaries, 
fortunately I did not encounter any problems. I have, however, 
anonymised the identity of informants and places; this is discussed in 
further detail in the ethics section of this chapter. 
 
I gathered data on how the right to water has been developed into policy 
and the reforms to the water sector since 2006 using a variety of data and 
methods. I triangulated interviews with civil servants with data found in 
municipal government and MISICUNI and NGO archives. I also began 
reviewing public policy documents including the Plurinational Constitution 
of Bolivia, The National Plan for Basic Sanitation and The National Plan 
for Development and grey material passed to me by civil servants. In 
order to get a better idea of how the state was consulting with peri-urban 
communities, and civil society at large I observed government 
consultations and social movement workshops and meetings around 
proposed reforms to the sector. By this point many of the actors present 
were familiar with me and so I was often advised about or even invited to 
such events.  
 
In April 2010 there was a weeklong event to commemorate the Water 
War, this brought local water NGOs and activists together, alongside 
international water activists to Cochabamba. This event included lengthy 
discussion about what the right to water should mean in Bolivia and how 
this relates to international campaigns to recognise the right to water. 
Locally there were a variety of public meetings to discuss the progress, or 
more often the lack of progress, that had been made by SEMAPA to 
improve access to water in the Zona Sur. Observing these meetings 
provided me with a great opportunity to hear a range of different opinions 
on the reforms that had been made to the Bolivian water sector to date. 
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Furthermore, I was able to conduct several on the spot interviews with 
Canadian and European water activists who are not always readily 
available. 
 
During this period, I spent time travelling across the municipality, 
specifically within the peri-urban southern zone to gather data on water 
provision and interventions, in order to develop maps and also to 
familiarise myself with the diverse methods of water access in the barrio. 
The first map sets out the diverse formal and informal water providers, in 
Cochabamba (see Map 2). The also mapped water sources and 
infrastructural or capacity building projects by the state or NGOs relating 
to water and areas that are subject to water poverty. This involved 
collating data from municipality records and NGOs, and field visits with 
engineers and project coordinators to large projects like the MISICUNI 
dam project, and smaller local projects like the EU-funded PASAAS 
projects to improve DWC infrastructure.  
 
Water provision in the peri-urban interface: ethnography 
April – September 2009 
Anthropologists have a notable tendency to think small… It 
sometimes helps even for the general planner to look at what his 
plans and generalizations mean on a small scale, the scale of the 
individual human being or the neighbourhood. (Peattie, 1968: 1-2) 
 
There is a shortage of in-depth ethnographic work in peri-urban 
communities, and more specifically the capacity of peri-urban DWCs and 
their role within the community. There is wealth of similar work on rural 
irrigation systems, but there is limited research on drinking water 
committees in the peri-urban interface. Research on water provision in 
the Zona Sur of Cochabamba has tended to be short-term and focussed 
on collecting quantitative data (Wutich 2006) or based on interviews with 
social movement leaders, but the voices of peri-urban vecinos are often 
absent (Terhorst 2003). The state and social organisations frame the 
development and capacity of drinking water committees according to their 
respective political agendas. During the third and most challenging phase 
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of my fieldwork I had planned to undertake a traditional ethnographic 
methodology to explore the role and capacity of the DWCs, and further, 
the opportunities and challenges to enhance sustainable water provision 
in peri-urban areas. In practice, I needed to adopt a more reflexive 
approach. Ultimately, I supplemented the qualitative approach with 
quantitative data to attain the detailed and rich understanding of water 
provision in the peri-urban interface that I was seeking. 
 
When I began planning this phase of fieldwork, I asked the advice of 
several NGOs operating in the Zona Sur. They told me to be mindful of 
my positionality as an unmarried foreign woman, and the preconceptions 
held by both men and women. Moreover, several NGO workers advised 
me against the work I was trying to undertake. They told me I was putting 
myself at risk of being robbed or worse, and naturally at first I heeded to 
their concerns. Often, NGOs that were based in the wealthy northern 
suburbs of the city would send workers down in taxis to undertake half-
day workshops, but few of them stayed any longer or lived in the 
communities they were working with. I spoke to volunteer organizations 
and churches that housed volunteers in the Zona Sur, and they gave me 
a different perspective, and encouraged my work. The secretary of the 
DWC in the barrio where I undertook my fieldwork was instrumental in the 
development of this stage of my fieldwork, and put many of my fears into 
perspective. I asked her whether the Zona Sur was dangerous and she 
responded “Yes, definitely!” somewhat taken aback, I asked her why and 
what I could best do to protect myself. At this point she lifted up her 
trouser leg to show me the scars she had on her ankles from nipping 
dogs in the barrio, and told me I would be safe if I was quick on my feet. 
These words, (along with a rabies vaccine booster) gave me renewed 
confidence to undertake ethnographic work in the southern zone.  That is 
not to say undertaking work in the Zona Sur was not challenging. I 
approached fieldwork delicately and with caution. The barrios of the Zona 
Sur are closed spaces; communities are often fragmented and prone to 
conflict between and within communities. It took time to understand why 
and how these conflicts arise. I tried to align myself with some of the most 
 65 
neutral members of the barrio. A Franciscan priest from the United 
States, who had been living in the barrio for almost two decades, and 
who was respected by the community become a friend and an advisor 
and helped me to maintain a favourable position within the barrio. 
 
Gaining a sort of acceptance in the barrio 
I intended to find a community with a water committee that was part of an 
association of DWCs called ASICASUDD-EPSAS, and so began 
attending their weekly workshops for all water committee secretaries, with 
the intention of finding a committee that had been with the association for 
some time, and had been in receipt of funding and/or been the focus of 
some of the government reforms. I was cautious about going through the 
ASICASUDD-EPSAS as far as I suspected that there were a few ‘show-
case’ committees that academics, NGOs, activists and researchers 
regularly engage with. Goldstein (2002) has highlighted how there are 
some communities in the Zona Sur that are the subject of regular 
interventions and investigations because they are harmonious 
communities that are well organised (ibid, 489). In an attempt to meet and 
engage with a few DWCs, I attended a few of the regular ASICASUDD-
EPSAS meetings and workshops for member DWCs. Here I met Doña 
Petra, the secretary for the DWC Agua Sur that operates in barrio 15 de 
Febrero, and she invited me to help out with some work. I heard nothing 
for a few weeks and then I received a call around 5.30am one Sunday 
from Doña Petra, asking me to come and help clean the water tank out. 
The following week I shadowed her on her debt-collecting rounds. Having 
demonstrated that I was willing to participate, Doña Petra seemed 
somewhat more comfortable with me, and people around town started to 
recognize me.  
 
The barrios of the Zona Sur are difficult places to get to grips with. 
Demographic information is unreliable or non-existent and often 
undermined by the fact that there is a mix of permanent residents and 
vecinos (residents) who are only there for seasonal work or during term 
time for studies. This, combined with a fear of crime and infighting 
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between different parts of the community, means that is a highly 
fragmented group of people (this is discussed in more detail in chapter 7). 
Gaining complete acceptance by the community would be impossible. 
One priest who had been working in the barrio for seven years told me 
over coffee one morning how happy he was to have been invited in for 
dinner by his next-door neighbour that day. They had been neighbours for 
seven years, it had taken that long for them to develop the relationship, 
but this was not unusual, vecinos tended to be suspicious of newcomers. 
Vecinos also tended to work long hours in the city and often lived in 
houses that were surrounded by high gates and walls lined with broken 
glass, furthermore the barrio did not provide many public spaces for 
congregation. Consequently, it would not be unusual to meet vecinos who 
didn't know the names of their neighbours, let alone invite them in for 
coffee. In sum, and in light of the fragmented nature of the community, 
the best I could hope for in this barrio was a sort of acceptance. 
 
I began to volunteer at the school run by the Franciscan priest during the 
mornings, in an attempt to get to know the barrio; this was also where I 
stayed while I was working in the barrio. I was eventually given a formal 
introduction by the Residents’ Association, firstly over tea with the 
president of the community, and then I was invited to come along to one 
of their monthly resident meetings. This was a difficult first meeting. I was 
given the opportunity to present my research plans to the barrio, and the 
president then encouraged all residents to cooperate with me where 
possible. There was, however, an expectation from the outset that I might 
be able to bring money in, either for projects, like the NGOs working in 
the region, or otherwise perhaps I would want to invest in a vecino's 
business. I imagine that most vecinos were disappointed to find out I had 
mainly come to the barrio to ask lots of questions. Ultimately, people were 
friendly and encouraging, and during this meeting the barrio president 
volunteered the help of the eldest students at the local school, who were 
just turning 18. The following week I met with a class of them and offered 
to pay a small group of students to work as my research assistants. They 
refused the money. I have a feeling it was because they had been told to 
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do so by the head teacher. Consequently, I offered to help them prepare 
for their English exam, which was to put on The Three Little Pigs as a 
play in front of the school: the exchange worked well. Having research 
assistants was helpful because they knew the barrio so well. They knew 
who lived where, and the residents recognised them. They also spoke 
Quechua (the local indigenous language) and some of the barrio elders 
spoke little Spanish, so they were able to translate for me. We began 
fieldwork by trying to understand the history of the barrio. The barrio had 
been an informal illegal barrio for several decades and there was no 
written history of it. We collected a series of life histories with barrio 
elders, sometimes individual sometimes with groups so that they could 
re-call events collectively. I then began systematically interviewing the 
key members of the water committee and spending more time shadowing 
Dona Petra to understand more about the committee. I interviewed the 
leaders of the Residents' Association in order to understand how they 
related to the water committee and understand the challenges to 
improving water provision in the barrio. I conducted one-on-one 
interviews such as these independently at their places of work or at their 
houses. I spent several days shadowing the principle engineer in charge 
of upgrading the water system under the EU PASAAS project which 
funded rural and peri-urban potable water and sanitation projects, in order 
to understand some of the technical challenges in developing a water 
system for peri-urban areas. 
 
Finding methods that work in the peri-urban interface 
After having spent a few weeks in the barrio I was contacted by an MA 
student at the state university in the city, Universidad Mayor San Simon 
(UMSS). The student, Maria Renee, was conducting research in the 
barrio around waste and waste disposal. We discussed the difficulties of 
working in the barrio and collecting data using ethnographic methods, 
particularly observation, participant observation and informal 
conversations. Vecinos live in houses that are built behind large walls and 
rarely use the limited dusty public spaces during daylight hours because 
many work in the centre of the city or often because it is too hot. During 
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the evening people stayed indoors because they were scared of crime. I 
was able to conduct some participant observation in the weekly 
neighbourhood meetings and monthly water committee meetings. These 
provided a useful but rare glimpse of the community dynamics, and the 
conflict that existed between the water committee and the neighbourhood 
association, or the discontent that some vecinos felt towards the 
neighbourhood leader. Nonetheless, often less than a quarter of the 
barrio participated in these meetings. I had to find a way to reach the 
other vecinos.  
 
Maria Renee and I discussed the value of developing a short survey. The 
last census had been conducted over a decade ago in 2001. As 
discussed in further detail in chapters 6 and 7, there is limited 
demographic data available about the Zona Sur. NGOs, communities and 
social organisations often hold more recent demographic data, but it’s 
often incomplete, or not readily available. State planning for the peri-
urban interface is then based on data or projected data from the 2001 
census. The data that is available is contested, with varying figures on the 
population size of Cochabamba, which has been particularly challenging 
for planners. This thesis has used the projected figures from the National 
Institutive for Statistics in Bolivia, but also recognises that during the last 
census many parts of the Zona Sur were not populated. Furthermore, 
during the last census many of the barrios were still ‘informal’ and so 
socio-economic data was not gathered on them. Some researchers that 
have worked in the Zona Sur for some time have contended that data 
from the next census is likely to have a negative impact on the socio-
economic status of the Zona Sur (Los Tiempos 2012). After pressure 
from social movements for a long-over-due census, the state has 
endeavoured to gather data from every household in Bolivia in order to 
develop updated and comprehensive demographic and socio-economic 
data on the whole population (on census day no one is allowed to leave 
their house or else they face a £300 fine). 
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This is problematic in the peri-urban interface, a region that has been 
subject to large influxes. We thus felt it would be useful to gather more 
up-to-date household data, and so we designed a household survey that 
incorporated questions for both our research, the survey contained 
questions not dissimilar from those in the census, and a section on water 
use and waste disposal. We recognised the limitations of a survey 
approach in the peri-urban interface, first, because of the transient nature 
of the population, which is often seasonal; second, we recognised that 
the informal nature of the barrio could mean that some residents may not 
give us accurate answers, many are wary of civil servants or those they 
suspect may be working with the state. Traditional state-citizen 
relationships were weak in the barrio. Vecinos often rely on informal 
private and collective basic service providers and have little allegiance 
towards the state, or reason to cooperate with state and non-state actors 
who have let them down in the past. I was advised by the priest and 
NGOs working in the region to expect that residents might exaggerate 
levels of poverty or the failings of the water committee in an attempt to 
secure funding or supplies to improve the community or the water 
system. We tried our best to mitigate this by receiving an official 
introduction to the community by the head of the community and by 
making clear that we had no allegiances with the state and had no access 
to funds or resources to improve the community. I wanted to reciprocate 
the helpfulness of the community to some extent, and so I took part in 
several community workdays. This included one project to paint the 
community hall and clear the land around it. I went to the local market 
and bought paint supplies and then helped with the painting and clearing. 
While I could not provide funding for the new sports hall they wanted, I 
could show willing by buying building supplies, and helping at workdays 
when required. 
 
We began administering the survey with the help of the students once it 
was approved by the neighbourhood council on the promise we could 
give back some of the household survey data to the residents. While the 
data gathered was useful and could be helpful for future comparative 
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research in the region, this method mainly helped us to overcome the 
‘closed’ nature of the barrio. Once we were inside, people were often 
willing to sit and talk and we were able to enlist informants who were 
willing to undertake more in-depth semi-structured interviews around 
access to water and how it had changed over time. This method also 
allowed me to explore and confirm some of my understandings of trends 
in water use in different parts of the barrio. This method was originally 
employed to get a feel for the barrio; however, we were able to gather a 
sizable data set on water use in the barrio. Our sample size was 100 out 
of 293 households and we collected 82 responses. We were aiming to 
engage with a third of the barrio. We split the barrio up into 10 zones and 
randomly knocked on 12 households in each zone. In some areas we had 
a better response than others and in chapter 7, I set out some of the 
socio economic disparities between regions of the barrio, which may have 
contributed to a lower response rate in some regions over others.  
 
I adopted a snowballing method (Biernacki and Waldorf 1981) of 
sampling for more in-depth semi- structured interviews as I got to know 
the barrio in more depth and became acquainted with more people. I also 
undertook further group interviews, when I was looking to establish the 
history of the barrio. This meant that different vecinos were able to 
corroborate dates and jog each other’s memory. Without a formally 
documented history of the barrio it was important to triangulate the data 
that we had gathered to build the barrio’s history. Furthermore, it was 
obviously an enjoyable activity for vecinos to reminisce about the past. 
 
I collected most of my data on weekends when people were most likely to 
be in.  During the week, I complemented the survey data and interviews I 
was conducting with participatory rapid appraisal methods such as 
transect walks, and walk and talk session with community members who 
stayed in the barrio and those who were part of the water committee or 
working for the committee. I undertook walk and talk sessions, where I 
would ask stay at home mothers, members of the water committee and 
local engineers who were upgrading the water system to walk and talk 
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me through the barrio. I did this in order to get a multi-dimensional 
understanding of the region. All in all my approach drew on many 
different methodologies and entailed much trial and error, however, I think 
that the dynamic and challenging nature of the peri-urban interface 
requires a more reflexive approach to research design and 
methodological approach.  
 
There is limited formal cartographic and demographic data on the zona 
sur. I have drawn on a lot of the data gathered during transect walks, 
along with grey material, such as community maps and surveys, held by 
the community, to build multi-dimensional maps of the barrio. This 
allowed me to understand how residents used public spaces and regions 
that are thought to be more dangerous than others, and furthermore, 
some of the socio-spatial inequalities that are not visible on a satellite 
image or map. 
 
Water provision was contested in the barrio. The DWC had control of the 
water system, but the Residents’ Association sought to undermine the 
DWC and wanted control of the system. This meant that maintaining 
relationships with the water committee and the residents association 
could be tricky at times. I always explained that I neither worked for the 
committee, the federation nor the residents association, and helping out 
more or less equally at neighbourhood workdays as well as water 
committee workdays was another way of negotiating this. Once again, 
due to the sensitive nature of some of the information disclosed within the 
barrio, I have anonymised the barrio, its residents and the water 
committee. 
 
Follow up 
I re-visited the field in July 2011, after I had started analysing and writing 
up. This was principally to corroborate my findings with some of the 
Bolivian academics I had been working with and also to fill some small 
gaps with supplementary interviews with my informants and field visits. I 
also wanted to share my findings with some of my informants, particularly 
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those working for NGOs in the region, who were keen to hear how I had 
analysed and interpreted their work. In addition I have promised to send a 
summary of my thesis to them once it is completed. 
 
Leaving the field and analysing data 
As my fieldwork drew to a close, I was faced with processing and 
analysing the data gathered. I had collected a diverse data set, including 
extensive grey material and policy documents from the government 
departments and NGOs working in the water sector. I also had formal and 
informal cartographic and demographic data on the Zona Sur that needed 
to be triangulated and synthesized. During the ethnographic phase of my 
research, I had collected 82 household surveys, conducted more than 
100 interviews and filled five personal field diaries with my ethnographic 
observations. This was the most challenging data to analyse; translating 
personal experiences into thesis data is a daunting prospect. I had 
started to generally code the data that I had gathered while in the field, 
and then when I arrived back in the UK I began the process of more 
rigorous coding. Emerson et al (1995) set out how coding comes from 
‘reviewing, re-experiencing and re-examining everything that has been 
written while self-consciously seeking to identify themes, patterns and 
variations within this record” (144).  With time I created clear categories 
into which I needed to clean, organize and classify the data that I had 
gathered (LeCompte and Schensul, 1999: 67). While I have used coding 
software in the past, I decided to code my data by hand. In my 
experience, manual coding was a more efficient method of drawing out 
data and engaging with the text. It also allowed me to begin general 
coding while in the field, where I often did not have access to my laptop. 
Once I had gathered my data I began the writing up process by writing 
vignettes, small ‘impressionistic accounts’ (Van Maanen, 2011: 103) that 
helped me develop ideas and chapters. 
 
Ethics 
On the surface, the data gathered in the field was not of a particularly 
sensitive nature. However, I was undertaking predominantly ethnographic 
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methods in the field that meant I spent a lengthy time in the city of 
Cochabamba and in the Zona Sur, and I drew on the work of Punch 
(1994) and was mindful of the relationships that I developed with my 
informants, their knowledge of the research being undertaken, and how 
the data was then kept and has since been presented. Punch (ibid) sets 
out the need to establish relationships with informants that are not 
exploitative, that are open and not deceptive, and finally that are informed 
and with consent, and that protect the privacy of barrio resident, activists, 
NGO workers and, in some cases, friends. In practice this meant 
undertaking research that required informed consent, after having 
explained the purpose of my research and how and where the findings 
would be later presented. The more time that I spent in the barrio, the 
more I became aware that water management was highly contentious, 
and that relationships between the community and different actors, 
including the state, NGOs and social organisations were delicate and 
often contentious. I ultimately decided that it would be best to anonymise 
most interviewees and the name of the barrio and committee where the 
research was undertaken, in order to be able to develop a fuller account 
of the water committee without compromising my informants. There was 
on-going conflict between the DWC and the neighbourhood association 
regarding who should control the water supply in the region, I have thus 
endeavoured not to reveal too much about the individuals, their 
institutions or location. 
 
In keeping with this I have anonymised the water activists and NGO 
workers due to the various alliances that exist between different actors 
and organisations involved in and/or lobbying the water sector.  As 
outlined earlier in this chapter, over time I became mindful of the power 
relations between different actors and had to be careful not to align 
myself too closely with any one institution. Firstly, I was always aware of 
my positionality as a western researcher who had come to a poor and 
marginalised barrio for a short while to undertake ethnographic work. In 
the barrio, there were tensions between the residents association and the 
water committee, and thus I had to be clear that I was not working for 
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either. Community organisations had complex relationships with NGOs 
and social organisations that worked in the barrio or represented water 
committees, I thus had to be discreet with information gathered from 
either. Moreover, certain government agencies and public utilities had 
contested relationships with social organisations and movements 
representing drinking water committees.  
 
This chapter has outlined my methodological approach, and set out how 
this research has unfolded over time. The following chapter provides 
some background to my research, thus contextualising the empirical 
chapters that follow.  
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Chapter 3- Bolivia: A brief overview 
 
Since the election of Evo Morales, Bolivia has developed an international 
reputation as a progressive and radical state. In 2009 the government 
expelled the IMF and the US ambassador (Guardian Editorial 2009). 
Bolivia was the only country that refused to sign the COP 16 agreement 
on climate change on the grounds that it did not go far enough (Solon 
2010). It also hosted the first World People's Conference on Climate 
Change and the Rights of Mother Earth in 2010. Meanwhile, president 
Morales was posthumously crowned the first (and only) World hero of 
mother earth, by the UN General Assembly. Bolivia has also been lauded 
internationally for passing a progressive constitution, which enshrines 
extensive human and indigenous rights (Canessa 2012: 23). 
 
However, in recent years Bolivia has not been without its critics. On 
August 2nd 2012 Amnesty International released a statement. It 
contended that the Bolivian state should recognize the rights of 
indigenous communities in TIPNIS National Park in the Amazon lowlands 
of Bolivia to previous informed consultation on a proposed highway that 
would run through their territory. This statement was the culmination of 
months of protest by local indigenous communities, green activists and 
social movements against a highway that would create a north eastern 
link between Cochabamba to Beni (as part of the IIRSA (Initiative for the 
Infrastructure of Regional Infrastructure in South America)) project. The 
local communities organised two marches of over 300 miles from Trinidad 
to the administrative capitol La Paz to highlight their plight, and to 
demand their constitutional right to consultation on development projects 
(Canessa 2012). The steamrollering of the project by the state without 
consultation undermined the sovereignty and rights of the indigenous 
councils that were supposedly protected by the Bolivian constitution. 
 
The state claims that the road is essential for regional and local 
development, and that the protests are actually the product of a 
conspiracy organized by foreign NGOs (Hines 2011). Meanwhile activists 
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campaigning against the road expressed concerns that it would open up 
the Amazon to further exploitation. They also contended that it is a 
reflection of Brazilian hegemony in the region and that the infrastructure 
serves to promote the interests Brazilian business, as new pathways are 
opened up from east to West. What is undisputable is that the state has 
failed to recognize the indigenous communities’ constitutional rights to 
previous consultation on development projects as enshrined in the 
constitution.  
 
The TIPNIS case reveals how the needs and rights of some groups 
continue to be marginalised in Bolivia even under this supposedly 
progressive government. Furthermore, this is not an isolated case, but 
the most dramatic and notable to date. There are other examples of 
industrial and mining projects where communities’ rights to water sources 
have been overlooked (Moran 2009; Bustamante, Crespo et al. 2011). 
These demonstrate the contradictions in government policy and rhetoric, 
and limitations of the constitutional rights enshrined under Evo Morales. 
Furthermore, these cases highlight the challenge posed by the juridical 
plurality that characterises Bolivia, meaning the existence of different 
normative systems (often but not always indigenous) beyond the 
established juridical norms of the state (Regalsky 2009) that has come to 
characterise Bolivia and has recently been recognised in the constitution. 
 
This chapter seeks to set out the historic context and sequence of events 
that have led to the current political context, the evolution of the policies 
around the right to water and the existence of non-state institutions 
including water providers. It is not possible to understand the current 
context of political reform and water provision in Bolivia, without first 
understanding this socio-political history. I set out Bolivia’s current 
development status, to situate it within Latin America. I then set out the 
regional socio-spatial differences that characterise Bolivia, to situate 
Cochabamba and contextualise patterns of migration. I then consider the 
development of the Bolivian state and its relationships with Bolivians over 
time. I touch upon ideas of indigeneity because I believe this provides a 
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basis to understand recent political movements, and ideas of indigeneity 
in the city in chapter’s 6 and 7. I go on to consider some of the challenges 
and contradictions of the Morales government, which emerge from the 
socio-political history outlined in this chapter.  
 
Bolivia in 2012 
For a period Bolivia’s international reputation was forged around the idea 
that it was the poorest and most unequal country in Latin America. It had 
a track record of political instability and experienced a succession of 
rebellions, uprising, and dictatorships, which gives Bolivia an infamous 
world record for having had 189 coups in the 154 years between 1826 
and 1980 (Clomer, 2001:182). This was followed by a period of intense 
neo-liberal re-structuring under successive governments, which led to an 
almost inevitable public backlash during the early 2000s. In 2005, Evo 
Morales, an indigenous coca growers union leader, and head of the 
Movement for Socialism, was elected as president. This was widely 
heralded as a step change. With the widespread popular support of 
indigenous social movements and unions Bolivia followed in the footsteps 
of Venezuela, Ecuador and Brazil. This was proclaimed by the 
international press to be part of the pink tide of socialism that was 
sweeping the continent; another leftist domino had fallen in Latin 
America. President Morales has ushered in the longest coup-free period 
of democratic political stability in living memory, and has until recently, 
enjoyed widespread popular support from citizens, social movements and 
unions. This political stability has allowed the president to usher in far-
reaching economic reforms including the nationalisation of several major 
industries and constitutional reforms that include a myriad of human, civil, 
political and indigenous rights.  
 
Bolivia is no longer the most unequal country in Latin America, but it still 
ranks poorly on the Human Development Index against its Latin American 
counterparts, only coming in above Haiti, Nicaragua, Honduras, 
Guatemala and Guyana (UNDP 2010). While still poor and unequal, 
things are improving (see UNDP report 2010). The country has enjoyed a 
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long period of sustained economic growth since the early 2000s, and has 
reduced the national debt to below 40% of the GDP from 94% in 2003 
(World Bank 2009). While extreme poverty is declining, over half of the 
population still experience moderate poverty and socio-economic 
inequality is widespread (UNDP 2010). The apparatus of the state is still 
considered to be weak by international agencies (World Bank 2009) and 
a large proportion of Bolivians rely on the informal economy and informal 
basic service provision. This is true in rural, urban and peri-urban 
communities. Furthermore, the state’s failure to develop adequate 
infrastructure has been widely documented (World Bank 2009, UNDP 
2010). Consequently, as evidenced in the water sector there is an 
extensive patchwork of informal providers that have evolved to meet the 
basic needs of Bolivians. The role and capacity of informal providers and 
economies, and the impact they have on the economy and basic service 
provision are rarely recognised by the state or international agencies. 
Indeed if we look at a map of water providers in Cochabamba it only 
reveals the water provided by the public utility SEMAPA (see Map 3). The 
role and capacity of the numerous water committees beyond the centre is 
unknown and unaccounted for (see Map 2). This thesis focuses on the 
logic behind reforms since 2006 that seek to consolidate the role of the 
state in water provision, and how reforms affect informal providers such 
as the peri–urban DWCs. 
 
While government rhetoric suggests a strong re-distributive economic 
policy, which prioritises social spending, Webber (2011) demonstrates 
that social spending between 2005 and 2008 actually declined as a 
percentage of GDP. Although there are direct cash transfer schemes for 
children and the elderly (ibid: 198), spending on infrastructure for basic 
services has been more opaque. At the time of writing there was still no 
funding to expand the public water system in Cochabamba. The National 
Plan for Basic Sanitation highlights the need to secure more investment 
in the water sector, and recently the state has been successful in 
securing loans to develop the sector from institutions such as the Inter 
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American Development Bank which committed $78 million to the sector in 
2012 (MMAYA 2012). 
 
As highlighted in the instance of the TIPNIS, it has become increasingly 
evident that the state is finding it difficult to realise, develop and fulfil its 
constitutional commitment to human and indigenous rights. The state and 
structures of state governance continue to be weak. The economy 
continues to depend on the extractive industries, and Bolivia is at the 
whim of the cross-border development initiatives of powerful regional 
actors like Brazil. 
 
Understanding the regional differences  
One cannot overstress how diverse and varied Bolivia’s physical 
geography is. Although landlocked, it has three distinctive regions: the 
highlands, the lowlands and valleys, and the Altiplano. Each one presents 
distinctive environments and landscapes, with specific natural resources 
and communities. Consequently there are broad and varied physical and 
social challenges that impact on water provision in Bolivia. Cities in 
Bolivia tend to be supplied by municipal- level water providers; however, 
beyond the urban centres, peri-urban communities rely on a range of 
water providers and sources, many of which are informal. The following 
pages briefly outline the general differences between these diverse 
regions and the challenges to water provision in the region. I demonstrate 
that across the country, in diverse settings, the weakness of the state has 
led to the entrenchment of informal community water providers in various 
forms. 
 
The Altiplano (the plateau) is Latin America’s highest plateau. It runs 
down the western flank of the country and is dominated by enormous 
snow-capped peaks and active volcanoes. The Altiplano is also home to 
the world’s highest navigable lake, Lake Titicaca, and the administrative 
capitol La Paz. This region has proven to be particularly vulnerable to 
climate change. Here communities have relied on community systems 
served by glacial melt water from Chacaltaya for domestic and productive 
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uses. Over time the glaciers have melted and receded. Consequently, 
younger generations have moved to La Paz and El Alto in search of work, 
as the agricultural practices of their parents and grandparents become 
unviable (Rosenthal 2009). 
 
The Altiplano runs south along the Andes to the mining regions of Oruro 
and Potosi, down to the salt lakes and on to Chile. These regions are 
exposed, inhospitable and extreme, as captured by the local saying you 
will burn in the sun and freeze in the shade. Oruro and Potosi have been 
mining centres for centuries. Potosi’s mineral riches, along with its 
people, provided the silver that underpinned the development of the 
colonial Spanish empire. The mines would later supply the tin that would 
gild the empires of the country’s tin barons, and supply up to a quarter of 
the world’s tin during the first half of the 20th century (Dunkerly, 1984:7). 
Miners from this region were slaves until the 1940s when slavery was 
abolished. Then in the late 1940s the first mining union was forged. The 
miners were few in numbers compared to the rural peasants, but they 
have, and continue, to wield political power because of the intrinsic role 
that mining played in the national economy.  In 1950 3.2% of the active 
working population worked in the mining sector which accounted for 25% 
of the GDP, meanwhile 72% of the population worked in agriculture, 
cultivating only 2% of the land and worth only 33% of GDP (ibid: 5). Many 
miners relocated to the cities and peri-urban areas in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s (for reasons discussed later in this chapter). The identity of 
the mining communities has carried to the cities, and has shaped the 
DWCs that are the focus of this thesis. This phenomenon is discussed in 
chapters 6 and 7.  
 
Mining continues in the southern Altiplano today. Small mining 
cooperatives eke out the last scraps of metals from mighty mountains 
such as Cerro Rico. Meanwhile larger mines have been established or re-
opened by Canadian and Japanese mining firms looking to extract and 
export silver and copper at scale. Conflicts over water resources in these 
regions are not uncommon. The rights granted to mines such as San 
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Cristobal to exploit subterranean water sources have undermined the 
local community water rights of farmers. In the case of San Cristobal, the 
mine has been proven to deplete and contaminated groundwater sources 
that quinoa growers rely on. Meanwhile the state has yet to honour the 
constitutional rights of communities to consultation on this, or other 
projects and industries that might have social and environmental impacts 
(see Moran 2009 for discussion of this). The experiences of these mining 
communities highlight some of the general hurdles that have impeded the 
recognition of new constitutional rights in Bolivia. 
  
The Valleys are the eastern slopes that descend off the Altiplano. They 
are characterised by their fertile soils and temperate climate. Until the 
middle of the last century there were numerous haciendas in this region. 
Today farming and peasant unions exist where the haciendas once 
stood, some of which have become closely aligned with Evo Morales and 
his party the MAS (The Movement for Socialism). In The Valleys the cities 
of Sucre and Cochabamba are located. Beyond Cochabamba to the 
north-east in the lush hills of the Chapare, resettled miners make up 
some of the formidable coca growers or cocaleros. They grown the leaf 
that many Bolivians chew and hold sacred, but which is also the core 
ingredient for cocaine. The coca-growing unions, that emerged here, are 
where Evo Morales cut his political teeth. They continue to be strong and 
provide some base support for the president’s political party.  
 
The third topography is The Lowlands, the eastern flatlands than run 
east from the valleys. They are expansive, sparsely populated and 
remote. The indigenous populations in these regions have little contact 
with the state, and tend to be organised according to indigenous councils. 
They have come under threat, of late, from development initiatives, 
specifically the IIRSA project. This is where the TIPNIS is, and where the 
proposed highway will run. 
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Being indigenous in Bolivia today 
The following considers ideas of indigeneity in Bolivia today. Peri-urban 
parts of Bolivia are often home to indigenous migrants. Furthermore, as 
will be discussed in chapter 6 and 7, peri-urban DWCs often draw in 
indigenous and mining discourses to develop a sense of community in 
peri-urban areas. Furthermore, Bolivia is often perceived to be one of the 
‘most indigenous’ countries in Latin America, with an indigenous 
president and famous indigenous social movements. It was also host to 
the world’s first indigenous people’s conference on climate change. 
During the 2001 census 62% of the population ascribed themselves 
indigenous, this was the first time that Bolivians could self-ascribe, to be 
indigenous prior to this, one had to speak an indigenous language. The 
majority of those who claimed to be indigenous were living in urban 
centres (Canessa, 2007). This shows that the act of proclaiming to be 
indigenous in the census could be both an expression of belonging to an 
indigenous community, or an individual expression based on political or 
personal ideals. Indeed, Regalsky (2009) has highlighted that less people 
ascribe to a collective indigenous ideal. This is not to make a judgement 
on which is more valid, it is simply to recognise the difference between 
the collective and the individual indigenous.  
 
The term indigenous was quashed to some extent during the 1950s, 
when the term Indian was taken out of the census in favour of the word 
campesino (peasant). This reflected the co-option of the rural peasants 
into union structures as part of the 1952 revolution, and thus ideas of 
ethnicity were supplanted with ideas of class (Canessa, 2008:201) for a 
time at least. The long-term failure of the 1952 revolution (discussed in 
more detail in the following pages) led to the repression of class based 
politics and ideas of indigenous ethnicity which, in turn, led to a revival of 
indigenous movements during the 1970s and 1980s. This revival led to 
the first in a series of marches to draw attention to the plight of diverse 
indigenous movements (Regalsky 2009).  
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Many of the social movements that emerged during this period went on to 
support the election of president Morales in 2005. But over time the idea 
of indigeneity in Bolivia has been essentialized and homogenized in 
popular politics. There are numerous different indigenous communities in 
Bolivia even today, and there has, historically, been conflict between and 
within these groups. During the summer of 2011, conflict arose between 
the indigenous coca-growers that forged Evo Morales, and who support 
the development of a new road through the TIPNIS on the basis of the 
benefits it will bring to the coca trade, and the indigenous communities 
who live in the lowlands and whose livelihoods and local environment are 
set to be overhauled by the project. Moreover this conflict has been 
encouraged by the president himself, who, during a speech to the coca 
unions suggested his comrades might seduce the local indigenous 
women into agreeing to the road.  
If I had time, I would go to the Yuracaré women and convince no 
to oppose (the road). You young men, have instructions from the 
president to seduce the Yuracaré and Trinitaria women, so that 
they don't oppose the road. (Los Tiempos 2011)  
 
There is conflict between diverse indigenous groups, and some of them 
evidently enjoy a better relationship with the state, than those that are 
clearly marginalised and undermined by it. 
 
This thesis does not have the scope to discuss in any great detail the 
extensive literature relating to indigineity in Bolivia. Instead, this brief 
discussion of ideas of indigeneity is included because Bolivia is becoming 
increasingly urban, 60% of the population now live in urban areas. 
However, urbanised ideas of indigeneity are not in keeping with the 
essentialised ideal of being indigenous (Canessa 2006). Collective ideas 
of indigeneity persist in some urban settings (Lazar 2008) but individuals 
can also ascribe themselves as indigenous. Increasingly academics 
working in Bolivia are beginning to consider how ideas of indigeneity, and 
forms of indigenous organising influence social structures in urban and 
peri-urban settings (see Lazar 2008 and Goldstein 2004). This thesis 
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considers to what extent ideas of indigeneity frame and influence the 
development of peri-urban DWCs 
 
In the following pages I take a glance at the political history of Bolivia and 
how it has shaped state-citizen relations. I locate some of the key historic 
legislative reforms that have shaped the water sector over the 20th 
century and that have led to the institutional and juridical plurality and 
inter-legality that characterises every day life in Bolivia.  
 
From independence to the 1952 revolution 
The early Bolivian state was established to serve the needs of a small 
elite. The first constitution of the republic of Bolivia was written in 1826 
following Bolivia’s independence from Spain. It only recognised Bolivian 
men who could read and write, who owned property valued at more than 
200 bolivianos, and who were listed on the civic register. Bolivian citizens 
were thus recognised as the tin barons and mining magnates and the 
land-owning elites in and around the cities. This constitution excluded 
most indigenous Bolivians from civic rights, but developed a structure of 
taxation for indigenous communities (UNDP 2010: 160).  
 
Bolivia’s first (and only) water law was passed in 1906, and reflects a 
similar agenda that protected the interests of landowners and the elites. 
While the law recognised water as a public good, in practice access to 
water was based on private rights to water that were generally tied to 
property and land rights. Rights to water were somewhat ambiguous, but 
skewed in favour of landowners during an era when many of today’s 
Bolivian metropolises were small towns and markets. Landlords (from the 
agricultural or mining sector) with water on their land had usufruct rights 
so long as its use had no direct negative impact on third parties. Anyone 
who could prove that they had been using water for more than 30 years 
could claim the source as their private property.  
 
The Constitution of 1938 now recognised citizens to be men over 21 who 
could read or write, they no longer had to own property however. The 
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constitution also introduced some benefits for indigenous groups, 
specifically the prohibition of slavery and servitude. This reflected broader 
international and national struggles for citizenship and citizenship rights 
(ibid: 159-160). 
 
During the late 1940s things began to change as previously marginalised 
mining groups began mobilising through unions. This formed the basis for 
a leftist political movement in Bolivia that would challenge the status quo, 
and further, was able to co-opt the rural peasants.  
In this phase, Indian and peasant insurgency in the countryside 
would coincide with proletarian activism, galvanized the mining 
districts, to make possible deep changes to society…Aymara 
and Quechua community members… continued to challenge 
landlords over land, labour and the right to education. (Hylton 
and Thompson, 2007:73) 
 
These processes were the precursors to the revolution of 1952, which 
was steered by the MNR (The National Revolutionary Movement), a 
centre-leftist party that consolidated support from the mining bases and 
the peasants, and came into power as a result.  
 
 
1967: Post-revolution 
The MNR government instigated reforms that would lead to the 1967 
constitution that recognised all Bolivians over the age of 18 as citizens, 
regardless of their status, property ownership or occupation. The 
constitution came on the back of a series of progressive political reforms, 
specifically the agrarian reforms that led to the dissolution of the 
haciendas, the abolition of landlords, and the redistribution of land to 
peasants. Some have argued that the agrarian reforms in this period 
were symptomatic of state attempts to replace ideas of indigeneity with 
ideas of class, and that they embodied a broader shift towards the 
assimilation of indigenous communities. Robert Albro contends that: 
Reforms sought to consolidate the country using a homogenised 
mixed identity of the campesino (peasant) and mestizaje, in an 
attempt at building a modern nation. “The ideology of mestizaje - 
the mixture of indigenous with non-indigenous - was paired with 
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the extension of individual citizenship rights to newly designated 
campesinos (peasants) who, it was imagined, would set aside 
their collective cultural investments in keeping with the 
expectations of modernity. (Albro 2010:74)  
 
The post-revolution nation was thus built on homogenization and 
individual rights. 
 
The period of reforms did not, however, lead to the homogenization of the 
population, indeed, it has been judged to have quite the opposite effect, 
leading to further entrenchment of indigenous and communal forms of 
organisation.  
The disappearance of the authoritative figure of the landowner 
after the agrarian reform of 1953 led to the gradual 
reappearance of indirect communal indigenous governments, 
this time described as communitarian agrarian unions (Dunkerley 
2007:74)  
 
In practice, what did this mean? Communal structures of organisation 
began emerging to meet the needs of new farming communities that were 
developing where haciendas once stood. Alternatively, communities were 
forged around systems of irrigation that now served the community of 
farmers which emerged from the peasant labourers which had served the 
haciendas on the outskirts of Cochabamba. In sum, a strong state 
apparatus did not replace the landowner. As a result, deep-rooted state-
citizen relationships were not forged, and communal organisations such 
as agrarian unions and indigenous councils persisted and grew. This 
history has a bearing on the formation of the organisational structures 
and institutions that have continued to develop for water provision 
(irrigation, and potable) in Bolivia until today.  
 
Certain legislative reforms even consolidated emerging communal 
structures. In 1953 the Ley de Reforma Agrarian (Law of Agrarian 
Reform) was passed. This law had far reaching social and political 
consequences beyond how people accessed water (as discussed in the 
preceding chapter). This was the piece of legislation which brought about 
the dissolution of the haciendas and redistributed land as discussed 
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above. It also brought de-facto water rights to previously marginalized 
peasant communities. This had a particular impact on how water was 
managed and distributed in the north and northwest of Cochabamba. 
Communities developed around communally managed irrigation systems, 
these were often formed around pre-existing irrigation systems of old 
haciendas. These irrigation systems are based around dynamic ideas of 
uses and customs that were shaped by the physical constraints of the 
river basin, historic and cultural process, mutually agreed water rights, 
and the long-term management of the river (Flores et al 2004: 11). This 
law thus spurred the development of unions of collective water providers, 
and this model came to influence the development of other associations 
of communal water providers in peri-urban areas, including the DWC 
association ASICASUDD-EPSAS, that are discussed in chapter 5, 6 and 
7.  
 
It has been contended that diverse indigenous and community-led 
institutions prospered after 1952 as a direct result of the policies and 
approach of the MNR government as they sought to recognise and repay 
the union and peasant bases that they were established upon. Xavier 
Abro argues that the period following the revolution:  
…Represent(ed) the longest and most successful attempt in 
Bolivian history to fashion a governing structure that was at once 
relatively solid and inclusive of the population as a whole… The 
1952 national revolution brought about a series of 
transformations in the public and social spheres… the 
introduction of universal suffrage, even for illiterate indigenas… 
the expansion of rural education… new forms of peasant 
unionisation, encouraged by the government and backed by the 
presence of a substantial number of peasant representatives in 
Congress. (2008 18- 19)  
 
One can thus understand the reforms to be part of a broader political 
process that intentionally incorporated and fostered indigenous and 
collective institutions and forms of social organisation. 
 
Gray-Molina (2008) sees this as a period when the Bolivian state 
purposefully engaged with pre-existing social organisations, which 
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contributed to the institutional pluralism that characterises Bolivian society 
today.  
“The national revolution in 1952 transformed the social and 
political scenario… A consequence of increasing pressures for 
popular participation and discontinuous state development has 
been the delegation of spheres of authority and dimensions of 
power to civil-society organisations by means of multiple 
institutional mechanisms. Institutional pluralism is the rule of law, 
- dual power, worker co-management, oversight committees, 
delegation taxation, communitarian justice - have resulted not out 
of state failure but from state’s engagement with civil society and 
its ethnic regional diversity.” (112). 
 
The institutional pluralism that Grey-Molina refers to is akin to the juridical 
pluralism that has been the focus of numerous studies that have emerged 
out of the Andes of late (Regalsky 2008. Assies, van der Haar, and 
Hoekema 2000). Traditionally, juridical pluralism has focused on 
communal indigenous systems that operate territorially and govern 
several aspects of every day life. 
“The issue of juridical pluralism involves the recognition not only 
of different cultures and languages, but moreover it is an explicit 
recognition of different normative systems. This implies the 
existence of different jurisdictions in what might have profound 
effects on the way the state organizes the spatial configuration 
intended to establish its rule over the national territory.” 
(Regalsky, 2008:10)  
 
In this thesis I explore how juridical pluralism now exists but in relation to 
certain aspects of daily life, that the state has been unable to provide, 
such as water provision. These are present not only in rural areas, but 
also in peri-urban areas. 
 
Over time the MNR government grew increasingly conservative, and was 
eventually ousted by the military coup of 1964. This was followed by 
almost 30 years of successive military dictatorships that consolidated 
state capitalism but which curtailed real progressive social reforms. 
During this period the state continued to adopt a light touch approach to 
indigenous communities in rural areas (Yashar 2005). This meant in 
practice that the state did not extend influence into rural and tropical 
areas, and that indigenous councils and union institutions continued to 
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flourish.  Regalsky (2010) argues that during this period indigenous 
communities… 
…Embarked on the ethnification and the reconstitution of local 
power… These processes were taking place in movements that 
had gradually acquired a definite national and class character… 
deep-down ethnification underlines the reaffirmation of the 
commons that plays a vital role in the reproduction of the rural 
indigenous community. (41) 
 
Meanwhile, in developing metropolises such as Cochabamba, the state 
pursued policies of exclusion towards the emerging informal settlements 
flourishing on the fringes of the city (Goldstein, 2004). In the absence of 
the state, migrants from indigenous communities or mining unions who 
had moved to these regions began organising at the level of the 
community for local development and for the provision of basic services. 
As demonstrated in chapter 6 and 7 of this thesis, the creation of unions 
and indigenous ayulls (indigenous councils) was not replicated in peri-
urban areas, but many migrants were accustomed to organising 
collectively in the absence of the state as a result of the historical 
processes outlined above. 
 
 
1980s: Economic crisis and neoliberal reform 
Migration to cities such as Cochabamba during the 1980s and 90’s was 
driven by the neoliberal economic policies. These were proscribed by the 
IMF as a remedy to the Bolivian economic crisis of the 1980s. By 1985 
inflation was running at 25,000% (for a full discussion of the reasons 
behind this see Dangle 2007, Postero 2006), that same year, under the 
guidance of Jeffery Sachs, the first phase of intensive structural 
adjustment reforms was rolled out. This began with the New Economic 
Policy of 1985 and the now infamous Decree 2I060 that led to the 
privatisation of the national mines. The international tin market had 
collapsed and so the national mines, which had been the biggest source 
of state income, were sold off. Consequently, during the late 1980s 
20,000 miners were ‘re-located’, along with their families, leading to one 
of the biggest demographic upheavals in recent Bolivian history (Gill 
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1997). Unemployment continued to rise until the early 1990s as further 
national mines were sold or closed, the public sector was streamlined, 
and the continued global economic downturn led to closures in other 
areas of industry. It is estimated that at least 45,000 jobs were lost 
between 1986 and 1991 (Hylton 2007: 95). This led to dramatic social re-
organising as miners and their families, along with farmers who had been 
hit by the economic crisis, migrated to the cities, and the fringes of cities, 
such El Alto above La Paz and the southern zone of Cochabamba, in 
search of work.  
 
There has been a tendency to presume that the displacement of rural and 
mining communities to the fringes of cities, has led to a reproduction of 
the strong tradition of collective organising which characterises them. 
(see Zibbechi 2010, Terhorst 2004). This presumption will be explored in 
more detail in chapters 6 and 7. Here I argue that while communities are 
organising collectively to provide water services, the communal 
organising observed in the Zona Sur of Cochabamba is different to that 
observed in rural and urban areas because it focuses on one basic 
service. There are numerous collective entities that operate to provide 
basic services here, from refuse collection to education, but they are 
fragmented and overlapping, and often don't correspond with the 
geographical boundaries of one barrio. Some are the result of state 
initiatives and some are the result of grassroots or NGO-led impulses, 
this is discussed in further detail in chapter 5. This structure of 
organisation is a result of the second round of neoliberal reforms that 
were implemented in the 1990s. 
 
Neoliberal reforms during the 1990s were less intense than those that 
came before and focussed on decentralising state control and 
streamlining the state. The decentralisation and diffusion of state power 
to pre-existing social structures, including ayllus and neighbourhood 
associations, commenced through the LPP of 1994 (Law of Popular 
Participation). The LPP set out to: 
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 …Recognize, promote and consolidate the process of Popular 
Participation articulated by indigenous communities, rural and 
urban life in legal, political and economic life. (de Lozada 1994: 
Art.1). 
 
In practice this meant that communities could access per capita funds for 
local development initiatives.  
 
In practice, these reforms have been assessed to be part of an approach 
that intended to build local groups to reduce “…the pressure on the state 
and break up the burgeoning social and union organisations, such as the 
Bolivian Trade Union Confederation” (Arbona, 2008: 28). Reforms were 
built on ideas of multiculturalism and were in keeping with broader 
neoliberal policies adopted across Latin America during this period 
(McNeish 2006). As outlined by Boelens;  
State downsizing, decentralization is seized upon by central 
governments to lighten their responsibilities and strengthen their 
legitimacy and control at the local level… the previous 
(neoliberal) Bolivian government explicitly stated that the core 
purpose of decentralization was to re-establish state authority 
over society. (Boelens 2008: 321)  
 
This was particularly useful in regions where historically, the state has 
had little or no legitimacy, specifically the rural and increasingly 
illegitimate peri-urban regions of Cochabamba (Goldstein 2004). 
 
The LPP has also been interpreted as being a method of exerting state 
influence over non-state organizations (McNeish 2006). Policies of 
inclusion during this period co-opted indigenous leaders into state 
bureaucracies and extended the influence of the municipality into rural 
and indigenous communities, in an attempt to extend the influence of the 
state according to the development of Foucaultian governmentality. This, 
however, had a limited impact on established indigenous forms of 
organizing (Dunkerly 2007). These reforms also endeavoured to break up 
class-bound social movements, they encouraged the development of 
local forms of organising and identity, and relatively autonomous forms of 
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local governance, which inadvertently became outlets for the expression 
of alternative political discourses (Arbona, 2008:28).  
 
Tapia (2008) continues in a similar vein by contending that the LPP 
reforms, that encouraged local structures of governance, had unintended 
long-term consequences and created the conditions for the emergence of 
alternative forms of organising with more agency, that he terms 
‘constituent power’ (ibid 164-165). Tapia defines ‘constituent power’ as “a 
degree of fluidity in the existing social and political order” and states that 
it “thereby creates the conditions for reconstituting the social order by 
means of change in political forms” (ibid 161). In essence, reforms that 
focussed on streamlining the state and decentralising power away from 
the central state and into communities, and pre-existing communal 
structures of organisation, provided indigenous communities with some 
room for manoeuvre. They also provided the space to exert political 
agency in an attempt to achieve social change. The weakness of the 
state and galvanization of community and indigenous organisations has 
been linked to some of the manifestations of discontent (as seen in the 
Water War and the Gas Wars) that characterised the early 2000s, and 
the demise of the neoliberal period. In sum, these social movements and 
uprising were able to unfold because of the weakness of the state at the 
time.  
 
2000s: Rebellion 
Hylton sets out how (2007: 149) neoliberalism in Bolivia entered a period 
of decline in 1997 and transitioned to a phase of crisis by the year 2000. 
This is evidenced by an intense wave of indigenous and union-led 
insurgencies. The first prominent rebellion was the Water War. The Water 
War has to be located and contextualised within the broader political 
history of the state; however, it was the symbolic ignition for a cycle of 
insurgency that rejected neoliberalism in Bolivia (see Olivera and Lewis 
2004, Shultz and Draper 2009 for full discussion of this).  
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Bolivia had been under pressure from the World Bank to privatise 
Cochabamba’s water supply since the mid 1990s, as a precondition of 
IMF and World Bank debt relief packages (Schultz and Draper 2009). In 
1999 the state contract was awarded to the sole bidder Bechtel which 
was granted sole rights to all the water sources in Cochabamba including 
the aquifer in the region (the legislative reforms that led to this are 
discussed in further detail in the following chapter).  
 
Part of the concession was the development of the Misicuni dam building 
project. The cost of this project and the ruling against subsidies by the 
state for water customers led to water price increases of up to 200% for 
some communities within 2 months of the concession being granted.  The 
contract also threatened to undermine the community-managed water 
and irrigation systems, based on ideas of mutual aid and traditional uses 
and customs that had developed around, and increasingly in, the peri-
urban fringes of the city (see Crespo 2003). Protests began in 1999 and 
brought rural irrigator communities, Cochabambinos from the urban 
centre and wealthy northern suburbs, and, some water committees from 
the Zona Sur (an urban mythology that I scrutinise in more detail later in 
this thesis) together. These protests were to develop into the Water War. 
This urban-rural alliance that became known as the Coordinadora del 
Agua has been widely acclaimed for its horizontal organising structures 
that overcame class differences (McNeish 2004).  
 
This thesis does not discuss the intricacies of the events between 2000 
and 2001, this has been done thoroughly by several commentators 
(Nickson and Vargas 2002; Assies 2003; Crespo 2003; Shultz 2003; 
Bustamante 2004; Olivera 2004; Laurie 2005; Perreault 2006; Spronk 
and Webber 2007; Schultz and Draper 2009). I refer to it only to 
contextualise the impact that the social movement and civil unrest has 
had on the legitimacy of informal water systems in the municipality today. 
The Water War was the first in a series of rebellions against reforms that 
threatened to undermine established systems of environmental 
governance (Perreault 2006, 151). It was followed by further uprisings, 
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notably the Gas Wars (see Webber and Spronk 2007) and smaller 
uprisings such as the movement in defence of El Oro Azul (Blue Gold) 
that resisted the exports of water to Chile (see Mamani, 2005). These 
social movements, including the Cordinadora del Agua proved pivotal in 
the support that they provided to Evo Morales during his election 
campaigns. 
 
The Rise of Evo Morales and MAS 
Postero (2010) describes how the failures of multiculturalism to tackle the 
racism and deep-set inequalities that were a feature of Bolivian society 
during the 1990s led to the emergence of indigenous parties and political 
leaders (ibid 24). The MAS (Movement for Socialism) led by Evo Morales 
was the most successful of these. The story of how a coca union leader 
rose to become the country’s first indigenous president has been covered 
in great detail (see Webber 2012 for further discussion). While Morales 
lost the 2003 election he gained ground as a result of the growing 
insurgencies and manifestations and was subsequently inaugurated as 
president in 2006. Webber (2010) argues that the MAS began as a 
political instrument with radical anti-imperial foundations, but had become 
more pragmatic and reformist by the time that the election was won. 
 
Nonetheless the international press rushed to declare that his election 
heralded a revolution, and was part of the pink tide that was sweeping 
across the continent that had been so thoroughly neoliberalised during 
the 1990s. However, with time an increasing number of Bolivianists from 
diverging political camps, have suggested that political reforms since 
2006 do not mark a radical departure from the neoliberal politics of the 
past (see Webber 2010, Bebbington and Bebbington 2010, Hines 2011, 
Crespo) nor have they embodied the public sentiments that had 
characterised the rebellions between 2000 and 2001. Dunkerly (2010) 
encapsulates the sentiment and asks: 
Is it, then, at all sensible to talk of a ‘revolution’ that was at least 
six years in the making and that had yet to deliver, in the form of 
materially implemented public policy, striking changes in the 
human condition? This may, indeed, be tantamount to a 
 95 
promotion of rhetoric and popular ambition over substantive and 
lasting change. (142)  
 
Of late, the continuity between the neoliberal state and Evo Morales’ 
Plurinational state has become increasingly evident.  
 
Following Morales’ election, Bolivians developed and passed an 
ambitious constitution that guarantees Bolivians a range of human and 
indigenous rights (the process behind this will be discussed in relation to 
water in the following chapter). Furthermore, and similarly to Ecuador, the 
state is being restructured around ideas of plurinationalism. The concept 
of plurinationalism has framed political reforms and the campaigns of 
indigenous movements in the Andes since the 1990s. The concept is 
premised on the state recognising other indigenous ‘nations’ within the 
established nation state. In Ecuador it has become a political concept 
with some agency, as discussed by Jameson: 
 …The maturation of the concept has allowed the indigenous 
movement to take a principled and dynamic position, challenging 
existing political structures and parties” (2010: 71)  
 
The term has been used in the Bolivian constitution since 1994, but has 
gained ground since Evo Morales’ election, as he has introduced reforms 
based on recognising the rights and territories of indigenous people, 
regions and municipalities (Gustafson 2009). 
 
The discourse of plurinationalism is now widespread across the Andes, 
but there remain concerns about how and to what extent autonomy for 
diverse indigenous groups, regions and municipalities can be realised in 
practice. As outlined by Gustafason, plurinationalism,  
…Speaks of robust redistributive social rights rooted in a strong state 
alongside with equally robust indigenous rights. The question is whether 
plurinationalism can reconcile both indigenous rights and strong state 
sovereignty… (2009: 991) 
 
The contradictions in Buen Vivir 
The Bolivian state is now seeking to roll out extensive social reforms but 
continues to rely on expanding its extractive industries to fund the 
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reforms. Consequently there are now two competing paradigms that 
shape development in Bolivia, those are Buen Vivir or Vivir Bien (living 
well) and El Gran Salto Industrial (the great industrial leap). The TIPNIS 
case highlights the contradictions that have emerged since Morales’ 
election in 2006 and which exist between the government’s conflicting 
development paradigms. 
 
Buen Vivir is based on the premise of living well as opposed to living 
better.  This is best understood as an anti-capitalist Andean development 
paradigm also based on indigenous principles of living well in nature 
(Gudynas 2011). Buen Vivir is in-keeping with the state’s commitment to 
defending indigenous rights and communal forms of natural resource 
management, and the rights of indigenous communities to participate in 
local development issues. It is a very potent ideology amongst indigenous 
social movements. Conversely, Bolivia is one of the poorest countries in 
Latin America that has historically been the victim of the resource curse, 
and thus has little agency to resist the regional infrastructural 
development program being pushed by Brazil. El Gran Salto Industrial 
forms part of a broader discourse of Andean Capitalism, a phase of up to 
50 years that the vice president Garcia Linera has argued is necessary 
before Andean socialism can be recognized (Garcia Linera 2006), and 
extensive social and economic reforms can be implemented. In the mean 
time the rights of indigenous communities, and local community forms of 
organization, such as the communities in the TIPNIS are being 
compromised. This is not the only example, throughout Bolivia there are 
insurgencies against the continued presence of multinational corporations 
who control the extractives, and the development of mega dams across 
the Amazon basin. These are also as part of the IIRSA project that 
threatens local communities and the environment of the TIPNIS. These 
protests are endemic of growing discontent amongst the social 
movements and electorate that supported Evo Morales’ first and second 
election. There are contradictions between the constitution which 
enshrines so many indigenous and human rights, and the continued 
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pursuit of economic development goals premised on the policy of 
expansion of the extractives and the industrial sectors.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to briefly set out the historical creation of the 
Bolivian state, and the historical events that have led to Bolivia’s current 
political reforms. It has also attempted to set out how reforms have 
shaped relationships between Bolivians and the state, and the 
emergence of the juridical plurality that characterises the state today. 
Above all this chapter has attempted to set out the historical, cultural and 
political context which has led to circumstances that have created the 
current reforms around water, and the informal providers that have 
emerged in peri-urban areas. The following chapter discusses how the 
right to water has shaped reforms to the water sector since 2006 and 
been contested by some. 
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Chapter 4:  Reforming the Sector  
 
In this chapter I set out the legislative and policy context to the reforms 
that have been implemented in the water sector since 2006, under the 
banner of the human right to water. While Bolivia has played a key role in 
the international movement to recognize the right to water, the concept of 
the right to water has been controversial at a national level because it has 
the potential to undermine community-led water provision in both rural 
and urban settings (Crespo 2010). Theoretically, it has been contended 
that the right to water can be compatible with community-led water 
providers if there are appropriate legislative and policy frameworks in 
place (Bakker 2007). In this chapter I demonstrate how Bolivian water 
activists are concerned that reforms which attempt to actualise the right to 
water are symptomatic of the encroachment of the state, and that they 
will impinge upon the autonomy of community-led water providers.  
 
The concept of the right to water remains (perhaps deliberately) opaque 
in Bolivia. A legislative framework to implement the aspirational reforms 
of the government has not been drafted. The human right to water in 
Bolivia is thus best understood as a banner under which extensive 
reforms have been undertaken since 2006. These reforms endeavour to 
universalise and improve access to water. They include the creation of a 
central Ministry for Water, (now the Ministry for Water and the 
Environment or MMAYA) and the appointment of a Water Minister. A new 
instiutionality has been forged around water that seeks to consolidate 
state control over water provision in a country where a large proportion of 
water providers are unregulated.  
 
There are few comprehensive figures on community water providers 
across Bolivia. This thesis draws on figures used by the state. It is 
estimated that 74% of the population has access to water (MMAyA 2008), 
however, there are many diverse providers that provide water services. 
The Ministry for Water and the Environment claim that they that they 
know of at least 1000 water providers in Bolivia ranging from community 
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water providers to urban water utilities, but only 27 of these are formally 
regulated by the state (MMAYA 2012). Meanwhile Agua Sustantable and 
SENASBA (National Service for the Sustainability of Basic Sanitation 
Services) contend that there could be over 28,000. (Campanini 2007, 
SENASBA 2009).  While there are no comprehensive figures on all 
drinking water committees and water systems managed by OTBs 
(decentralised resident’s associations), the state estimates that 1.2 million 
people living in peri-urban areas rely on these community-level providers 
in Bolivia (PNSB; 2010). Community providers are formally recognised by 
the state, and will be supported through a new multi-scaled regulatory 
framework, and the institutions, which will support and develop small-
scale water providers such as DWCs in rural and peri-urban areas.  
 
In this chapter, I demonstrate that while rhetoric supporting community-
led water provision colours policy documents such as the PNSB (National 
plan for water and Sanitation), and new institutions have been forged to 
develop a range of non-state providers, including community providers, in 
practice the state has not devolved sufficient control of resources to 
community-managed providers to improve local water systems. In 
practice reforms have actually focussed on centralising and securing 
state control over the water sector, as part of a process of 
(re)nationalisation (which the current government has embarked on). This 
chapter contextualizes reforms to recognize the right to water within the 
broader policy and legislative landscape that has shaped how people 
access water since the first and only water law, written in 1906.  
 
The Water War and the right to water 
The people of Cochabamba became famous as the David that ousted the 
Goliath of water privatisation, the Bechtel-led Aguas del Tunari 
consortium, as a result of the Water War that began in 2000. The private 
concession was annulled as a result of the protests, and provision 
returned to the municipal water provider SEMAPA in 2001. The original 
Water War unfolded on the streets of Cochabamba, but it has carried in 
the international imagination as a result of the numerous studies, books, 
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documentaries and feature films that followed. It also became the poster 
child of the anti privatisation movement that spawned the campaign to 
recognise an international human right to water. But how did that process 
unfold, how did a very localised campaign that brought irrigator groups, 
unions and urban citizens to the street in defence of local water systems 
and resources, and against the privatisation of water provision, come to 
be the poster child for the international campaign for a universal human 
right to water?  
 
One of the first mentions of the human right to water in relation to the 
Water War occurred in the immediate aftermath. In December 2000, 
representatives from the Council for Canadians, The interior Alliance and 
the Assembly of First Nations, Public Services International, The 
International Forum on Globalization, members of the Coordinadora del 
Agua, who had been at the centre of the Cochabamba Water War that 
year, Bolivian social movements, NGOs and members of the public came 
together for a week of water-related meetings and events in 
Cochabamba. It was during this meeting that the Cochabamba 
Declaration was signed. This was the first declaration by a coalition of 
international water activists that set out the objective that the state should 
be responsible for guaranteeing the human right to water. 
 
The Cochabamba Declaration 
1. Water belongs to the earth and all species and is sacred to life, 
therefore, the world's water must be conserved, reclaimed and 
protected for all future generations and its natural patterns 
respected. 
2. Water is a fundamental human right and a public trust to be 
guarded by all levels of government, therefore, it should not be 
commodified, privatized or traded for commercial purposes. These 
rights must be enshrined at all levels of government. In particular, 
an international treaty must ensure these principles are non-
controvertable. 
3. Water is best protected by local communities and citizens, who 
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must be respected as equal partners with governments in the 
protection and regulation of water. Peoples of the earth are the 
only vehicle to promote earth democracy and save water." (Broad 
2002: 273) 
 
The Cochabamba declaration was made in the presence of activists from 
the Water War, but what is striking about it is that the Cochabamba 
declaration is not representative of the core demands expressed in the 
Water War; specifically protecting community-led water systems in rural 
and peri-urban areas and building spaces for citizen participation in public 
utilities, (see Oliver and Lewis 2004). 
 
Instead, the declaration focused on the role of the state in guaranteeing a 
universal human right to water, to be implemented by an international 
treaty. During informal discussions with activists I was told that the human 
right to water was not one of the principle demands of the Water War. 
Indeed, during my time in the field I became aware that the campaign to 
recognize the human right to water was becoming increasingly unpopular 
amongst water activists in Bolivia who had been involved in the Water 
War. 
 
Box 1. Bolivian water movements  
 
The Coordinadora del Agua para la vida (Coordinator of Water for 
Life) brought together trade unionists, irrigator groups, and 
representatives from community water systems (urban and rural), 
students and activists in opposition to the privatisation of water 
services and appropriation of community water systems and sources. 
Oscar Olivera was one of the principal figureheads of the movement. 
The Coordinadora went on to support the election of Evo Morales but 
over time both the movements and figureheads such as Olivera have 
come to oppose the state.  In the decade that followed the Water War 
the momentum behind the water movement has diminished. The 
movement has become fragmented, as irrigator and peri-urban 
potable water groups have organised separately. Some have 
contended that key groups have been co-opted by the state(III Feria 
Internacional del Agua 2011), which has undermined the potency of 
the movement. 
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This sentiment has gained momentum over time. During the 2012 Red 
Vida conference that brought Latin American water activists together to 
discuss the right to water on the continent, Olivera gave a talk in which he 
summarised some of the key arguments I was hearing informally in 
Bolivia in opposition to the right to water. He argued that in a country 
where 67% of provision comes from communal providers (although this 
figure is contested as discussed in chapter 2) the conceptualisation of 
water and water governance are going to be different to that of say 
Uruguay or Mexico. In both rural and urban areas of Bolivia, communal 
water management means that water cannot belong to anyone nor can 
anyone have exclusive rights to it. Further he emphasised how Bolivians 
have never collectively struggled for water to be recognised as a human 
right. He contended that the human right to water does not take this into 
account:  
 
We want to establish that the theme of water is related to the 
theme of power… What has happened in Bolivia is that the 
human right to water has been consitutionalised… It is a 
fundamental human right… (but) the right to water has been 
converted into a method of expropriating these communal forms 
of water management… Today, what is happening… (the) state 
is making inventories of water sources and systems, and 
establishing that the state is now responsible for water 
provision. And what we will see over the next few months is the 
expropriation of these water communities. The state is using the 
idea of the human right to water to do this. But there is 
resistance from the rural communities and the urban barrios 
against this.16 
 
While I was in the field, I was interested to understand why Bolivian water 
activists had signed the Cochabamba agreement and been so involved in 
the meetings around the declaration. I spoke to some activists about this 
informally and they suggested that the declaration was something that 
was arranged by the international water activists who travelled to Bolivia 
soon after the Water War. But furthermore we must recognise that the 
idea of the right to water in 2000, as set out in the Cochabamba 
Declaration was just a seedling for the campaign to recognise the human 
                                                
16 Oscar Olivera, Red Vida Conference Mexico City, October 15th 2012 
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right to water and the global water justice movement. No one could have 
foreseen or predicted the trajectory that the campaign would take. Over 
time, Bolivians have distanced themselves from the campaign for, and 
idea of, the right to water that has emerged. It is therefore not necessarily 
that Bolivian social movement leaders and activists were, or are, opposed 
to the idea of the human right to water. However, they are concerned that 
the discourse can be used by states and international NGOs to shape 
how local communities access and provide water.  
 
In June 2011, 11 years on from the Cochabamba declaration, Bolivian 
social movements, DWC leaders, NGOs and activists gathered in 
Cochabamba to discuss the idea of the human right to water and its 
implications for legislation and policy. Here it was suggested that the right 
to water should mean that everyone has access to clean water. There are 
certain political and social dynamics that have to be considered as states 
endeavour to recognise the human right to water. Those present felt that 
the national reforms around the right to water did not go far enough to 
recognise these dynamics. During this meeting it was agreed that water 
should not be commodified and that water services should not be 
privatised; something that the Bolivian state only partially prohibits in 
practice (and will be discussed later in this chapter). Furthermore, the 
consensus was that communities should have the right to provide their 
own water services according to collective water systems, and that the 
reforms are potential to undermining and co-opting the numerous informal 
collective providers that exist in Bolivia. While the value of rights was 
recognised, individual human rights are difficult to implement in a country 
where collective rights are prevalent in indigenous communities. 
Meanwhile historically, the state’s attempts to sanction collective rights 
can be excluding and lead to conflict in rural regions amongst irrigator 
communities, and has been denounced (Bolpress 2009) .  
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Bolivia and the international campaign to recognise the right to 
water 
Despite the concerns of some local social movements and activists about 
the applicability of the human right to water in the Bolivian context, 
several Bolivian NGOs and politicians have played a pivotal role in the 
international campaign to recognize the human right to water. This has 
included representatives of the NGO Fundacion Solon that has links to 
international NGOs, the soon to become president, Evo Morales, and 
representatives of FEDECOR amongst others. These people have 
regularly participated in the early alternative global water forums, and the 
human right to water has been one of the subjects under discussion here. 
The first Alternative International Water Forum was held in Kyoto in 2003 
to draw attention to the shortcomings of the official World Water Forum 
held simultaneously in another part of the city. Discussions focused on 
the struggle to recognize the human right to water, but also de-privatizing 
the water sector, the impacts of large-scale infrastructure such as dams 
and the benefits of adopting local, participatory, democratic forms of 
water management (Bakker 2007). These ideas were then developed in 
the alternative Water Forum in Mexico in 2006 and attracted water 
activists from all over the world. During this meeting the idea of the 
human right to water was one strand that was developed by some 
participants, Elizabeth Peredo, director of the Fundacion Solon explains. 
We as activists with the leaders of organisations, such as Evo 
Morales, we went to all the water forums. We became part of an 
international current of activism. We didn’t know them before, but 
in 2000 when the Water War erupted they came to us. This led to 
a more collective construction of the idea of the human right to 
water.17 
 
Several Bolivian activists and NGOs then became key actors in an 
alliance of water activists and other so called progressive governments 
such as Venezuela. This alliance that was forged in the Istanbul Forum in 
2009 went on to focus more centrally on lobbying the UN to recognize the 
human right to water. The momentum continued, and it was Pablo Solon, 
                                                
17 Elizabeth Peredo Director Fundaccion Solon, Cochabamba, 22 October 2010. 
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ex director of the Fundacion Solon and Bolivian ambassador to the UN, 
who presented a resolution to the United Nations General Assembly on 
July 28th, 2010, which then led to declaration of the Human Right to water 
and Sanitation by the UN. 
 
Bolivia thus played a strategic role in the development of the global 
campaign to recognise the human right to water which would also have 
deep felt implications for Bolivia’s international reputation. On the one 
hand Bolivia provided the movement with a myth by which the 
international water justice movement defines itself. On the other, the 
campaign lent its self to enhancing the international image and identity 
created by President Evo Morales as protector of human rights, 
indigenous rights, and campaigner for climate justice.  
 
Contesting rights 
However, the campaign that eventually led to the resolution that was 
passed in the UNGA, was something quite different to the struggle that 
manifested itself on the streets of Cochabamba during the Water War. 
Olivera and Gomez describe how, 
…the Cochabamba Water War in 2000 was not only a response 
to aggression against life itself, but also one in which the old and 
the new social technology were embodied in a resounding “no” 
that affirmed our potential to do things ourselves and our own 
way…  (Olivera and Gomez, 2006: 2)  
 
Here Olivera and Gomez contend that the Water War was never a 
campaign to call for the state to provide water; instead the communities 
that participated struggled to defend their water systems against the 
privatisation of water services and commodification of water; it was an 
outright rejection of proscriptive reforms advocated under neoliberalism 
that threatened local ways of life. For Olivera and Gomez, the idea of the 
right to water is not dissimilar to a human rights-based approach to water 
provision;  
…It is assumed that ‘to provide us with water’ (and other ‘rights’) 
is economically sustainable for the state, local governments, and 
businesses, and for the maintenance of the bureaucracy… 
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However, those of us in Bolivia, due to our government’s 
historically negation of us, are not able to pay our taxes; we are 
materially incapable of complying with the laws that were written 
not for us, but over us.  For us, the suit-coat of “citizenship” is too 
tight a fit. (Olivera and Gomez 2006: 3)  
 
Olivera and Gomez understand socio-economic rights as being 
dependent on strong relationships between all citizens and the state, and 
argue that this relationship has never materialized in Bolivia. Instead, 
indigenous, peri-urban and rural communities have frequently been let 
down and marginalized by the state. A state-sanctioned right to water 
based on ideas of citizenship is perceived as being incompatible with 
commons and communally managed water provision which exists in 
Bolivia. 
 
Olivera and Gomez’s words are symptomatic of academics and activists 
in Bolivia that seek to defend communal water rights, uses and customs 
against individual ‘rights’ to water and the commodification of water 
(Bolpress 2009; Crespo 2010).  This movement reflects the demands of 
the Water War, and has over time distanced itself from national and 
international endeavours to recognise the right to water. Some activists 
fear that recognising the human right to water could affect collective 
forms of organising for water provision, and that rights-based approaches 
do not have the capacity to ensure that the water needs of the most 
marginalised communities are met. Oscar Olivera explains:  
 
The human right to water, has nothing to do with the social 
movements or the commons, (it) is actually in contradiction to the 
struggles of the social movements who frame water as part of the 
common good.18  
 
Furthermore, for many Bolivian activists the right to water is actually part 
of a broader state-led approach that is focussed on consolidating control 
over a fragmented and complicated water sector. It does not embody a 
departure from the trajectories of other global water policies advocated in 
the past, including under neoliberalism, and thus does not offer a solution 
                                                
18 Oscar Olivera, Cochabamba, May 15th 2010 
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to water provision that really tackles the deep set social and physical 
inequalities that plague countries, regions and cities. In fact it has the 
potential to reinforce those inequalities. Carlos Crespo, water activist and 
professor of sociology at the city state university in Cochabamba 
develops this point as part of an on-going discourse that reveals the 
discontent that Bolivians feel towards the proscriptive global water 
policies that shape local water governance.  
 
“The right to water is not emancipatory. It serves to legitimise 
this pro-poor focus on water, that has been advocated through 
international cooperation, and so there is all this focus on the 
management of water that comes to bring technology and 
processes that are orientated towards the most poor, and it has 
been sold to us by the World Bank, by international funding and 
by some international activists. And they plant this idea and what 
it brings us is this distinction between the services for the poor 
and the established ones for the rich.”19 
 
In Bolivia, there have been no struggles aiming at securing access to 
finite sums of water for individuals, as there have been elsewhere. 
Instead, concerns that were ignited during the Water War about the 
impact of neoliberal reforms to the water sector on local systems of water 
governance have proliferated and persist as a result of more recent 
reforms based on the right to water. The concerns that some Bolivians 
have with the idea of the human right to water are indicative of some of 
the broader challenges in adopting a human rights approach to water 
provision in the global south. In regions where the state has failed to 
provide water, and alternative systems of water provision have emerged, 
there is an unwillingness to give up that system of provision, and a ‘way 
of doing things’, in favour of either a state sanctioned right that may not 
materialize, or to a private company that monopolises water sources and 
provision. This is indicative of a culture which lacks strong state-citizen 
bonds and where the state is traditionally unable to guarantee 
fundamental security, rights and services to its citizens, who have 
traditionally had to self organise on a communal basis. New policy and 
                                                
19 Carlos Crespo, Cochabamba, February 10th 2010 
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legal frameworks, and institutions both in the shape of privatization or 
state led provision are ultimately indicative of the re-organisation of the 
sector which undermines communal systems of provision and power. The 
fear amongst Bolivian activists and non-state providers, are that while 
reforms, both private and state driven, set out to improve access to water 
they involve the re-organisation and re-distribution of power. 
 
The following section explores how the notion of the right to water has 
developed in Bolivia and how it has shaped reforms to the water sector. 
In doing so I set how and why it has been contested by activists and 
communal water providers.    
 
Reforming the national sector  
The election of Evo Morales in 2006 heralded a step change in Bolivian 
politics. After almost two decades of neoliberal governments, president 
Morales and the movement for Socialism began overhauling the state 
according to a leftist ideology, often termed ‘post-neoliberal’ political 
ideology (as discussed in the previous chapter). The water sector was 
revamped both institutionally and legislatively almost immediately. A 
Ministry for Water was established and a new Minister for Water put at its 
helm. Further, a new institutionality to regulate and develop the capacity 
of water providers was put in place. 
 
The constitutional and legislative foundations to underpin these reforms 
were being undertaken almost retrospectively. This began with the 
development of constitutional articles relating to water that were 
established by the Constituents’ Assembly (CA), and continued with 
legislative reform, which is still on-going. The CA had been a demand of 
Bolivian indigenous social movements and organisations for several 
decades, and Evo Morales granted its establishment as one of his 
election pledges. The Assembly was tasked with developing an inclusive 
constitution that would be the blueprint for the Morales Administration. 
While this assembly was led by social movements and organisations 
there have been subsequent critiques levelled at the processes behind 
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the CA, specifically that the process was closed, undemocratic, and that 
some parts of the text were subject to substantiative change (see 
Reglasky 2009 and Webber 2011 for further discussion of this). The CA 
was made up of 21 Commissions, and proposals and discussions around 
water were made in the Commission for Water Resources and Electricity. 
Elected representatives from every part of the country, alongside 
representatives from diverse unions, social movements and organisations 
led the discussions, and ultimately had to consider and consolidate the 
237 proposals that were submitted. At the core of the discussions were 
debates around the recognition and protection of collective rights, 
usufruct rights and rights to manage water resources according to 
collective uses and customs of diverse rural, peri-urban and urban 
communities (Campanini, Rios et al. 2008). Further, the challenge of 
implementing a universal and equal right to water for both the productive 
and reproductive needs of the population as a whole was debated and 
proved controversial. A representative from the NGO Agua Sustentable 
who observed and facilitated the discussions recalled some of the 
debates which reflected the conflict that existed between sectors around 
rights and access to water sources. 
 
“The indigenous social movements, to begin with, demanded the 
possession of all the water on their territory. I always remember 
the process…. We had managed to arrange a meeting where 
everyone was present, because it was very important that we 
didn't meet according to sectors, for example only the peasant 
groups or only the urban groups, because water flows, it flows 
through places and peoples, and involves different populations 
and communities…There were representatives from migrant peri-
urban barrios too. So when the indigenous social movements 
said they should have the right to all the water on their territories, 
the urban peri-urban populations asked, “Who here doesn't 
originally come form a rural or indigenous territory? Because as a 
result of migration we are now living in the cities, we have not 
necessarily left our communities and ancestry, but we still need 
water, so what will do, buy water from you, from our families? It is 
the blood of pachamama (mother earth), how can you sell it to 
us?” This was at central core of our discussions. These 
discussions were so rich.20 
                                                
20 Agua Sustentable employee, Cochabamba, November 23rd 2010 
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This recollection highlights the diverse claims and ideas of indigeneity 
that formed the constitutional articles relating to water. Indigenous groups 
have and continue to defend their water rights and usufruct rights to water 
sources in the face of expanding industries such as the extractives 
(Mamani M. 2006; Moran 2009) or in the face of demands by water 
utilities. However, during AC meetings it was recognised that cities and 
peri-urban areas expand, often as a result of indigenous migration from 
rural areas. The recognition and acceptance of this link between rural, 
urban and peri-urban underpinned some of the arguments that advocated 
the need for a more joined up approach to water provision. These 
arguments sought to look beyond local water rights and build a more 
integrated vision of water provision for Bolivia, as opposed to for the 
community alone. 
 
As a result of the discussions, the participants 21  in the sessions 
developed and agreed upon a list of ten guiding principles for the water 
sector. These were to form the basis of the constitutional articles relating 
to water. These points reveal a commitment to recognising and protecting 
local water systems, and protecting local water sources against 
contamination and over-exploitation by industry, but also to establish and 
guarantee the role of the state as guarantor of the right to water. They are 
as follows: 
1. Recognise the social, cultural and environmental functions of water 
2. Recognise the state’s role in promoting water on the basis of 
solidarity, reciprocity, equality, diversity and sustainability 
3. Acknowledge the state as guarantor for prioritised use of water for 
life for all its inhabitants 
4. Respect for the uses and customs of communities, local 
authorities, indigenous peasant organisations, all Bolivians with 
regards to the right to and management of water and a new law 
will establish the conditions and limitations of this 
                                                
21 Diverse social movements participated including several representing irrigator 
communities, peri-urban water committees and peasant unions amongst others. 
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5. Advocate the management of river basins for food security 
according to the uses and customs of communities 
6. Water and sanitation as a basic service that is the responsibility of 
the state. Provision will not be for profit and according to national 
policy. The new law will frame the service of provision 
7. Fossil, glacial, subterranean, mineral, medicinal and other waters 
constitute a resource of the Bolivian people. Conservation, 
protection, preservation and sustainable management of these 
waters as a national priority. 
8. Before the development of any industrial activities such as mining, 
the government must consult with indigenous communities, 
peasant communities and social organisations in the area. 
9. Water resources as the property and domain of the Bolivian 
people, they cannot be sold, privatised, made concessionary or 
exported. The state will regulate, protect and plan adequately and 
sustainably with social participation. 
10. The national interest must be prioritised over any commercial 
interests when it comes to water resources. 
(Campanini, Rios et al. 2008) 
 
These statements would then inform the nine articles for the chapter on 
water resources. The rational behind the CA was that the Bolivian people 
would re-write a constitution for The Plurinational State of Bolivia. There 
were various elements of the broader constitution, which the CA could not 
reach agreement over, leading to unrest and violence. The president and 
the government ultimately took control of the process and drafted the final 
constitution in Oruro. The undemocratic nature of this decision has 
attracted some criticism (Webber, 2011), and the government has 
responded that that the constitution was revised and put out to review, 
and ultimately was approved via referendum. 
 
For the purposes of this thesis I have categorised the key articles relating 
to water according to 8 themes. 
1. Water is a fundamental right for life to be guaranteed by the state 
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(Articles 16, 20, 373, 374) 
2. All natural resources belong to the Bolivian people (Article 349) 
3. It is the state’s responsibility to ensure every Bolivian’s right to 
water as a basic service, through public, mixed, cooperative or 
communal water providers (Article 20).  
4. It is the state’s responsibility to protect water sources against 
contamination and to plan for sustainable use of all water sources 
with social participation (Articles 342, 374, 376)  
5. Recognition and respect for traditional uses and customs around 
water (Articles 374, 375)  
6. Water concession and the privatization of water services is 
prohibited (Articles 20, 373)  
7. Regulation and management of water resources with social 
participation (Articles 374)  
8. Protection of water sources from free trade agreements (Article 77) 
(Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia 2008) 
 
The articles present a framework for the overhaul of the water sector, 
although many of these principles were already framing policy and the 
state’s approach. In sum reforms were based on principles of anti-
privatisation, the (re)nationalisation of water provision, a universal right to 
water, and the protection of communal water providers. A public system 
is envisioned with spaces for citizen participation in urban utilities, but 
which incorporated alternative community providers and which 
recognises the social and cultural significance therein.  
 
The articles that emerged relating to water reveal more nuanced 
contradictions. The articles establish the role of the state as being the 
guarantor of the right to water, but also promise to recognise and respect 
the uses and customs of communal water systems. The CPE boldly 
declares the prohibition of privatisation of water services, thus embodying 
the anti-privatisation sentiments rooted in the Water War, which is still so 
important to Bolivian social movements and organisations. This assertion 
is undermined somewhat as mixed service providers, which can include 
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the private sector, are allowed. Baer (2011) suggests that this was 
included in an attempt to appease international donors. Finally, as 
outlined by Raul Prada (2010), reforms to recognise human rights and 
collective rights are set against a backdrop of a country that is 
industrialising (ibid:110), and in the process of nationalising and 
expanding the extractive industries to facilitate a redistributive economic 
policy. The CPE does not tackle the potential conflicts of interests 
between indigenous and collective water systems and the water needs of 
big industries. Further, there are constitutional articles and rights that 
were designed to protect the rights of communities to water sources, in 
light of development initiatives and the expansion of the extractives. One 
example is the right to previous consultation. In practice there are 
numerous examples of how the rights of industry to water resources have 
been prioritised over those of local communities. (Bustamante, Crespo et 
al. 2011) 
 
Developing a legal framework for the sector 
While the articles relating to water in the constitution have been 
developed into a key component of the National Plan for Development, 
and a more detailed outline of reform to the water sector has been set out 
in the National Plan for Water and Sanitation, the difficulty has been in 
developing and passing a water law for the sector. Historically, long 
before the election of Evo Morales over 30 proposals for a new water law 
have been tabled, but there has been insufficient political will to develop a 
water law.  
The theme of a water framework has been discussed for so 
many years, that few remember exactly when it began… various 
proposals, projects and final versions of laws have been drafted 
but none have been passed (Bustamante 2011)   
 
Since 2001, there has been a push by the NGOs and social movements 
that developed in the wake of the Water War to organise consultations on 
a new water law. The problems with these consultations is that they have 
tended to target distinctive groups of actors in the water sector, for 
example the irrigators, the potable water providers and the indigenous 
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social movements, each of which have developed their own respective 
proposals for a new water law. While I was in the field I attended 3 
consultations on the new water law, each of which was undertaken 
according to sector. Consequently the proposals tend to reflect the needs 
of one sector.  
 
Since 2006 there has been a renewed effort on the part of the state, with 
the support of NGOs and social movements, to undertaken consultations 
with communal water providers and indigenous movements for a new 
water law. I met with a consultant, Juan22, who worked with the Ministry 
for Water and the Environment as part of small technical committee to 
consult with different groups and develop proposals for a new water law 
and to develop a legal framework around the right to water in Bolivia. He 
acknowledged the challenges facing the sector but was hopeful that there 
is sufficient political will for a water law to be passed.  
We (as a sector) are paralysed by old laws… but the current 
political climate makes it a good time to formulate and create a 
new water law… the political will to pass this law is strong.23 
 
Some social movements have come together to present proposals for a 
new water law. These have tended to reproduce constitutional articles, 
and the pre-existing institutional frameworks that have been developed by 
the state form the basis, with the focus remaining on guaranteeing water 
rights and developing the right to water. Some social movements from the 
potable water sector and irrigator sector developed a proposal for a new 
water law in January 2011. However, it was somewhat vague and there 
has been no attempt to define the right to water or develop a justiciable 
right to water24. This might be because the human right to water was 
never a demand that came from the social movements, or social 
organisations such as ASICSUD-EPSAS, who instead have focussed 
more on improving access and community-management. 
                                                
22 Pseudonym 
23 Consultant for MMAYA on Water Law, La Paz, 16th November 2010 
24 This proposal was co authored by over 50 representative groups from irrigator and 
drinking water organisations in Bolivia. It can be viewed at 
http://www.fobomade.org.bo/public/uploads/docs/1122.pdf 
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There are many challenges that hamper the development of a new water 
law. A Bolivian water law must encompass the diverse and complex 
articles relating to water provision in the constitution. The central tension 
is how a universal right to water can be legislated for, which also 
incorporates the usufruct rights of communities, or the rights of 
communities to provide water. Further, as industry, agriculture and the 
extractives are all sectors that have been prioritised as central to the 
future economic development of Bolivia, the legislative framework has to 
reconcile the industrial sector with the potable water sector and the 
collective water rights of indigenous communities. To date there has been 
a series of consultations with potable water providers (community-level 
providers and the cooperatives), social movements, and irrigator groups, 
but discussions have tended to stall at discussion around who has priority 
use or access; those seeking water for productive or domestic uses. This 
is an age-old sticking point in Bolivia, and a question that is difficult to 
reconcile through consultations that are undertaken sector by sector. 
Furthermore, the state’s capacity to consult with all groups, and to 
organise cross-sectoral consultations is limited, and so they have been 
working with the Bolivian NGO Agua Sustentable, an NGO that has been 
undertaking independent consultations on the water law in departments 
across the country. Juan, who had been coordinating these events 
explained, 
We don’t have enough money to hold the types of workshops 
that the people are accustomed to here today. NGOs have the 
money to hold big expensive workshops, and this is what people 
have come to expect, we do not have that sort of money.25 
 
It has also become increasingly difficult to secure the participation of all 
social movements and organisations. The CPE guaranteed Bolivians a 
range of socio-economic rights, many of which require the development 
of new laws based on consultations with social movements and 
indigenous groups. Social movements have become prone to 
consultation fatigue. Juan explains,  
                                                
25 Consultant for MMAYA on Water Law, La Paz, 16th November 2010 
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The social movements are being asked to participate in 
consultations for many laws at the moment…(what) we would 
like to do is bring them together at least with some 
representatives so that they could discuss the issue of water.26 
 
The focus has been on engaging with civil society groups and social 
movements, or community-level providers. Consultations have yet to 
extend to the biggest water users and polluters, agro-industry and mining. 
This is indicative of the schism between the two contradictory 
development paradigms that define Evo Morales’ government, Vivir Bien 
(living well) and El Gran Salto Industrial (The great industrial leap). Vivir 
Bien27 is an alternative Bolivian development discourse that seeks to 
harmonize human development while protecting the environment by 
incorporating indigenous ideologies and practice. As outlined in chapter 
3, this could be framed as a normative alternative to sustainable 
development that has been adopted in Bolivia and Ecuador, but which is 
critiqued for building on capitalist conceptualisations of economic growth 
(Gudynas 2011). The idea is premised on the notion of living well as 
opposed to living better, which is framed as the underlying premise of 
capitalist systems. Vivir bien is a broad concept that continues to be 
moulded and defined but it is a component of the overarching objective if 
the government’s 5-year Water and Sanitation Plan  
The state aims to improve and extend sustainable water and 
sanitation services, to implement the human right to safe water 
and sanitation services, thus fulfilling the government's 
commitment to change so that living well can be achieved for all 
people. (MMAyA 2008)  
 
Vivir Bien is compromised by the other core development paradigm in the 
National Plan for Development, which is El Gran Salto Industrial. and the 
idea of Andean Capitalism, specifically the expansion and nationalisation 
of the extractive industries, is core to the economic growth and 
development of the country. While the state has a new constitution that 
protects indigenous and human rights, and is building an alternative 
development paradigm of Vivir Bien, it is still inherently tied to the 
                                                
26 Consultant for MMAYA on Water Law, La Paz, 16th November 2010 
27 Living Well 
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international economy. In order for the state to be able to pursue its 
redistributive economic policy, to fund the expansion of basic services 
and tackle poverty, Evo Morales and his government argue that a further 
50 years of Andean Capitalism must unfold in Bolivia (Garcia Linera 
2006). The contradictions between El Gran Salto Industrial and VIvir Bien 
are yet to be reconciled, and in practice certain ministries, departments 
and individuals within the state tend to be based around Vivir Bien or El 
Gran Salto Industrial, which exacerbates the clash. As an example this is 
pronounced between the Ministry for Mining and Hydrocarbons and the 
Ministry for Water and the Environment. The key role that the extractives 
play in the economic development of the state means that they carry a lot 
of weight in terms of dictating state policy. Activists are concerned that 
legislation will continue to protect the interests of big businesses and 
industry, as has been the case to date. During an interview with an 
employee of Collectivo Casa, an NGO that supports social movements to 
tackle environmental injustices, I was told that the delay in the 
development of a new water law could be a consequence of deliberate 
heel dragging. The employee explained that it was widely believed that 
the new water law could only be passed once the mining and extractives 
law is passed, guaranteeing and safeguarding water use for the sector28. 
 
There are further practical reasons why it has taken time for the water law 
to be finalised. The consultant in charge of coordinating consultations for 
a new water law explained that the Ministry for Water and the 
Environment does not have detailed geographical, hydrological and 
climatic information for the country. Bolivia is often highlighted as one of 
the countries that is most vulnerable to climate change (Plurinational 
State of Bolivia 2010). The international press have focussed on the 
melting of the glaciers to the north of the capitol La Paz, which have 
created some of the world’s first ‘climate migrants’ (Vidal 2011), while the 
droughts in Pasorapa (a farming region eight hours south of 
Cochabamba) that have seriously affected cattle farmers in the region 
                                                
28 Collectivo Casa employee, Oruro, August 5th 2010 
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have drawn similar attention. In practice there is little long-term data that 
the state can draw on to assess the extent of the problem. As explained 
by the consultant on the new water law, 
We haven’t fully integrated the sectors and we also need 
hydrological information and projections for climatic change, 
these are some of the biggest challenges29.  
 
Without these it is difficult to develop a legislative framework that reflects 
the water needs of the country. 
 
The right to water in Bolivia is a long way off being a justicable right, and 
perhaps it never will be. There is evidently opposition and certain 
obstacles to recognising individual rights, and instead the right to water in 
Bolivia might be better understood as a commitment by the state to 
improve access to water and water provision across the board. The 
consultant explained that there had not been any discussions relating to 
daily allowances for the poorest like those that unfolded in South Africa. 
Instead the focus was on developing a legislative framework that 
incorporates communal providers in peri-urban and rural regions where 
public utilities do not provide. Reforms then focus their energies on 
supporting their development so that they are better placed to provide 
water to the communities they serve. The right to water in Bolivia is thus 
better understood as a framing discourse focussed on recognising the 
role of communal providers, while the on-going consultations around its 
legal implications highlight some of the complexities in legislating for a 
universal human right where diverse sectors have become entrenched 
themselves and sought to protect their water rights over time. Without 
comprehensive legislation, the newly created institutions that are part of, 
or decentralised from, the MMAYA have driven reforms to the sector and 
developed projects to improve access to water in peri-urban areas, and to 
develop communal providers. 
 
 
                                                
29 Consultant for MMAYA on Water Law, La Paz, 16th November 2010 
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Developing policy frameworks 
There are two principle documents that have developed the articles in the 
constitution relating to water and guided reforms to the water sector. The 
PND (National Plan for Development) and PNSB (National Plan for Water 
and Sanitation). The PND (2006) outlines the long-term plan(s) for social 
and economic development in Bolivia. The PNSB sets out the three core 
pillars by which the water sector will be reformed. 
 
In order to reach these objectives the state outlines three core strategies: 
  
1. Re-nationalizing water  
The state understands that by bringing water back into the public 
domain it is better placed to ensure equitable access, and to protect 
and plan against contamination and over-exploitation. This is a 
commitment to prioritizing the needs of potable water users and 
irrigators, protecting the local environment and also traditional forms, 
rights, uses and customs around water management. This will be 
made possible by increased investment in the sector and an explicit 
commitment to improving access to water in peri-urban areas. This 
increased funding is all set to come from foreign donors.  
 
2. Building Environmental Integrity 
The second strategy demonstrates a commitment to protecting the 
environmental integrity of water resources, namely through the 
development of adequate sanitation systems and the treatment of 
wastewater. 
 
3. Developing a legal and regulatory framework to fit the water sector.  
By building institutional and technical support for all water providers in 
Bolivia, and with the inclusion and formalization of many different 
types of diverse water providers, the PND makes a commitment to 
strengthening all providers and the sector as a whole. Legitimizing all 
water providers also means capacity building and eventually 
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regulating providers, as the state endeavours to build equal access, 
and fair tariffs across the board.  
 
While the PNSB recognizes that communal water systems can be 
precarious because water supplies can be subject to depletion or 
contamination, or because local infrastructure is fragile, the PNSB 
outlines an approach that sets out to capacity build and incorporate 
communal water systems. The PNSB states that the participation of the 
population in the water sector is required to ensure and promote 
efficiency and transparency in the sector. The PNSB is looking to build a 
very public system. In urban centres this means making public companies 
such as SEMAPA more accountable to their users, and making spaces 
for participation (Crespo and Spronk 2007). Meanwhile, in peri-urban and 
rural regions communities tend to participate not only in the management 
of their water systems, but also more directly in the development and 
operation of their systems. In practice this means that the state is 
encouraging broad citizen participation in the water sector, and 
formalizing customary rights and collective systems, thus developing the 
system of rights and registries that was created in the wake of the Water 
War.  
 
(Re) nationalising water in Bolivia 
In the following pages I demonstrate that Bolivia is a long way off 
developing a justiciable human right to water, in fact it is so contested that 
in practice the idea of the right to water is better understood as a banner 
under which post 2006 reforms have been implemented. The reforms 
have been threefold and include: (re)nationalising and centralising state 
control over water provision, reforming legislation and regulation, and 
institutional development and reform. I explore each of these in turn. 
 
The private sector never got a good grip on the Cochabamba concession 
as a result of the Water War, while the La Paz-El Alto concession was 
terminated in 2005. In that sense urban water provision was never 
universally privatised in Bolivia. However, one might argue that water 
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provision has never been universally public in Bolivia, as a significant 
proportion of water provision comes from communal or informal water 
providers. Negotiating state control of the Bolivian water sector is 
particularly difficult because of the vast and varied informal providers that 
have emerged in the light of the failure of the state to develop and ensure 
provision. The state has never centralised control over water providers, 
neither has it successfully regulated or incorporated informal providers. 
There has never been an integrated Bolivian waterscape, instead it is 
fragmented and disjointed. Water provision has been controlled by 
landlords and mine owners, communities and cooperatives, and 
municipal utilities, but never by the state. Controlling natural resources, 
particularly access to water is part of nation building. Peru and Ecuador 
have built legislative frameworks that have incorporated informal and 
indigenous providers, based on the liberal equality myth and the 
assumption that a “modern water society could be legally engineered” 
(Boelens, 2008: 314). While Ecuador and Peru’s reforms have not been 
straightforward, the Bolivian water sector has never formally recognised 
or even partially assimilated the numerous informal providers under 
neoliberal ideologies of equality (Roth, Boelens et al. 2005), as has been 
the case in other Andean countries.  
 
The Bolivian Constitution has enshrined the human right to water and 
sanitation. In practice this is a massive task because water and sanitation 
coverage in Bolivia is poor. As water cannot be privatised, water provision 
is now the responsibility of the state, but can be provided through public 
utilities, cooperatives, and community providers, like drinking water 
committees or mixed entities. These are collectively known as water and 
sanitation service providers (EPSAS). The state estimates that there are 
over 28,000 small-scale providers in the country (SENASBA 2009) in the 
country, but only 27 public companies are, in effect, regulated (IAB 
proposal: 5).  
 
Institutional reforms to the sector are based on the constitutional 
commitment to state led reform and regulation through the many diverse 
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established water providers. The Ministry for Water and the Environment 
(MMAYA) has been established to coordinate the sector. “The Authority 
for the Fiscalisation of and Social Control over Drinking Water and 
Sanitation” (AAPS) oversees regulation. The National Service for the 
Sustainability of Basic Sanitation Services (SENASBA) is responsible for 
ensuring the sustainability of all water providers through community 
development strategies and technical assistance. The Environment and 
Water Executing Agency (EMAGUA) and the National Productive and 
Social Investment Fund (FPS) oversee the implementation of programs 
and projects formulated by the MMAYA.  
 
In practice water provision is managed at the level of the municipality. 
Municipalities can provide water through public utilities. But as is the case 
in Cochabamba community providers such as the DWCs, once formally 
recognised as EPSAS, can provide water. The Ministry for Water and the 
Environment along with institutions such as SENASBA and AAPS are in 
place to support the municipalities. To date the institutional groundwork 
for these reforms has been undertaken. The state has recently received a 
$78 million dollar loan from the Inter American Development Bank to 
develop and consolidate this model (MMAYA 2012). 
 
Establishing the Ministry and the role of NGOs 
The government has had to tread lightly so as not to enter into conflict 
with the powerful water movements and activists that developed in the 
wake of the numerous Water Wars that unfolded during the 2000s 
(discussed in chapter 3). The first reform undertaken was the 
establishment of the Ministry for Water, and the appointment of a Minister 
for Water in an attempt to centralise control over a fragmented water 
sector. This was also, however, in response to a demand that had 
emanated from some of the social movements, who demanded a Ministry 
for Water so that there was one sole department that would address the 
challenges facing the Bolivian water sector (Campanini 2007). Before 
2006, the water sector had come under the jurisdiction of the Vice 
Ministry for Basic Services. A senior employee for the NGO Agua 
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Sustentable describes the reforms to the water sector that followed the 
election of Evo Morales, “At the change of government, the MAS entered 
and began the process of taking command of the sector…”30  
 
Reforms unfolded in a way that recognised and consolidated the role that 
NGOs, social organisations and communal providers had played in sector 
in the absence of strong public or private providers. The employee 
continues,  
In Bolivia, civil society plays a significant role in the management 
of water, so ideas around the human right to water have to 
incorporate community irrigation systems, collective providers 
etc. In other countries where there isn’t collective management, 
where water is completely public, people see water as just a 
basic service. Here water is much more than just a basic 
service.31  
 
The Ministry for Water was the first of its kind in Latin America. The 
Ministry brought water back into the public realm, moving away from the 
neoliberal streamlined state. However, it endeavoured to demonstrate 
that it was not another bureaucracy, and would reflect the demands of the 
social movements and civil society in Bolivia. The first Minister for Water 
was a shrewd appointment named Abel Mamani, and this showed 
willingness on the part of the state to include the leaders and activists in 
the extensive reforms to the water sector. Mamani had led the water 
movements in El Alto. His appointment could be understood as being 
characteristic of the co-option of social movement leaders by the state 
since 2006. The Ministry for Water has been developed with extensive 
support of one NGO in particular. Agua Sustentable is an NGO that has 
been working to support local water systems and also with the 
development of sectoral legislation such as the River Law of 2004. The 
NGO rose to prominence in the years following the Water War receiving 
funding from a host of foreign donors including Oxfam and IDRC. It now 
occupies a particular niche, where they have worked closely with 
communities on the ground, but have pragmatically supported state 
                                                
30 Senior Agua Sustentable employee, Cochabamba, November 7th 2010 
31 Senior Agua Sustentable employee, Cochabamba, November 7th 2010 
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efforts to reform the water sector. By working with Agua Sustentable the 
Ministry had links to social movements and organisations such as the 
irrigators, but also has the expertise of individuals who have been 
supporting the development of the water sector since the early 2000s. 
The NGO has successfully straddled both worlds. An employee explains, 
The Ministry of Water was the result of social demands and 
processes, that were met on the election of the MAS, as the 
Ministry (for Water) evolved, we (Agua Sustentable) were able to 
help in its design and development… as a result we have been 
able to help in different instances where there has been a social 
demand for change within the water sector… for example the 
development of the PNSB (National plan for Basic Sanitation) 
and SENASBA (National service for the sustainability of water 
and sanitation services).32 
 
The NGO has thus been central to the development of the new 
institutionality that has been developed around water provision in Bolivia. 
 
Rene Orellana, the ex-director of Agua Sustentable went on to be 
appointed as Minster for Water in 2008 and was arguably the most 
dynamic minister of the MMAYA until the time of writing. Rene Orellana 
was a key driving force behind many of the policies designed to develop 
and capacity build water committees in the peri-urban southern zone. His 
capacity to channel funding to peri-urban water committees and build 
links with drinking water committees in the Zona Sur was not continued 
by his successors. This is discussed in more detail in chapters 6 and 7. 
 
Agua Sustentable’s role in the development of new institutions, and as 
shall be demonstrated, policies and legislation is significant. Evo Morales’ 
election has evidently not marked a disjuncture with the water policies 
and politics of the past. There has been significant continuity in process 
and actors who have been shaping water provision in Bolivia since 2000. 
Agua Sustentable has pragmatically positioned its self to be able to 
oversee many of the reforms to the water sector since the Water War. It 
is one of the few NGOs that has survived the transition from the 
                                                
32 Senior Agua Sustentable employee, Cochabamba, November 7th 2010 
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neoliberal governments of the past to the leftist MAS government since 
2006. 
 
Forging new water institutions  
As outlined previously, re-nationalising the water sector has involved 
centralising its control, creating a new institutionality based out of, and 
around, the MMAYA, but what has this meant in practice? Public 
municipal utilities tend to continue to be the main providers in urban 
areas, but control over and planning for the sector is located within the 
MMAYA. Eventually some power will be devolved to departments, but this 
process has not been finalised yet. There are three core departments 
within the MMAYA. They are; planning for potable water and sanitation, 
water resources, rivers and the environment, and biodiversity and climate 
change. There are then a series of decentralized organisations 
responsible for projects such as capacity building, the Misicuni dam 
project and regulation amongst others. As the sector continues to exist 
without a comprehensive water law, the new water institutions that have 
been established have become de-facto legislators. This section will 
focus down to explore the function of two newly created entities: the 
capacity builder SENASBA and the regulator AAPS. These are two 
decentralized organizations that have been established to support and 
regulate all water providers including DWCs across the country. 
 
SENASBA (National Service for Sustainable Water and Sanitation 
Services) was established in 2008, as a public institution decentralized 
from the MMAYA. Its objective is to support the development of more 
sustainable water providers across Bolivia. It is estimated that there are 
over 28,000 formal and informal water and/or sanitation providers across 
the country (SENASBA, 2009), and SENASBA is tasked with capacity 
building all water providers in rural, urban and peri- urban settings, from 
the smallest community-level potable water providers to municipality-wide 
public utilities such as SEMAPA. Rene Orellana, the ex Minister for Water 
and the Environment explains:  
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The many diverse water providers of Bolivia, require investment 
in infrastructure from the state but also administrative capacity 
building so that a better service can be provided, we are referring 
to technical capacity building, financing and technology, so that 
services can be managed well. (SENASBA: 2010)  
 
Instead of excluding communal providers, or allowing them to be 
subsumed by larger providers, SENASBA allows the state to pursue a 
more inclusive policy.  An Agua Sustentable employee explains how the 
work of SENASBA is linked to the reforms that began to protect 
communal water providers in the wake of the Water War;  
There were many discussion and interactions between the state 
and social organizations between 2001 and 2006. The central 
debate was about regulation, regulation was interpreted to be to 
punitive. So an alternative approach to regulation was put 
forward, which advocated communitarian management and 
required a different type of regulation, less punitive and more 
supportive, an important element of this was technical and 
capacity building support. This was where two processes joined 
the discussions around Law 206633 that began in 2001, and the 
ideas of the new government.34 
 
SENASBA is not a completely new concept. The previous government 
had appointed a private organization called FUNDASAB to undertake 
technical and capacity building work with small-scale providers that had 
been legitimized by reforms to licence and register small-scale rural and 
urban water providers. FUNDASAB was one of the foundations and 
private enterprises that had been supporting basic service provision up 
until 2006. While the state recognized the role of communal providers, 
support and capacity building was undertaken by the private sector and 
NGOs35. SENASBA is a decentralized public body and has a broader 
remit. The overarching objective of SENASBA is to build sustainable 
water providers that provide an efficient service of sufficient quality and 
quantity. It works with providers that operate on all scales, from small 
rural and peri-urban EPSAs (Small-scale water and sanitation providers), 
to municipal utility companies such as SEMAPA. While the organisation is 
                                                
33 Law 2066 was established to protect water systems and rights following the 
Cochabamba Water War. 
34 Senior Agua Sustentable employee, Cochabamba, November 7th 2010 
35 SENASBA employee, La Paz, November 16th 2010 
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in its infancy its focus is building the institutional, technical and financial 
sustainability of water providers. It provides technical assistance, it works 
with providers to strengthen them as institutions, it provides 
administrative and financial capacity building training, and also 
undertakes community-level capacity building exercises. SENASBA also 
coordinates research into the development of alternative technologies for 
water providers on behalf of the state, provides education on sanitation 
and distributes communication on the water sector (SENASBA 2012). Its 
future remit will be to foster community development of water systems in 
rural and peri-urban areas, suggesting that the state envisions more 
community managed water systems to expand access to water (MMAYA 
2012). 
 
SENASBA is the first organisation of its kind in Latin America. Its specific 
role is to enhance the sustainability of all water providers in the region. 
However, limited financial and human resources compromise its capacity. 
Principally, and as outlined earlier in this chapter there is limited data on 
how many small-scale water providers exist in Bolivia and the service 
they provide. SENASBA are therefore dealing with an unknown quantity. 
It has limited legitimacy in communities that rely on informal water 
providers, further it does not, and cannot be expected to, understand the 
diverse social and cultural dynamics that have forged the numerous water 
providers that exist in Bolivia. One organisation has been tasked with 
engaging with hundred of water providers, some of which are not even on 
the government’s radar. Further, SENASBA has limited human and 
financial resources for the task at hand. It has to employ diverse methods 
to overcome the scale of the challenge that it faces. In practice, 
SENASBA has come to rely on a platform of small scale-water providers 
such as ASICASUDD-EPSAS in peri-urban Cochabamba as gatekeepers. 
The southern zone of Cochabamba is one region in which SENASBA has 
struggled to engage with DWCs. ASICASUDD-EPSAS holds regular 
meetings with member DWCs in the region and regularly engages with up 
to 40 committees and associations. ASICASUDD-EPSAS gives 
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SENASBA an in-road as it endeavours to engage with DWC leaders in a 
region in which it has little or no legitimacy.  
 
A SENASBA employee explained,  
Our first most urgent intervention was to do an initial assessment 
to try to understand some more about the committees in the 
southern zone… We had to go in through ASICASUDD-EPSAS, 
and had to operate with their involvement, in reality 
ASICASUDD-EPSAS are the organisation who link up the 
committees, and who link us to the committees, and who link the 
committees with all other institutions.36 
 
Small EPSAS have always presented a challenge to the Bolivian state 
because they have emerged in regions where the state has failed to 
provide. They are testimony to state failures, and also an unknown 
quantity. The state has very limited information about how they provide, 
and to whom. In theory SENASBA is an attempt to understand these 
EPSAS and to develop the relationship between EPSAS and the state. In 
essence this is part of a process of formalising the informal sector and to 
build EPSAS’ capacity as water providers. A civil servant at the regulator 
AAPS explained,  
We cannot compare EPSAS La Paz (the public utility in La Paz), 
with a water committee. They (the water committees) have the 
right to provide (water)… the community has organised and now 
we must respect their right to provide... We have to develop 
these committees so that are able to provide a service of 
quality…The water sector now is creating a host of institutions 
that will develop and invest in smaller water providers.37  
 
In essence SENASBA is looking to capacity build water providers that 
exist on a variety of scales, so that the state can efficiently regulate the 
sector.  
 
Regulating the sector 
AAPS was formed in 2008 as the new regulatory authority for the potable 
water sector. AAPS was created to ensure the compliance with the 
fundamental right to water and prioritized use for human consumption, 
                                                
36 SENASBA employee, La Paz, November 16th 2010 
37 Senior civil servant AAPs, La Paz, November 16th 2010 
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food security and the conservation of the environment. Regulation of the 
water sector in light of the government’s commitment to formalizing and 
recognizing previously informal providers poses particular challenges for 
AAPS. A senior policy-advisor at AAPS who has worked on water 
regulation for over a decade explained:  
This is a complicated scenario, before there were 28 providers to 
be regulated, to date there are 600, but our capacity has 
declined. So we are trying to develop a system of provision and a 
regulatory framework that accommodates all these different 
providers.38 
  
Regulation of the water sector was preserved for the larger utilities, now 
the state is trying to develop a regulatory framework that incorporates 
small-scale water providers. But what does this mean in practice? AAPS 
has multiple responsibilities that include: 
- Overseeing the development of a system of licenses and 
registries for rural and urban potable water providers of all size.  
- Authorizing, modifying and revoking rights to use water for 
human consumption, and to provide water and sanitation 
services  
- Ensuring compliance with the obligations linked to the rights 
granted through the system of licenses and registries.  
- Protecting, preserving, and the sustainable use of all water 
sources, resolving conflicts around water provision.  
- Protecting the rights of different water user groups. 
 
The state obviously frames developing and fortifying regulation as key to 
improving water provision in Bolivia. According to one civil servant 
working at AAPS failures within the water sector in the past, particularly 
the failure of privatization, have been put down to poor regulatory 
frameworks, or inefficient implementation of regulation. A member of the 
planning team at the MMAYA explained how developing an effective 
system of regulation was pivotal if reforms to the water sector were going 
tot work.  
                                                
38 Senior civil servant AAPs, La Paz, November 16th 2010 
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Someone has to regulate the sector, and make sure that the 
water that is provided is up to standard; there are so many 
different unregulated providers out there.39  
 
AAPS has been tasked with establishing a decentralized structure of 
regulation. Regulation of public utilities and urban water providers is 
premised on pre-existing regulatory frameworks and public participation. 
AAPS and the MMAYA are still in the process of exploring what 
regulation will mean for small-scale potable water providers such as the 
peri-urban DWCs. Before this can happen, AAPS has been charged with 
the task of ensuring that a further 500 informal providers become EPSAS 
by 2015. In practice this means licensing and registering informal water 
providers with the state. AAPS thus relies on SENASBA to capacity build 
smaller EPSAS so that they can become formal water providers, but as 
demonstrated, it lacks the capacity to do so. As explained by one 
employee at AAPS  
SENASBA has to develop and fortify its self so that it can provide 
adequate assistance to providers. This is because AAPS as an 
organisation can regulate, it cannot develop and capacity build 
providers.40 
 
Once the process of capacity building, and registering and licensing 
smaller water providers is underway, AAPS envisions a complex multi-
scaled form of water provision that incorporates small EPSAS. Regulation 
of smaller potable water providers will be gentler than that which 
regulates the larger utilities, as explained by an AAPS employee,  
The committees? We are going to facilitate instruments so that 
they can self regulate. We feel that regulating from above would 
not be effective. Firstly, we have to create institutionality and then 
we can regulate in the future. They will develop systems of self-
regulation. We want committees to start regulating each other, in 
groups of 20. Every group will have to provide the same quality 
of water, but large and medium scale providers will have to 
expand provision too, to keep up with demand. They will be more 
closely regulated. We will try to demand that they provide a 
certain quality and type of provider.41 
 
                                                
39 Civil Servant planning department of MMAYA, La Paz, November 17th 2010 
40 Senior civil servant AAPs, La Paz, November 16th 2010 
41 Senior civil servant AAPs, La Paz, November 16th 2010 
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This approach, although not underway yet, embodies an expansion of the 
regulatory framework to incorporate the smaller EPSAS. The approach is 
light touch, as AAPS employees recognise the power relations between 
community water providers and the state, or any state led reforms that 
might be perceived to be encroaching or co-opting community providers. 
 
In rural and peri-urban areas of Cochabamba the task of licensing and 
regulating small-scale water providers is undertaken by CTRL (The 
Technical Committee of Licenses and Registries). In Cochabamba, it is 
estimated that there are between 500 and 600 small-scale water 
providers, and so this is no mean feat. The rationale behind CTRL is 
rooted in the Water War. In the year that followed the protests and before 
the election of Evo Morales, there came a push by communal water 
providers to protect their rights to access, manage and provide water, 
initially against concessions and the privatisation of basic services 
(Comite Tecnico de Registros y Licencias Cochabamba 2012). This was 
demonstrated most successfully through law 2066, and the passing the 
irrigators’ law in 2004 (as discussed in the previous chapter). Reforms to 
the sector since 2006 have continued along a trajectory that began in 
2001, where a system of licences and registries were developed to 
replace the concession system that led to the Water War. In 2008, law 
2066 was amended to extend the system of licensing and registries 
through the work of CTRL. The organisation, which is devolved from the 
central regulator AAPS, operates at a departmental level and authorises 
two different types of rights to provide water in Bolivia, licences and 
registries. Once granted, the entities become an EPSAS (formally 
recognised provider of potable water and/or sanitation services). 
 
Water committees, associations and cooperatives can apply for a licence 
to provide a water service, this gives them usufruct rights to water 
sources and to manage and provide a drinking water or sanitation service 
to a defined community or region. This licence lasts for 40 years but can 
be renewed so long as the provider is still capable of providing an 
efficient service. Peri-urban committees and associations are able to 
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apply for licences. Indigenous and peasant communities, irrigators, and 
farmers’ unions can apply for registration of their drinking water or 
irrigation system. The registration is not time-bound and its duration 
depends on the resilience of the system, and its capacity to meet the 
needs of the community it serves. Licences provide communities with 
legally protected rights to water for at least 40 years, and according to 
CTRL longer if they can prove they are still providing an efficient service. 
Water systems that are registered are granted unbounded rights to water 
and to provide water.  
 
To date CTRL only exists in Cochabamba, principally because it the 
department with the most informal water providers. CTRL is a 
manifestation of demands that came from the social movements and also 
the intention of the state to capacity build and regulate the informal 
providers. Consequently, the organisation has two representatives from 
the platforms FEDECOR (which represents the irrigators) and 
ASICASUDD-EPSAS (representing the peri-urban water committees of 
the Zona Sur) and two representatives from the national regulator AAPS. 
CTRL is responsible for processing and administering registries and 
licenses in rural and peri-urban areas. By enlisting representatives of the 
irrigator and peri-urban potable platforms in the department 
(ASICASUDD-EPSAS AND FEDECOR), CTRL have been able to 
convert and formalize blocks of informal providers. Obtaining a license to 
use a water source and providing a service is the first step towards 
regulating the informal sector. The committees and associations are now 
recognized by AAPS as EPSAS in their own rights, and can, in principle, 
be the subject of SENASBA projects and interventions. 
 
Conclusion 
The right to water in Bolivia is principally a discourse that has framed the 
(re)nationalisation of the water sector. Renationalisation does not simply 
mean prohibiting private sector participation, it also means integrating 
informal providers. Activists that have campaigned to protect communal 
water providers are concerned that the idea of the right to water threatens 
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to encroach into the autonomy of communal providers. In practice, the 
reforms seek to continue the trend established prior to 2006, which 
involved formalising and incorporating communal water providers. But 
also a new institutionally has been established that seeks to develop and 
regulate the diverse providers that are now recognised to exist on 
multiple scales. In essence, failure to channel sufficient resources and 
funding into this initiative, or to develop and finalise a new water law 
means that the reforms to not mark a radical departure from the previous 
neoliberal path. Consequently the municipal models of provision continue 
to persist in urban areas, while informal water providers fill the gap in 
rural and peri-urban regions. This reveals that the right to water has not 
led to an overhaul of the established system. 
 
In the following chapter I explore the many waterscapes of Cochabamba, 
within and beyond the municipal parameters that the public utility 
SEMAPA should provide, and the power relations between different 
actors. 
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Chapter 5. The City  
 
In order to explore the role of peri-urban drinking water committees 
(DWCs), and the implications that reforms to recognise the right to water 
have had on peri-urban DWCs, I first set out the many waterscapes of 
Cochabamba. I draw on the well-established notion that urban 
waterscapes are hydro-social constructs (Swyngedouw 1999; Gandy 
2006; Loftus 2007) and that power relations within society shape them. 
Formal and informal waterscapes exist on different scales (see Hinjosa 
and Budds; 2012). In the case of Bolivia, the formal urban waterscape is 
premised on the municipality. In practice, the state’s failure to entrench 
and develop the municipal water provider adequately means that many 
diverse informal providers exist within the municipality. These have 
emerged in order to provide water at the level of the community within 
and beyond the limits of the municipality. The public water utility SEMAPA 
continues to promote rhetoric around consolidating the municipal model 
of service provision across the whole municipality, particularly in peri-
urban regions where community providers have proliferated to fill the gap 
in service provision. In practice I demonstrate that diverse community 
providers have historically contested, and continue to contest the 
municipal ideal with community level alternatives, thus subverting the 
state model of provision and municipal waterscape. The model for water 
governance within the municipality has been undermined over time and 
has become increasingly contested by the diverse informal providers 
which have flourished.  
 
I begin this chapter by setting out the physical water sources that supply 
the waterscapes in and around the municipality. I then explore the 
historical development of the municipality of Cochabamba, specifically the 
social processes that have shaped how people access water here and 
the waterscapes that have been forged as a result. Access to water in the 
municipality of Cochabamba is fragmented. The public utility SEMAPA 
provides water to elites in the centre and the north, but provision is 
unreliable and customers often rely on water vendors during the dry 
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months to top up their water tanks. Meanwhile informal and communal 
systems serve both wealthy and poorer communities beyond the centre. 
Water vendors provide water to the poorest communities, but also top up 
when SEMAPA or community water systems are experiencing water 
shortages. There is a long history of collective organising around water 
management in peri-urban Cochabamba and thus grassroots irrigation 
and drinking water systems are part of the rich fabric of the waterscape. 
The concept of the community water provider is thus ubiquitous but also 
rather ambiguous, and so this chapter explores and defines four different 
manifestations of community water provision in and around the 
municipality of Cochabamba.  In doing so I argue that while informal 
water providers are diverse, few are truly autonomous, and they vary 
greatly in their effectiveness as water providers.  
 
Community-led providers recognise the power and agency they 
command by retaining some control over water provision at a local level, 
and are unwilling to relinquish that control over water provision. By 
managing and providing water services at the level of the community, 
community water providers are undermining the established structures of 
the state. This chapter begins to outline some of the struggles for control 
between informal providers, and also between informal water provider 
and the state, although this relationship will be discussed in further detail 
in the following chapter. The unit of focus in this chapter is just beyond 
the municipality (see map 2), which extends beyond the urban centre to 
incorporate the peri-urban areas and the irrigators, who are inherently 
tied to the city for reasons that will be explained in this chapter.  
 
Water sources in the municipality 
The municipal provider SEMAPA has historically relied on a series of 
wells that exploit the aquifer to the north east of the city in the 
surrounding regions of Muyurina and Vinto. It also uses a range of 
surface sources including the lakes and reservoirs of lakes Warawara, 
Escalerani, and Saytokocha. 95% of SEMAPA’s water sources are 
beyond the city (Los Tiempos 2011). Increasingly these sources have 
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been contested by local communities who argue that the state is 
exploiting water sources on their land, to the detriment of their local wells. 
The communities of El Paso blocked the main road out of Cochabamba 
to La Paz in mid 2011 in protest (Los Tiempos 2011). These sources do 
not provide sufficient water for the provider and during the dry months 
some parts of the city rely on water vendors. These shortages feed the 
discourse among Cochabambinos that the region has become prone to 
natural water scarcity.  
 
There were two principle narratives that I would hear regularly from 
Cochabambinos; first, that the rainy season has become shorter and 
second that Cochabamba receives less rain during that season. During 
the first months I spent in the field I accepted these ideas, I was told that 
the rains came later and that the season was shorter. Using data 
available from the state meteorology department I set about verifying 
these claims. I plotted out the annual rainfall taken at a station near the 
airport, and it transpired that while rain patterns were highly erratic from 
year to year, there was no downward trend (see figure 2). With regard to 
the second point, the length of the rainy season did vary from year to 
year, but again there was no decreasing trend.  
 
 
Figure 2: Average annual rainfall Cochabamba 1942 – 2012 (mm) 
This idea of the declining rains and shortening rainy season was used by 
Cochabambinos to explain why SEMAPA’s water supply was limited 
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during the dry season and also why the Misicuni dam building project was 
essential. The perceived decrease in rainwater levels was often put down 
to climate change and often linked to occurrences in other parts of Bolivia 
that are widely thought to be due to climate change in the Andes (Vidal 
2011). Most frequently comparisons would be made with the severe 
droughts experienced in the dairy farming region of Pasorapa south of 
Cochabamba and also the dramatic melting of glaciers north of the capitol 
La Paz. While rainfall may not be decreasing, what is certain is that 
SEMAPA’s water system needs upgrading and is subject to leaks. The 
surface water supplies that SEMAPA have historically relied on have 
been running dry for some time (Laurie and Marvin 1999), which is not a 
direct consequence of climate change. In fact several commentators have 
highlighted that SEMAPA loses substantial amounts to clandestine 
connections and leaking pipelines estimated to be at around 55% (Shultz 
and Draper 2009:35). The utility has tried to negotiate rights to use other 
water sources belonging to irrigators in the region: its future development 
now rests on the Misicuni dam project due to be finished in 201542.  
 
SEMAPA’s on-going attempt to build a universal water system is 
dependent on the completion of the Misicuni dam. Since 1952, it has 
been the proposed solution to Cochabamba’s water woes. The project is 
centred on damming three rivers in the mountains north of Cochabamba 
although it has been remodelled several times over the years. During the 
1970s the IADB provided funding for a more detailed scoping exercise 
which developed the dam into a multipurpose project, providing water for 
irrigation, potable water for the municipality of Cochabamba and 
hydroelectricity. 
 
The project would provide a potable water source for the municipality and 
also a method of promoting economic growth and the development of the 
agricultural sector in the region. Although, in light of the rapid expansion 
of the city of Cochabamba and the lack of accurate demographic data on 
                                                
42 Misicuni employee, Misicuni site visit, March 10th 2010 
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the Zona Sur, some water activists and engineers that I met were not 
sure that the Misicuni dam would be able to keep up with the needs of the 
population. 
 
Several presidents and municipal mayors have promised to make this 
hydric dream a reality. The project has, however, been prone to stops 
and starts. Principally, it has been difficult to secure funding. Before the 
1990s there were insufficient public funds and foreign investment, then 
during the early 1990s disagreements between local and central 
government about the capacity of the project slowed progress. Following 
that, as the state began the privatisation of water services in the late 
1990s, Misicuni became part of a neoliberal dream not only to secure the 
water future of Cochabamba but also its economic development (Laurie 
and Marvin 1999). The dam was part of the Cochabamba concession 
granted to Aguas de Tunari, this was the same concession that ignited 
the Water War and which came to an abrupt end when the concession 
was terminated in 2001 as a result of the unrest. 
 
Funding was eventually secured from the Italian development agency to 
complete the project. The first phase, which was to drill a tunnel of just 
less than 20 km through the mountain ridge so that the water could reach 
the valley below, was completed in 2005. This was no mean feat and the 
first tunnel of its type to be constructed in Latin America. This phase was 
completed in 2005, at which point Misicuni was reconstituted as a public 
project, run by the state, to secure further funding for phase 2 and 3, the 
dam building phases. Ultimately the 120 metre dam will channel the water 
of three rivers through the tunnel to be distributed to irrigators and to a 
SEMAPA processing plant that will distribute potable water.  
 
Once the second phase of construction is completed, it is projected that 
the project will deliver 3,100 l/s of potable water to Cochabamba and the 
surrounding towns and 1,100 l/s for irrigation and 120 m/w an hour of 
electricity. An employee of Misicuni have declared that this will be 
sufficient water for the municipality and possibly for nearby towns, if they 
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can secure funding and infrastructure for connections43. Phase 2 began 
during Evo Morales’ first term as president in 2007 and since then the 
president has ostentatiously adopted the project as his own, linking it to 
constitutional endeavours to reform the water sector around a public 
model and to recognise the human right to water.  
 
The president of Bolivia, Evo Morales, signed an agreement this 
Saturday to build the Misicuni dam that will provide water for the 
city of Cochabamba and several provinces. He said that this 
huge public project consolidated the national struggle to realise 
the human right to water and that water provision should not be 
privatised for the benefit of just a few; ‘During the struggle to 
recognise water as a human right…and the struggle of 2000 (the 
Water War), I realised that water could not be privatised, it is a 
natural resource. How then can companies appropriate this 
natural resource to sell it?" … Morales said that the struggle was 
not only regional and national, it was also international, ‘Water is 
a human right and basic services are a human right’. (Los 
Tiempos 2009) 
 
The excerpt from the news article above demonstrates how Misicuni has 
shifted from a privatisation project to become an emblem of the 
nationalisation of basic service provision, fitting neatly into the anti-
privatisation narrative, rooted in the Water Wars, which formed the basis 
for reforms to the Bolivian water sector. A project that was once a 
neoliberal pipe dream has been developed and has secured state funding 
under the Morales government. This could be seen as a major 
achievement and a pivotal part of the industrial socialism or Andean 
capitalist project.  
 
The president claims that completion of the Misicuni project will enable 
the state to begin enacting the rights to basic services that are set out in 
the constitution, while also driving local development by providing water 
to the powerful irrigator groups and hydro-electricity to the municipality. 
Conversely, it currently provides a convenient reason why access to 
water has not improved in the Zona Sur since Morales was elected. In the 
late 1990s, the dam was a billed as a project that would modernise water 
                                                
43 Misicuni employee, Cochabamba, Feb 04 2010 
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provision in the municipality, further industrialising water provision so that 
it could be distributed universally to customers of the public utility.  
 
Misicuni has raised no strong opposition from the relocated communities 
who have been relocated and compensated, 44  or from local 
environmental NGOs or activists that I visited while in the field. 
Furthermore, the state has framed Misicuni as an inclusive project that 
will lead to improved and more equal access to water across the Zona 
Sur. Both the MMAYA and SEMAPA have made a public commitment to 
prioritising Misicuni water for the most marginalised peri- urban 
communities in Zona Sur.  
The main beneficiaries will be the peri- urban zones, especially 
in the southern zone, because they will have new networks and 
will be able to have 24-hour service with good pressure…" said 
general manager SEMAPA, Leonardo Anaya (Caero 2009) 
 
At the time of writing, the public utility SEMAPA had not secured funding 
to expand water provision into the Zona Sur to deliver Misicuni water. 
There are contested ideas about who should access and distribute the 
water. ASICASUD EPSAS have presented alternative proposals to the 
SEMAPA model, to the Ministry for Water and the Environment. In these, 
DWCs in the peri-urban Zona Sur could access and distribute MISICUNI 
water using a series of mega tanks and pre-existing DWC water systems: 
this continues to be contested. 
 
The aquifer  
Most suburban and peri-urban water committees rely on water from the 
aquifer. These tend to be accessed using wells within the community, but 
sometimes can be piped from wells in another community. In the Zona 
Sur of Cochabamba, this is generally saline and can be contaminated as 
a result of insufficient sanitation and the presence of industries and dairy 
                                                
44 The IAB funded the relocation of the nuemerous communites that were living in adobe 
huts in the valley that is set to be flooded. This was a relatively successful relocaton, 
there had been no opposition, and the relocated groups had new houses and schools 
and churches with windows and running water. Despite this the community members 
had requested that their old adobe houses be moved up the hill, and the new houses 
were being used by many to keep their animals in.  
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farming in the region. The topography of the valley means that the aquifer 
is naturally prone to salinity but this has been exacerbated by over-
exploitation, which happens as a result of wells being too close to one 
another, or using pumps that are too intensive45. This also means that 
many community wells are now starting to run dry. Furthermore, the city 
dump K’ara K’ara is poorly lined and prone to seepage, thus 
contaminating the water supplies of nearby communities (Mamani 2010). 
The impact of peri-urban processes on the aquifer and the process by 
which peri-urban communities address the contamination and depletion 
of the aquifer are discussed in more detail in chapter 7. Before exploring 
some of the diverse water providers that exploit the aquifer, I begin by 
setting out a brief overview of the urbanisation of Cochabamba. 
 
The urbanisation of Cochabamba 
Nestled in the Cochabamba valley, off the slopes of the Andes, the city is 
enclosed by the park and peak of Tunari to the north and the mountains 
of the Cordillera Real to the west (see figure 4).  
 
 
Figure 3: Cochabamba from the northeast 
 
                                                
45 NGO-affiliated Engineer, Cochabamba 
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The municipality stretches out to the more rural agricultural regions to the 
neighbouring towns of Tiquipaya and Quilacollo to the west and towards 
Sacaba in the east (see figure 4). The arid urban Zona Sur extends down 
beyond Alalay lagoon and formal housing and basic services peter out as 
one ventures into the informal settlement of the Zona Sur, in the more 
inhospitable hilly regions that lead down to the rural dairy farming areas 
of the department (see figure 5).  
 
Figure 4: Satellite image on the centre of the city 
 
Figure 5: Satellite image of the Zona Sur 
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Cochabamba had an estimated urban population of 1,197,071 in 2010 
(MMAYA, 2011) and, while the city has grown rapidly over recent 
decades and the centre and parts of the peri-urban south are very urban, 
there is a strong agricultural presence in and around the city. Dairy 
farming is still practiced in the Zona Sur, while flowers, fruits and 
vegetables are still grown just outside the city and farmers continue to be 
linked to the city because of the enormous market that the city has grown 
around. 
 
The Cochabamba valley has been inhabited by indigenous communities 
since before the arrival of the Spanish and was known locally as 
Qhochapampa which is Quechua for lake flood plain. The communities 
that settled here flourished because of the fertile soils and abundant 
water sources. The Spanish established it as a city, Villa Oropesa, in 
1574, but soon renamed it Cochabamba, a Spanish interpretation of its 
indigenous name. The name embodies the Castilian-Quechua mix that 
still characterises the culture, language and ethnicity of the city today. 
Agriculture thrived here and the region soon became the breadbasket of 
Bolivia as a result of the fertile soils and temperate climate. Local 
indigenous populations provided the Spanish with labour both for the 
growing agricultural sector in the region and also for the expanding mines 
in and around Potosi. The region continued to develop around small-
scale agricultural production and the hacienda system, while the ‘cancha’ 
or market in the south centre of the city attracted agriculturalists from the 
surrounding regions.  
 
The city continued to grow steadily, until the first half of the 20th century, 
when it expanded rapidly to the south and north around the new roads 
and infrastructure for transport was developed. Goldstein (2004) outlines 
urban planning for the city during the latter half of the century and its 
focus on creating an ordered and segregated modern city (65). Urqidi, the 
principal architect behind the socio-political project of modernising 
Cochabamba and its transformation from a rural town to a contemporary 
city, drew heavily on the ideas of the ‘Garden City’ from Europe, which 
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influenced the post-colonial development of many Latin American cities. 
Based on the idea of building cities surrounded by greenbelts for 
agriculture and leisure, Urquidi attempted to zonify modern Cochabamba.  
For these architects and political backers in the city’s municipal 
council, the goal of urban planning was to create an efficient and 
industrious city, based on the modernist principle of functional 
segregation as a means to create order, balance and economic 
productivity. (ibid)  
 
Such planning, it was hoped would ensure the orderly development of the 
city in the future (ibid: 70). However, the orderly development of the city 
was undermined by three waves of migration that formed the sprawling, 
unequal, municipality of Cochabamba that exists today. 
 
Communal organising for water on the urban fringes 
The revolution of 1952 brought a wave of rural-urban migration to the 
municipality:  it also re-ordered the form and organisation of agriculture in 
the department as the haciendas were disbanded and land was re-
distributed to peasants (as discussed in chapter 3). This was to 
dramatically change the waterscape as groups of farmers developed 
communally managed irrigation systems in the north and north-west of 
the municipality that continue to have a notable physical and political 
presence today (see figure 5). Systems were formed around pre-existing 
irrigation systems from the haciendas. Los Regantes (the irrigators) 
developed and managed their irrigation systems using rules based on 
dynamic usos y costumbres or uses and customs. The usos y 
costumbres of Los Regantes have been shaped by the physical 
constraints of the river basin, historic and cultural processes, mutually 
agreed water rights and long-term strategies for the management of the 
river basin (Flores et al 2004: 11). . 
 
Irrigation-led agriculture is not the norm in Bolivia, it is estimated that only 
25% (Perreault 2008: 847) rely on the method. In Cochabamba, however, 
a region that supplies much of the country’s fruit and vegetables, 
intensive farming has been driven by irrigation. In 2000 it was estimated 
that just over 70% of farming in the municipality was irrigated (Assies 
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2000:19). Irrigation has provided Los Regantes with relatively profitable 
livelihoods and, as a result, they have mobilized aggressively at different 
points since the 1990s to defend their irrigation systems and livelihoods. 
During the 1990s some came together to form an association of irrigators 
known as FEDECOR (The Cochabamba Departmental Federation of 
Irrigator Organizations), a platform of irrigators that became an effective 
and visible political block representing the views of irrigators in Bolivia. 
They mobilized to defend irrigation sources from depletion by wells 
excavated by SEMAPA to meet the needs of the urban population. Later, 
in 2000, it was the irrigators who first took to the streets during the Water 
Wars, in defence of their water systems that were to be appropriated as 
part of the Aguas de Tunari concession.  
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, during the 2000s FEDECOR 
became a political platform for irrigators to influence water policy and 
legislation, most notably the River Law of 2004 that protected their water 
rights, uses and customs, and in turn the livelihoods of the irrigators. 
Perreault (2008) has contended that FEDECOR has provided a platform 
by which community-level irrigators can interact with the state and gain 
leverage to influence policy.  
 
The first urban water committees 
Urban drinking water providers began emerging amongst the informal 
communities which first appeared in Cochabamba during the late 1950s. 
This was spurred by the migration that began as a result of the end of 
bonded labour in the late 1940s (Kohl et al, 2011). The city, however, was 
unable to provide enough cheap housing for the growing population and 
so small, sporadic informal settlements began emerging in the arid, 
mountainous land to the south of the city, which had previously been only 
sparsely populated by some farmers.  
People began to organise as settlers or renters unions with the 
intent of securing permanent housing for their members, even if 
that meant colonising land deemed ‘un-urbanisable’ by the 
alcaldia. Between 1955 and 1961, these renters’ unions initiated 
the first land invasions in the city. The land that these groups 
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occupied, on two hills in the Zona Sur [Cerro gran Miguel and 
Cerro Verde] overlooking laguna Alalay… (Goldstein 2004: 72)  
 
In the bottom right hand corner of figure 4, there is a lake. To the south of 
this is the location of the first informal settlements. Today it is the 
beginning of the Zona Sur, but figure 4 demonstrates how much the 
region has expanded since then. 
 
Land invasions continued throughout the 1960s and 1970s, then during 
the 1980s, after the crash in the cost of metals and the closure and 
privatisation of the mines in accordance with a structural readjustment 
program, a second wave of mining migrants led to the development of 
new informal communities, but this time further south of the municipality. 
This changed the demography and form of Cochabamba again, but also 
had an impact on the demography and land use of nearby rural areas.  
 
Migrants looking to take advantage of the booming trade in coca quickly 
populated the tropical region of the Chapare to the north east of 
Cochabamba.  Meanwhile, the sprawling peri-urban Zona Sur of 
Cochabamba became home to economic and political migrants looking 
for cheap land and or accommodation. There were then some migrants 
who worked seasonally growing coca, but built a family house in the Zona 
Sur of Cochabamba: the boom in coca thus partially funded the 
urbanisation of the south. The Zona Sur developed largely as a result of 
the impetus of ‘savvy’ loteadoras46 trying to make a ‘quick buck’, buoyed 
by the absence of any real regulation of the expansion. The impact of the 
loteadora-led development is discussed in further detail in chapter 7. 
 
The state chose to overlook the invaders and loteadoras until the early 
1990s, thus creating a peri-urban population that were socially, 
economically and politically marginalised from the outset. This began 
during the 1970s when the municipality initiated a policy of exclusion and 
                                                
46 Lodeadoras would illegally appropriate unused land on the edge of the city carve it 
into blocks and sell it off for migrants who wanted to build cheap housing in the region. 
The impact of this approach is discussed in more detail in chapter 7. 
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illegalisation criminalisation of the informal barrios that were emerging in 
and around the centre. The process of urbanisation led to the peri-
urbanisation of the social and environmental inequalities that were 
marginalised to the edge of the city.  
 
The city thus grew with labour and resources that were brought in from 
the edge of the city; communities that are simultaneously integral to and 
excluded from the development of the city. This, in turn, seriously 
undermined broader urban planning for the city and meant that its 
residents have driven peri-urbanisation of the Zona Sur and the state had 
very limited legitimacy.  
By (the) 1990s, the architectural impulse to produce an ordered 
city through physical design of the urban environment had 
failed… Indeed by 1993 80% of all the peripheral barrios were 
categorised as clandestine or illegal, a figure that encompassed 
40% of the total urban population… By ignoring the legal 
requirements of urbanisation, migrants themselves had taken 
control of the urban development process… the unintended 
consequence of excluding these neighbourhoods from 
membership in the city had been to prevent the state from 
penetrating and controlling the excluded barrios. (Goldstein 
2004: 79) 
 
Access to water services reflected the exclusion and segregation of 
migrant peri-urban communities from the centre and the basic services 
granted to the elites living in the old centre. There has been a citywide 
water provider in Cochabamba since 1948, but the public water utility 
SEMAPA was established in its first incarnation in 1967 as a 
decentralised public body responsible for the technical, administrative 
provision of water and sanitation across the municipality of Cochabamba. 
The municipalisation of water provision during this period did not, 
however, extend to the whole municipality.  
 
Mirroring the trend observed in many developing countries during the 20th 
century Cochabamba experienced an infrastructural crisis reflecting 
broader economic and political processes (Marvin and Laurie 1999). The 
municipality became more densely populated and simultaneously 
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continued to expand, urbanising the surrounding regions, but did not 
develop sufficient infrastructure to meet the water and sanitation needs of 
the city, particularly the poorer migrant communities in the peri-urban 
Zona Sur. The public utility, like the sector at large, was underfunded until 
the 1990s, with less than 1% of public investment in the sector prior to 
privatisation (Oporto and Salinas 2007) and infrastructure was prioritised 
for the urban centre. This meant that large parts of the city were left un-
served by the public utility and came to rely on informal communal 
provision and water vendors.  
 
As part of the conditions attached to a World Bank loan during the 1990s, 
the process of privatising the water sector began in the late 1990s. 
Mirroring the trend for privatisation observed across Latin America during 
this period driven by international financial institutions, the failing public 
providers were replaced with private sector participation. This led to the 
Water War, as discussed in chapter 3. As outlined in chapter 4, soon after 
law 2066 was passed to protect the rights of communities to provide 
water and the uses and customs, as well as the social and cultural value 
that is linked to the water systems. The Water War sought to defend and 
further galvanise the struggles of the alternative local water providers that 
had emerged out of the space left by the state and in opposition to private 
sector involvement.  
 
In the long term the irrigation systems and DWCs have become sacred 
cows. It would be politically unviable for the state to advocate the 
absorption of community-led water providers by a public or private 
initiative. Additionally, and as outlined in the previous chapter, private 
sector participation in the water sector has been prohibited under Evo 
Morales, and furthermore, since 2006, the role and capacity of community 
providers has been advocated as a solution to improving access to water 
in rural and peri-urban areas. 
 
The reforms to date have sought to re-order the waterscape, moving 
beyond traditional conceptualisations of a universal municipal- wide water 
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provider, to engage with informal water providers operating at the level of 
the community. The implications of these reforms appear to be a form of 
co-option or incorporation which is discussed in more detail in chapter 6, 
7 and 8. However, in order to understand the role diverse providers play, I 
begin by exploring some of the shortcomings of the public utility across 
the municipality over time (its role in the Zona Sur is discussed in more 
detail in chapter 6). I then explore the persistence and development of 
informal water providers and the relationships of power that exist between 
these diverse actors. The following section will provide a very brief 
overview of the public provider SEMAPA and the gaps in its coverage. 
This is to contextualise the development of the diverse community water 
providers in Cochabamba. The utility’s role in the peri-urban Zona Sur is 
discussed in more detail in chapter 6.  
 
“SEMAPA? It’s all but broken”47 
Over a decade after being re-instated as the public utility for the 
municipality water provision, SEMAPA has not made much progress in 
improving access to water across the municipality. It only covers the 
centre of the city (see map 3). This is widely accepted to be attributable to 
a number of factors. Firstly, insufficient investment in the sector by the 
state and weak regulation (Baer 2012). Secondly, the inability to secure 
funding as a result of a poor credit rating, which is in turn a consequence 
of inefficient project implementation (interview with SEMAPA employee, 
October 16th 2011). Thirdly, corruption and poor management (Driessen 
2008). Beyond the political and economic processes that restrict the 
expansion of SEMAPA into the Zona Sur, the region poses particular 
technical difficulties. The mountainous terrain and unplanned barrios and 
informal constructions make it difficult and expensive to develop and 
extend water and sanitation systems. There have, however, been 
insufficient technical studies as a result of insufficient funds and 
investment in the sector to really explore the viability of extending the 
network (MMAyA 2008). Recently, SEMAPA’s coverage has declined. In 
                                                
47 Civil servant planning department of MMAYA, La Paz, November 17th 2010 
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2010 47.97% (SEMAPA 2012) of the population received SEMAPA water 
compared to just over 60% in 1997, however, given the increase in 
population in the region this may not equate to fewer connections, but it is 
certainly not impossible. SEMAPA has not had the funding or the capacity 
to maintain and upgrade a decaying water and sewage system or tackle 
widespread clandestine water connections48.  
 
Community water providers in and around Cochabamba 
Drinking water committees exist all over the municipality of Cochabamba 
often as an alternative to the poor service delivered by the municipal 
provider (see map 2). They are more concentrated in the Zona Sur, 
however, because of the absence of any municipal provision in this area. 
It is estimated that there are 500-600 small-scale formal and informal 
potable water providers in the municipality of Cochabamba (World Bank 
Water and Sanitation Program 2007), and 149 formal community water 
providers in the peri-urban Zona Sur of Cochabamba (ibid:18).  
 
It is important not to make generalisations about the community water 
systems in Cochabamba, they emerge under different circumstances, 
and thus the term community-provider covers a broad range of providers. 
Generally it is possible to group them into two camps. Some have 
developed using state funding through the LPP (Popular Participation 
Law), which is outlined in more detail in the previous chapter, but are 
managed by the community. Others are community-led initiatives that 
have emerged with the financial and institutional support of NGOs and 
the church, which can be on going. I did not encounter any that were truly 
autonomous (that is managed by the community with resources from 
within the community and without any funding or capacity from outside 
the community).  
 
I want to avoid romanticising these organisations from the outset; they 
are often plagued by conflict, for reasons that will be discussed in more 
                                                
48 SEMAPA presentation as part of the Water War +10 events, Cochabamba, April 15th 
2010 
 151 
detail in chapter 7. Water committees can be fragile institutions and are 
often undermined by limited water, financial and human resources. 
Alongside the increasing demand for water from a growing peri-urban 
population this means that water committees are prone to fading off in 
one region only to mushroom in another. In the following section I set out 
a typology of water providers.  
 
Water providers are diverse and dynamic and thus are difficult to group 
and label. What follows is by no means a comprehensive typology of all 
of the community providers that exist in and around the municipality of 
Cochabamba.  Instead it sets out some of the diverse forms of providers 
that have emerged beyond and within the formal municipal waterscape, 
and how they exist and relate to the state and other actors. I begin by 
considering the water system belonging to Villa Juan 23. This is a 
relatively stable community-led water system and somewhat typical of the 
types that exist in the northern and western suburbs of Cochabamba. I 
then explore the development and capacity of diverse community water 
providers in the peri-urban Zona Sur, and how communities without a 
committee or access to SEMAPA access water. 
 
The suburban water committees  
Examples of the urban Cochabambino communities that benefited from 
the 1994 reforms which decentralised state control and financial 
resources in accordance with the Law of Popular Participation can be 
found in the suburban barrios in the North West of the city (highlighted in 
map 2). More recently these impacts have also been felt in the peri-urban 
south of the city. On the road heading west from the centre of the city 
towards Quiacollo, there are several barrios that were established during 
the 1980s by miners who had been displaced as a result of the closure of 
state-owned mines during that period. Villa Juan 2349 is a suburban 
barrio, located around 4km outside the centre of the city in the barrio and 
populated by teachers, shop-owners, dentists and housewives. Vecinos 
                                                
49 Methods used to gather the data that informs this section are discussed in chapter 2. 
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(residents) here live a comfortable life; many own cars and may have 
enough money to pay for their child to go to private school; several 
families own second properties and apartment blocks that they rent out.  
 
The miners who settled in Villa Juan 23 had worked in the same mine 
and lived in the same villages. As such, the community is characterised 
by stable pre-existing relationships between families which makes for a 
coherent social structure. When they arrived in Cochabamba, the miners 
were well-organised and coordinated work together to set up the basic 
services that they needed. Using per capita funds available to the 
community through the LLP they excavated a well:  the residents were 
fortunate that the well tapped into an abundant water source. This water 
is for community members only and, while funding for the construction of 
the system and some upgrading came from the LPP, the system is 
operated by the community and extracts water from the aquifer using the 
well that the community has exclusive usufruct rights to. The community’s 
resident’s association (OTB) manages the water supply with the 
participation of residents, along with other devolved aspects of everyday 
life.  Residents of Villa Juan 23 pay less for water than SEMAPA 
customers and claim that they have better quality water, a claim I was 
unable to verify for this thesis. Villa Juan 23 residents have supported the 
development of their water systems and basic services in the barrio with 
money through the LPP. The community has the option of having its 
water supplied by SEMAPA directly, or to have the existing system 
managed by SEMAPA, however, they prefer to continue to manage their 
own water systems for their community.   
 
Villa Juan 23’s story is not an uncommon one. In the centre and north of 
the city, there are several communities which have built and maintain 
their own water supply. Similar self organising communities are even 
emerging in the barrios of the Zona Sur closest to the city. These systems 
are often built with communal funds, but become embedded through the 
use of LPP funds. Community members in these areas talk positively 
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about the LPP, as one of the most useful recent policies that the 
community has been able to use to steer local development.  
 
While Villa Juan 23’s water system requires the time and effort of the 
vecinos, they believe it is a fair trade off for cheaper, better quality water, 
which is less likely to run dry during the dry season50. Villa Juan 23 is 
bound by an identity forged in their original mining community which is 
still very strong within the barrio today. This is evidenced through events 
that re-affirm their identity as a mining community, such as anniversaries 
of the re-settlement. Vecinos know their neighbours; they have a shared 
sense of history that they regale with one another;  they decorate their 
houses in photos and memorabilia from their mining community and 
share stories that re-affirm their collective identity. There are high levels 
of participation in the development and management of the water system 
and community-led activities across the barrio. This community has 
developed a water system that works and they are unwilling to give it up. 
SEMAPA have offered to incorporate their system into their main line and 
they have refused. The community was unwilling to participate in 
meetings that bring DWCs together from other parts of the municipality. 
One meeting I attended with a member of the community was organised 
by FEDECOR and attempted to bring diverse communal drinking water 
providers together from across the municipality. However, the only reason 
we attended the meeting was because they were keen for me to observe 
one of these meetings; they didn't really participate in it.  
 
In general, the community preferred to operate independently, using LPP 
or communal funds. Furthermore, there are fears amongst community 
elders that the reforms to recognise the right to water and universalise 
access to water may have detrimental effects on the community’s water 
supply. One barrio elder explained to me that he had heard rumours that 
there were plans afoot to start piping water from abundant springs such 
                                                
50 That is not to say that there aren’t a few vecinos who choose to opt out of the system, 
the option of buying in SEMAPA water is open to vecinos. 
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as his down to the communities of the Zona Sur. These fears are 
unfounded, but demonstrate the strong sense of collective ownership and 
rights to water sources within communities and the lack of willingness to 
compromise those water sources.  
 
This community is not ‘Masista’51, like the irrigator communities that are 
part of FEDECOR. Community members tended to be cautiously 
pragmatic about the reforms proposed by Evo Morales and his 
government. Their lack of enthusiasm for reforms to link up water 
providers in the municipality, through informal or state-led initiatives is 
symptomatic of the fact that the community has developed its own water 
system independently that works efficiently. Any change to that system 
has the potential to undermine water provision in the area. Villa Juan 23 
residents have a reputation for their skills and efficiency at local 
organising, and thus appear to be the exception to the rule. Some of their 
neighbouring barrios have had their own community-developed water 
systems in the past but the water has dried up, or the community has 
decided it would rather receive water from SEMAPA. 
 
Water systems in the barrio here are not dissimilar to those in other 
communities to the west and north of the centre that have developed 
them themselves but received financial support from the state through the 
LPP. Community leaders in these areas talk positively about the LPP, 
one ex-president of the barrio explained that he thought the LPP had 
brought more positive change to the barrio than any other policy since it 
had been established. Decentralising funds has promoted local 
development and fostered a strong sense of community. Because the 
community is well organised and has access to resources such as a 
plentiful water supply, they have been able to develop a barrio that 
functions well and a water system that is cheaper and supposedly 
supplies better water than SEMAPA. Ironically, a state-led initiative has 
forged a community that is now unwilling to cooperate and become 
                                                
51 Pro MAS (Movement for Socialism) Evo Morales’ political party 
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involved with development initiatives outside the barrio. Similarly to the 
irrigators, Villa Juan 23 believes it has the right to usufruct water via their 
well, to manage their water service independently, and to own and 
develop their own infrastructure.  
 
Informal water providers have always existed across Cochabamba, and 
thus water provision has always been splintered, as outlined by Kooy and 
Bakker (2008). The LPP, as part of decentralising neo-liberal reforms 
advocated during the early 1990s in Bolivia has served to re-enforce this 
fragmented provision, but this is not necessarily a bad thing. Villa Juan 
23’s experience demonstrates that while decentralising funds to support 
local water provision can be effective, its success is dependent on 
cohesive social relations, a willingness to participate, and plentiful, clean 
water sources.  
 
In the following pages I present the three different types of water 
provision in the peri-urban Zona Sur, a region that is poorer and more 
socially fragmented than the centre and north of the city, and suburban 
barrios such as Villa Juan 23. I present two different types of communal 
water providers, and the water vendors that serve the poorest 
communities. I discuss their relationships with other state and non-state 
actors and their capacity to meet the water needs of local communities. 
 
The peri-urban drinking water committees  
The Drinking Water Committees are products of the community-led 
development that has characterised the Zona Sur as a result of exclusion 
by the state, the failure of SEMAPA, and the initiatives of NGOs and the 
church. DWCs are predominantly found in communities in the south and 
south-eastern corners of the municipality (see Map 2), in districts 5,6,7,8 
9 and 14 of the municipality that are collectively known as the Zona Sur 
(see Map 4). Many of these barrios were established around the same 
time. 
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Map 4: Districts 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 14.  
 
Most DWCs appeared following the second wave of migration into the 
Zona Sur during the 1980s, outlined earlier in this chapter, and the 
migration has continued into district 9 more recently (highlighted in Map 
5). The Zona Sur is generally portrayed as poor, it uniformly ranks low on 
the human development index (see Map 6), but the poverty is not 
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uniformly manifested. Poverty tends to be peripheralised southwards in 
the Zona Sur; the most recently settled populations have settled on the 
furthermost and most inhospitable edges of the city. Poverty also 
manifests itself spatially within barrios, as the poorest residents live on 
the edge of communities (the reasons for this are discussed in more 
detail in chapter 7).  
Map 5: Urban expansion. [Orange highlights regions that were 
consolidated up to 2005. Yellow up to 1985 and the browns between 
1945 and 1965] 
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Some communities (although these are not the poorest) have driven 
basic service provision in the Zona Sur. Over time the state and diverse 
NGOs have provided or co-produced some basic services here (this 
process is discussed in more detail in chapters 6 and 7). Some 
communities have developed basic services more efficiently than others.  
 
Map 6: Human Development Index by district Cochabamba 2001 
It is estimated that 50% of the water in the Zona Sur is provided by 
committees (Ledo 2009: 85). There are pockets of provision that emerged 
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prior to the privatisation of water provision, they have, however, 
proliferated in the years following the water wars as a result of the church 
and private foundations that were established to support community 
water providers in the wake of the Water War.  Peri-urban communities in 
this region are more internally fragmented and disjointed than those of 
the irrigators and the mining and dairy farming communities in the west. 
This is a consequence of the mixed migration and the fact that many of 
the residents in these communities return to the country for seasonal 
work or only come to the city temporarily, for example students during 
term time (this is discussed in further detail in chapter 7).  
 
There are communities in the Zona Sur that are not, (or were not 
immediately), recognised by the state, and so they cannot (or couldn’t) 
access decentralised state funds. Even if they are formally recognised, 
LPP funding may not be sufficient for them to develop a water system in 
view of the physical challenges of developing a water system in the Zona 
Sur. The financial and human cost of maintaining and developing 
systems in this area is high because of the difficult terrain and limited 
water supplies.  Water systems tend to consist of one or two wells and a 
small pipeline. They are managed and maintained collectively or with the 
help of the church or NGOs operating in the region. As a rule, there are 
individual connections to each household. Committees and associations 
are structured around local uses and customs based on ideas of mutual 
aid.  
 
The scarcity of water in this region, allied to the population density, lack of 
sanitation and presence of polluting industries, means that water in this 
part of the aquifer is declining and becoming contaminated by domestic 
and industrial sources (Ghielmi et al 2008). Many of the physical and 
social features described above undermine communal provision in per-
urban areas. Dwindling water supplies and poor management of water 
committees leads to conflict with vecinos who feel that the residents’ 
association might be better placed to manage the water system.  
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Conflict over access to water sources has also arisen between 
communities as increasing population has led to increased competition 
for water resources. Chapter 7 draws on ethnographic material gathered 
in one community characterised by conflict in the Zona Sur. The chapter 
explores the role of DWCs, their capacity to meet the water needs of their 
members and the broader implications that DWC-led provision has for 
local environmental integrity. 
 
Water committees proliferated here during the 2000s with the support of 
the church and water-focussed NGOs and the post-water war climate 
(discussed in the following chapter). While SEMAPA had been re-
instated, their plans to extend provision to the Zona Sur did not come into 
fruition. In the vacuum that was left, the water committees of the Zona 
Sur federated to form ASICASUDD-EPSAS. This association, formed in 
2004, has provided marginalised peri-urban water providers with a 
platform to interact with the state and NGOs and to advocate an 
alternative model for water provision in the Zona Sur, based on the co-
gestion or co-management of water services. Associations and 
federations of irrigators and peri-urban potable water providers have 
successfully accessed state and non-state funding and support, but more 
significantly, they have established alternative channels of engagement 
and institutional and legislative arrangements with the state. In practice 
this means that the association has had to formalise and demonstrates 
institutional inter-legality (outlined in chapter 3), which is discussed in 
more detail in chapter 6.   
 
Water committees in the dairy-farming region  
The rapid expansion of Cochabamba into the Zona Sur during the late 
1980s enveloped some pre-existing dairy farming communities. These 
communities are found in the region surrounding the airport called La 
Maica (see map 2). Here it is commonplace to find community-managed 
wells that tend to provide water for cattle. Water is abundant in the region 
but tends to be saline. The community funds improvements to their 
system through money they can access through their resident’s 
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association from the municipality (OTB), not dissimilarly to Villa Juan 23. 
La Maican communities have built their water systems themselves, and 
tend to manage them from within the community. They have water 
committees that are linked to their OTBs or resident’s associations. The 
OTBs or resident’s associations have presidents who represent water 
Committees in negotiations between the municipality and NGOs 
operating in the Zona Sur to support communal water providers. In La 
Maica, this tends to be the NGOs Aguatuya and Water for People, not the 
association of DWCs ASICASUDD-EPSAS. As demonstrated in the 
following chapter certain NGOs work with certain community water 
providers, often reflecting local politics or for reasons that are unclear.  
 
Not all communities in this region have a water committee, as the region’s 
water can be too saline; those that do supplement their water supplies 
with water from the aguateros (water vendors) to varying degrees, as the 
water is prioritized for cattle, but can be too saline for human 
consumption. These communities are well organised, they tend to have 
residents’ associations and have been in a good position to take 
advantage of funding from the state through the LPP and the increasing 
numbers of international and Bolivian NGOs operating in the region.  
 
The most marginalised communities  
Migration to the Zona Sur continues today, barrios continue to expand 
and new informal barrios continue to emerge on the very fringes of the 
municipality and in the most barren mountain regions to the southeast 
and south west of the city. These communities are established in the 
regions that have been avoided by earlier settlers, perhaps because of 
the elevation, the incline and proximity to a waste dump or the absence of 
a water source. This is symptomatic of the on-going peripheralisation of 
the most extreme poverty, which forges the most marginalised 
communities in the region, the majority of which are not yet recognised by 
the state. 
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Some of the newest, and simultaneously most remote, barrios do not 
have residents’ associations let alone water committees. This can be as a 
result of lack of will on the part of the community, insufficient 
subterranean water sources, or a lack of collective capitol to make the 
initial investments in infrastructure. NGOs work and some of the most 
recent government initiatives do not extend to these regions because 
they are recently established communities and may not have a residents’ 
association or cohesive neighbourhood council. As the region is so 
disparate and perceived as dangerous, NGOs find it difficult, or are 
reluctant, to work with these communities and so one does not find the 
capacity building, or infrastructural projects that communities in La Maica 
and Villa 15 de Febrero have.  
 
People here rely on water vendors, (aguateros), who deliver all over the 
barrio, often supplementing the water of SEMAPA customers and water 
committees during the dry season. This is the most expensive water, 
which generally cost £2.50 per cubic meter in the Zona Sur at the time of 
writing, while SEMAPA customers in the centre of the city pay 36p per 
cubic meter. Water quality is dubious, with tankers filling up from sources 
all over the municipality, sometimes these are formal wells other times 
using contaminated water sources (the role of the aguateros are 
discussed in more detail in chapter 7). Water tends to be delivered to and 
stored in barrels called turils outside each house. Water from aguateros 
becomes expensive in the more remote mountainous regions of the Zona 
Sur that are more difficult to reach, but this is where the cheapest land is; 
the price of water can almost double depending on the elevation of the 
community. These regions are neglected by the state and receive some 
support from the church, missionaries and some charities that operate in 
the area. The communities in these areas are some of the most 
marginalised in the municipality. They are often informal, i.e. not formally 
recognised by the state and so there is little or no public basic service 
provision and thus the residents do not have the same rights as people 
who live in the centre of the city, or even in less peripheralised 
communities such as Villa 15 de Febrero. Communities here may not pay 
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taxes regularly and tend to have weak connections with the state. They 
have low expectations of the state in the light of their experiences, and so 
they rely on coping strategies for water provision that can be expensive or 
dependent on charitable and church initiatives. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to map out the Cochabamba waterscape. We 
can conclude that the universal municipal model has never been rolled 
out here. This is principally a failure to develop infrastructure for the 
poorest on the edge of the city, but not solely. Community providers exist 
across the board. There is consequently a diverse patchwork of water 
providers of different sizes that serve the needs of the municipality, each 
using and sharing different sources. In this chapter I have outlined the 
different and contested water sources. Then I have attempted to 
demonstrate how diverse and dynamic forms of community-managed 
systems have emerged in the region. Chapter 4 demonstrated how the 
state is attempting to engage and develop community water providers in 
per-urban areas. This chapter was an attempt to set out how diverse 
community water providers can be. It demonstrated that the idea of 
community-managed water is ambiguous and often refers to collective 
action for water provision. Most systems are not wholly self sufficient or 
autonomous. Furthermore, the poorest communities do not instigate 
community-led water provision. Indeed this chapter demonstrates the 
success of the relatively affluent suburban potable water committees and 
also of the relatively affluent irrigator communities. This means that the 
approach that the state is embarking on, that is advocating and 
supporting community-led water provision, might not have the potential to 
reach the poorest. However, the following chapter demonstrates that 
poorer peri-urban DWCs have had some success by working together to 
build and co-produce water services with the state or with the support of 
NGOs or development agencies. 
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Chapter 6: ASICASUDD-EPSAS 
 
This chapter focuses on the role of the organisation ASICASUDD-
EPSAS (The Association of Communitarian Water Systems and EPSAS 
of the Zona Sur and the department). As the principal association of 
DWCs in Cochabamba, it brings together 42 of the estimated 149 
DWCs in the Zona Sur of Cochabamba and has played a key role in 
developing peri-urban DWCs. It has also become a gatekeeper to the 
peri-urban interface for NGOs and has facilitated state initiatives on 
peri-urban water provision since 2006. ASICASUDD-EPSAS provides a 
lens by which we can explore a whole range of processes and 
dynamics that affect water provision in peri-urban areas. This chapter 
therefore investigates how community based water provision has 
developed in Cochabamba, and how this relates to reforms around the 
right to water. It considers how the right to water is contested, and it 
also looks at how reforms have been implemented. In turn, it explores 
the relationships and politics behind the diverse actors that support 
water provision in peri-urban areas. 
 
The association was established around the idea of the co-gestion (co-
management) of water services, and presents an alternative model to 
municipal system developed by SEMAPA. Co-gestion is a model of 
water provision for the peri-urban interface. It is premised on 
community-led water management that is supported by the state 
funding for infrastructure and/or supply of water. This chapter presents 
the background and history of the association and the idea of co-
gestion. It then considers how the organisation has come to engage 
with the state by facilitating the work of new institutions, channelling 
funding, and supporting new initiatives around licences and regulation.  
 
ASICASUDD-EPSAS representing DWCs in the Zona Sur 
ASICASUDD-EPSAS was established in 2004 and is a formal 
association of DWCs that represents at least 42 providers in district 7, 8 
and 9, each of which provide to between 42 and 950 household (see 
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map 7). Its origins will be discussed in more detail in the following 
pages, but it has, in principle, been forged in opposition to the 
established municipal model, which has failed, and it operates in the 
premise that co-gestion is the most effective way to improve water 
provision in the Zona Sur. This in principle means that water services 
are managed and produced by both the state and communities, and so 
is a form of coproduction. Meaning the joint and direct involvement of 
citizens and public agencies to deliver a particular service (Ostrom, 
1996: 1073). This is undertaken through a regular long-term relationship 
between state agencies and organised groups of citizens, where both 
make substantial resource contributions” (Joshi and Moore, 2004:1).  
The coproduction of water services can involve the state and the 
community taking on a variety of roles. In this instance it is based on the 
idea that water should be supplied by SEMAPA or the state, and that 
ASICASUDD-EPSAS should manage its distribution to DWCs who in 
turn distribute to the community using existing water systems.  
 
By linking over 40 DWCs, ASICASUDD-EPSAS has developed the 
capacity to engage with the state and SEMAPA. DWCs are often 
undermined because of their illegitimacy and because they operate on 
a different spatial scale to the established municipal model and provider 
SEMAPA. The association has power in numbers, and has negotiated 
buying in some water in bulk from SEMAPA for communities where 
wells have run dry. It has also received some funding and support from 
the state for projects to improve infrastructure, as will be discussed later 
in this chapter. It has political leverage, having organised marches 
demanding support for the model of co-gestion (see figure 6). 
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Figure 6: ASICASUDD-EPSAS march 
 
It also has established links to the numerous NGOs and social 
organisations working on water in Cochabamba since the Water War. 
More recently it has become a representative of the Zona Sur as the 
state has engaged with it over planning for the peri-urban interface and 
water provision. Consequently the association has developed 
alternative models of water governance for the Zona Sur in preparation 
for the completion of the Misicuni project, which it is currently lobbying 
for (see map 7) and will be discussed in more detail in this chapter. 
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Map 7: The Wells and Tanks of ASICASUDD-EPSAS DWCs, the JICA 
pipeline and proposed new pipeline for Misicuni water 
In sum, ASICASUDD-EPSAS presents an alternative peri-urban model 
to the established municipal model that has failed the Zona Sur in the 
past. Budds and Hinojosa present a comprehensive review of academic 
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literature that demonstrates how scales and boundaries relating to 
natural resource governance “have been repositioned as the products 
of processes of social definition, contestation and struggle.” (2012: 123). 
ASICASUDD-EPSAS’ work is indicative of an on-going struggle over 
the scales of water governance in Cochabamba, and who can and 
should legitimately provide water in the peri-urban interface. Reforms 
linked to the right to water can be framed as the latest attempt not only 
to tackle water provision, but also to consolidate state control over the 
water sector. This chapter demonstrates that ASICASUDD-EPSAS has 
the potential to be an institution that facilitates this process, or perhaps 
which has the potential to re-mold the shape of water governance in the 
Zona Sur, according to its model of co-gestion.  
 
A social organisation 
ASICASUDD-EPSAS is a social organisation, and not a social 
movement. It works to support its member DWCs. It has been forged 
around an idea of communitarian water management, ideals of mutual 
aid and reciprocity, and the discourse of uses and customs that was 
galvanized following the Water War. In that sense it is similar to, and 
has taken inspiration from, social movements such as FEDECOR  (the 
federation of irrigators discussed in chapters 5 and 3). However, it is not 
politically affiliated with the MAS in the same way. This was a deliberate 
decision in an attempt to avoid relationships that could be perceived as 
clientelist. A representative of ASICASUDD-EPSAS quite firmly 
explained this to me on our first meeting.52  
 
As outlined in chapter 5, the association represents a specific group of 
DWCs, predominantly in districts 8 and 9 of the Zona Sur, many of 
which were established with the support of the church (this will be 
discussed in this chapter and chapter 7). These DWCs tend to rely on 
local aquifers sources that are becoming depleted and are 
contaminated by numerous industrial and residential sources 
                                                
52 ASICASUDD-EPSAS representative, Cochabamba, November 11th 2009 
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(discussed in more detail in chapter 7). Not all DWCs want to be part of 
the association. Some DWCs prefer to operate independently. It is 
estimated that there are 149 committees in the Zona Sur, and 
ASICASUDD-EPSAS represents less than a third of these. Nonetheless, 
it is the only organisation that represents collective DWCs in the peri-
urban interface and thus has more visibility and greater capacity to 
engage with state and non-state actors as a result.  
 
To understand ASICASUDD-EPSAS, it is useful to consider its origins. 
Today, the organisation is independent and run by and on behalf of the 
committees, but it began as an organisation that was supported by 
SEMAPA. In the years that followed the Water War, the social 
movements and activists that had been central to the rebellion, 
specifically the Coordinadora del Agua, lobbied for ‘progressive reforms’ 
to SEMAPA and the water sector as a whole (Terhorst and Gomez: 
127). Additionally, in the wake of the Water War there was a willingness 
on the part of the state to engage with the social movements. 
Consequently a space was created for civil society participation in the 
management of SEMAPA in the urban centre, while there were 
initiatives to encourage and develop the DWCs in the marginalized peri-
urban communities in the south of the city.  This began with a project 
that involved activists from the Coordinadora del Agua and the 
coordinator for SEMAPA projects in the Zona Sur at the time, 
Salvatierra. Salvatierra had been heavily involved in capacity building 
local DWCs and the Centro Vincente Canas before the Water War. The 
‘Social Committee for Life” was established to promote coordination 
between committees, to strengthen DWCs as institutions, and to create 
an umbrella organisation so that the DWCs of the Zona Sur were able 
to interact with SEMAPA. This process was led by NGOs, activists, the 
church and SEMAPA, and it reflected some of the discourses and 
demands that had arisen out of the Water War. These included social 
control, protecting and galvanizing communal water providers, and 
developing new forms of public water management that incorporated 
community and citizen participation (Grandiddyer 2006).  
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The Social Committee for Life did not last, and was soon replaced by 
ASICASUR (now ASICASUDD-EPSAS), led by Abraham Grandiddyer. 
The organisation is horizontally structured but with a representative 
president that is democratically elected. However, over time it has been 
forged around the central figure that has led the organisation since the 
beginning. Grandiddyer had been the president of a long-running DWC 
Primer de Mayo, and played a key role in the Water War. This is not 
unusual and, several other social movements that have focused on 
water, including FEDECOR and the Coordinadora have prominent 
leaders that have come to define the organisation. 
There had been one alliance of committees before, under 
Salvatierra, but he soon abandoned us. By that point many of the 
committees had lost faith in him anyhow. And then Abraham came 
in, and he spoke with more vigour, he was a stronger leader, and 
he started bringing together various water committees, we were 12 
then 24 then 32…53 
 
Unlike Salvatierra’s organisation that had come before it, a DWC leader 
led this organisation. It was based on horizontal, grassroots principles. 
Ultimately the directorate is answerable to the assembly of 
representatives of drinking water committees. The directorate is made 
up of 5 elected members who receive no financial remuneration. The 
president is however central to the organisation. As the words of the 
water secretary demonstrate, DWCs were looking for a strong leader to 
guide them during this time. The organisation emerged in the post- 
Water War climate, and much of the impetus came from activists and 
funding from the church (Grandidyer and Tinto: 244). It is often taken for 
granted that most of the DWCs played a role in the Water War, and 
were driving this process. While the Water War provides a strong 
discourse that galvanizes organisations like ASICASUDD-EPSAS, 
many of the DWCs that are part of ASICASUDD-EPSAS, did not 
participate in the Water War, particularly those in the southern and 
more western parts. Furthermore, some DWCs joined the organisation 
                                                
53 DWC Secretary, Cochabamba, June 2nd 2010 
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because they were in need of institutional support, or saw it as an 
extension of church-led initiatives that were being undertaken in the 
region over time. (This process is discussed in more detail in the 
following chapter). 
 
The impetus for the formation of the organisation was to create a 
platform for the participation of peri-urban water committees in the 
development of better water provision for the Zona Sur, principally 
according to a model of co-gestion.  
(We) demand that water should and will be managed by its users, 
that is to say, communitarian management should exist, because it 
is the only way to ensure all citizens access to this vital resource. 
ASICA-SUR54 intends to consolidate this vision by advocating a 
system of co-gestion of water services, and to work as a 
negotiator with external actors”(Grandiddyer 2006: 246) 
 
In sum the idea of co-gestion seeks to build new relationships between 
peri-urban communities and the state to produce water services in the 
Zona Sur. As discussed in the previous chapter, the LPP (Popular 
Participation Law) channelled funding from the municipality to formally 
recognized neighbourhood committees some of which was used to 
build and maintain community water systems. This in itself could be 
framed as a form of coproduction. In the Zona Sur, this process was 
limited because some of the communities are not formally recognized 
by the state. Further, some communities felt that the LPP did not 
provide them with sufficient funds and agency for local development55. 
The galvanization of the committees through ASICASUDD-EPSAS, and 
the proposal for co-gestion of basic services thus presents an 
alternative paradigm for the development of local water services. 
 
The paradigm of co-gestion reflects the challenges and opportunities 
around water provision in the peri-urban interface. The state has failed 
to provide a mainline system of water provision across the municipality. 
This has led to the emergence of diverse communal providers (as set 
                                                
54 This is the original name for ASICASUDD-EPSAS 
55 OTB Treasurer Villa 15 de Febrero, Cochabamba, August 2nd 2010 
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out in chapter 5). However, there are certain challenges which 
undermine the capacity of DWCs in the peri-urban interface, namely 
limited and contaminated subterranean water supplies (as discussed in 
chapter 5 and 7). ASICASUDD-EPSAS provides a platform by which 
DWCs can collectively engage with the state, NGOs or development 
agencies to secure funding or support to tackle or address some of the 
challenges that exist around water provision at scale. The idea of co-
gestion for water provision has legitimacy, because SEMAPA does not 
currently have the capacity or the funding to extend provision into the 
Zona Sur.  
 
Forging a sense of community in the peri-urban interface 
ASICASUDD-EPSAS has forged an identity around ideas of traditional 
community-led water provision and uses and customs, which is not 
dissimilar to that of the irrigators of Cochabamba and the social 
movement FEDECOR. Ideas of community-managed water systems 
gained ground in the early 2000s in the wake of the Water War and its 
demands around protecting local water systems. The association draws 
on the collective ideologies of rural indigenous and peasant 
organisations and the social organisation of mining unions to create a 
shared history and identity, if somewhat romanticised. 
The population that form part of the water systems in the Zona Sur 
originate from the west of Bolivia, and are a mix of rural migrants 
and miners that have been relocated. Both of these characteristics 
have strongly influenced the communitarian organisations that 
have emerged to provide water. There is a strong Andean 
cosmovison in the rural areas that is based on ideals of 
communitarianism and solidarity… the contribution of the 
relocated miners was the union experience and its solid 
organisational structure, and their knowledge of the 
implementation of technology, in the management and 
construction of infrastructure for the transportation of water…” 
(Grandiddyer 2006: 241 author’s translation). 
 
The essentialisation and romanticisation of indigenous and mining 
social structures, and the idea that certain structures of social 
organisation can be transplanted to the peri-urban interface is 
somewhat dubious (Zibechi 2009). In practice DWCs often bear little 
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resemblance to indigenous or mining systems of social organisation, 
(as discussed in the following chapter). However, any resemblance 
between the DWCs and forms of organising and social structures from 
mining communities past are drawn upon to create a sense of continuity. 
This selective collective memory is used to create a shared sense of 
identity (Halbwachs, 1992). This is a useful tool for communities in the 
Zona Sur as they attempt to consolidate their community and the DWC. 
This is a region that has been acutely fragmented by successive waves 
of migration and transient populations.  
 
Rural and mining migrants have drawn on indigenous and union 
identities, many of which have been elevated as a result of the election 
of Evo Morales, and the role of the social movements within the pluri-
national state of Bolivia.  
 
Gill (2000) highlights how rural-urban migrants have sought out 
collective systems of organisation in El Alto, when faced with the 
increasing individualisation of urban societies (this is discussed in 
chapter 7). Rural urban migrants in peri-urban areas are accustomed to 
developing collective systems for basic service provision and 
community organising. The idea of recognising and mixing collective 
traditions to create new forms of communal structures to defend and 
manage natural resources have been popularly advocated by Bolivian 
activists (Lazar, 2008: 11). Meanwhile, since the election of president 
Morales the state has endeavoured to recognise indigenous and 
campesino communities and organisations. This is part of the project to 
establish the ‘pluri-national’ and thus incorporates the juridical plurality 
that characterizes Bolivia. This has manifested in reforms to recognise 
indigenous councils, autonomy, and the rights of indigenous 
communities to govern the development of their regions (Canessa 
2012). Within the water sector this entails recognising the rights of 
communities to manage their water supplies according to their uses and 
customs. This is quite feasible in the rural valleys, and the lowland 
tropics areas where neatly delineated CBOs, and embedded 
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established communities, manage enclosed water sources. However, in 
the dynamic peri-urban Zona Sur, communal water providers are more 
complex. Communities might consist of migrants from across the 
country and they may have weaker links with the regional indigenous 
social movements and unions. ASICASUDD-EPSAS mobilizes and 
merges traditional discourses of community management to anchor the 
social organisation it has established in the Zona Sur, thus forging a 
collective identity to galvanize the peri-urban water systems that they 
have speedily developed since the 1990s. This identity is useful as the 
association attempts to unify disparate peri-urban communities to 
create a collective unit which can engage with the state, NGOs or 
development agencies, as will be discussed in this chapter. 
 
Indeed, ASICASUDD-EPSAS’s struggle is quite different to that of the 
rural DWCs and irrigators. It has not been established to secure water 
sources that can comprehensively meet the needs of the community, or 
to enclose water resources or to demand exclusive water rights. It 
would be impossible to do so with an aquifer that supplies water with 
countless other users, and which is often contaminated and is fast 
becoming depleted (Ghielmi, Mondaca et al. 2008). ASICASUDD-
EPSAS is instead demanding the rights of communities to manage their 
water systems in partnership with the state, and further, to contribute to 
state planning around water governance and legislation. While the 
DWCs of ASICASUDD-EPSAS collectively organize around ideas of 
mutual aid to provide water to the community, somewhat similarly to 
rural water provider, they also seek to participate in broader discussions 
and planning for urban water management that are specific to peri-
urban areas. As this chapter and the following will demonstrate, the 
Zona Sur has not been subject to any form of integrated planning. 
ASICASUDD-EPSAS is attempting to shape and influence new projects 
and reforms aimed at tackling water provision in peri-urban areas. 
 
DWC leaders as part of ASICASUDD-EPSAS are willing to participate 
extensively in the development and management of their water services, 
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and also wider debates around water governance. In sum, the 
organisation is not solely focused on developing water provision in peri-
urban areas at the community level. It works to promote an alternative 
ideal for water provision in the peri-urban Zona Sur, which subverts the 
pre-existing municipal model. ASICASUDD-EPSAS provides a conduit 
by which marginalized peri-urban communities can shape or even 
attempt to subvert local and municipal development. In practice this has 
become an alternative water paradigm to that pursued by the municipal 
utility SEMAPA. Reforms to the water sector since 2006 suggest that 
there is some room for to engage directly with the newly established 
institutions in the water sector, including the Ministry for Water and 
organisations such as SENASBA. Before considering that, I begin by 
setting out the association’s contested relationship with the municipal 
provider SEMAPA. 
 
ASICASUDD-EPSAS and SEMAPA 
Despite the central state rhetoric since 2006 that suggests a 
commitment to incorporating and recognising the role of community-
level providers, the public utility SEMAPA continues to plan for the 
expansion of the municipal water system into the Zona Sur.56 The role 
and position of DWCs and ASICASUDD-EPSAS in the municipality is 
thus contested by SEMAPA. DWCs in the Zona Sur have become 
something of a thorn in the side of SEMAPA. Not only do their 
continued presence in the area highlight the shortcomings of SEMAPA 
and the state, also, DWC leaders regularly and publicly denounce the 
failings of the utility in the Zona Sur. During a public meeting held as 
part of events to commemorate a decade since the Water War in April 
2011, a renowned DWC leader in the Zona Sur began the event by 
dressing down SEMAPA.  
We in the Zona Sur, we fought in the Water War, but in the 10 
years following the Water War, what have we received from 
SEMAPA in the Zona Sur? Not even one drop.57  
 
                                                
56 Senior SEMAPA employee, Cochabamba, October 12th 2011 
57 DWC leader, Water War +10 public meeting, April 17th 2010 
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The DWCs present an alternative vision for water governance in the 
municipality. Community-led water provision propped up by the state, 
and this in turn has the potential to further compromise a utility that is 
already underperforming. Their models for water governance are 
therefore somewhat contradictory, although they do often overlap, as 
the following section demonstrates. 
 
I met with a SEMAPA representative, who has been coordinating the 
development of projects to improve access to water in the Zona Sur 
since 1995, to discuss SEMAPA’s plans for the area and their 
relationship with ASICASUDD-EPSAS. He argued that the only way to 
improve access to water in the Zona Sur was through the expansion of 
SEMAPA’s network and influence, and the development of an 
integrated universal water system. 58  I undertook interviews with 3 
different SEMAPA employees and each one contended that DWCs 
were unsustainable providers for peri-urban areas in the long term, and 
were thus a temporary feature of the Zona Sur. Consequently, there 
have been multiple proposals to extend state run water provision into 
the area since the early 1990s, but the only infrastructural project to 
have been completed by SEMAPA in the Zona Sur is the JICA-funded 
expansion project. This project extended a system of pipelines to 18 
barrios with an estimated population of 50,000 people in the south west 
of the municipality where numerous DWCs operated (see map 7). This 
involved developing infrastructure, including pipes, tanks and pumps for 
distributing water, and increasing the capacity of a local water treatment 
plant. The project was inaugurated by President Morales, who 
ceremoniously ‘opened the tap’ (see image in September 2011 and was 
widely hailed as a (rare) SEMAPA success story in the Zona Sur 
(Heredia 2011).  
 
                                                
58 Senior SEMAPA employee, Cochabamba, October 12th 2011 
 177 
 
Figure 7: Evo opening the tap to the JICA project 
 
The principal coordinator of this project also explained in the weeks 
following the inauguration that the system was not actually functioning 
yet.59 SEMAPA did not have enough water to distribute to the barrios, 
and so it would begin operating at full capacity once the Misicuni dam 
project was completed. The coordinator explained that several of the 
communities that are part of the project either had DWCs or water 
systems run by residents associations before the JICA project. 
Consequently, when the network begins operating they have requested 
that they retain control of the water system through a macro meter 
installed for each barrio. The DWC or residents will then assume 
responsibility for collecting funds, and are unwilling to relinquish all 
control over their water system.  I asked a woman who is both an 
employee of an NGO that supports DWCs in the Zona Sur and a DWC 
member, why the communities had come to this arrangement, and she 
explained,  
We don't trust SEMAPA… SEMAPA provides water to district 7 
using macro meters, and charges 2.37 Bolivianos per square 
meter (this is cheaper than water provided by the committee)… 
But SEMAPA has started charging for air 60 , and in Villa 
Venezuela too. They do not always have water, sometimes it is 
only once a week, and they are being charged for water they 
don’t use…so there are residents who have seen this 
experience and they don't like it… the community has lost 
                                                
59 Senior SEMAPA employee, Cochabamba, October 12th 2011 
60 This refers to meters counting air running through pipes as opposed to water used 
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control of water provision, SEMAPA has connected directly to 
the pipelines. We have learnt that it is better if the community 
stays in charge of the distribution.61 
 
Despite the development of new water infrastructure, DWCs are 
evidently unwilling to relinquish control over water management. This is 
fuelled by SEMAPA’s past failings, but also the established role of a 
DWC and the community’s faith in it. This begins to explain why 
organisations such as ASICASUDD-EPSAS advocate and lobby for the 
co-gestion of water services. This is a method that will allow the DWCs 
to avoid being reliant on SEMAPA, and to ensure that they receive 
sufficient water and are charged an agreed price for the water that they 
use. The continued role of DWCs in the Zona Sur also reveals how 
communities that have been politically and socially marginalized, have 
developed some political and social leverage to be able to negotiate 
with SEMAPA and the state, thus retaining a role in local water 
governance. SEMAPA have in turn engaged with the DWCs and 
created spaces for the community to manage the water service at a 
local level. DWC leaders are often keen to retain a role in water 
provision, because it is the product of the decades of on-going struggles, 
meanwhile, community members have made extensive physical and 
financial investments into their local water systems. Chapter 7 
demonstrates that community-managed water systems also have social 
and cultural significance for many. This is not simply a struggle to 
guarantee access to water. It has simultaneously become a struggle for 
legitimacy, control and political agency, but on their own terms. DWCs 
are asking that their distinctive ways of organising and living that have 
developed over time are recognised. 
 
A gatekeeper to the Zona Sur 
ASICASUDD-EPSAS has endeavoured to be recognized as an 
association of water providers and over time it has gained legitimacy, 
and political recognition. It is a group that the state now consults and 
                                                
61 NGO employee and DWC member, Cochabamba, August 5th 2011 
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engages with on issues of local water governance, as well as national 
reforms to the water sector and legislation. Despite representing less 
than half of the water committees in the Zona Sur, ASICASUDD-EPSAS 
provides a platform for state engagement with ‘the peri-urban interface’ 
on water provision. They have in essence become representative of the 
DWCs that exist in the Zona Sur. The association allows the state to 
interact with multiple DWCs, making the peri-urban interface more 
tangible. It has thus been a conduit for the delivery of state projects and 
reforms in the Zona Sur.  
 
This, in turn, has made the association more formal. Indeed, the 
organisation has started to change and to reflect and fit in with the 
norms and structures of the state: a form of institutional interlegality. 
ASICASUDD-EPSAS was originally known as ASICASUR, The 
Association of Communitarian Water Systems of the South, and then in 
2010, it reformed and changed its name to ASICASUDD-EPSAS The 
Association of Communitarian Water Systems of the South, the 
Department and EPAS. This highlights the association’s commitment to 
formalising and developing DWCs so that they are formally recognized 
by the state as EPSAS (water and sanitation providers). It also reflects 
the organisation’s acceptance of the new water politics that was 
emerging from the new constitution62. This is a change in direction, from 
the organisation that established its self as an association of water 
providers aspiring for an alternative form of water provision led by peri-
urban communities, to a platform firmly committed to engaging with 
state reforms. Their new title also reveals broader ambitions in light of 
the new political climate, to link up with other communitarian providers 
outside the Zona Sur in other parts of the department, and to act as a 
bridge between the state and other community water providers. 
 
If we consider two recent and notable state-led projects for the water 
sector, ASICASUDD-EPSAS have been consulted with on both, the 
                                                
62 see ASICASUDD-EPSAS.org 
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Misicuni dam and an Inter American Development Bank (IAB) planning 
project on Water and Sanitation in peri-urban Areas: Peri-urban Phase I 
and II. First the Misicuni dam project. This project has incorporated the 
participation of ASICASUDD-EPSAS as a representative of the DWCs 
of the Zona Sur, alongside representatives from the municipality, 
irrigator groups, the MMAYA and SEMAPA (Misicuni 2010). As outlined 
in the previous chapter, project works are set to finish in 2015, but there 
is still no funding for infrastructure to deliver Misicuni water to the Zona 
Sur, even though it has been prioritised by the state (Caero 2009). 
 
As a result of this engagement ASICASUDD-EPSAS has developed 
proposals and argued that Misicuni water should be delivered to the 
Zona Sur according to principles of co-gestion linking SEMAPA and 
ASICASUDD-EPSAS. They have presented plans to the MMAYA to 
develop a series of supertanks that could supply the pre-existing water 
committees belonging to the association (see pipelines on Map 7). 
ASICASUDD-EPSAS argues that this provides a more economical 
solution in the Zona Sur as it requires less investment in infrastructure, 
while also protecting the DWCs and their demands to retain a role in 
water management. Second, the state has received funding from the 
Inter American Development Bank (IAB) to undertake a scoping 
exercise to develop a master plan for basic service provision in peri-
urban regions across Bolivia. The IAB’s final report recognizes 
ASICASUDD-EPSAS as an operator and provider of potable water in 
the Zona Sur (IAB 2009: 44), and an organisation that provides an 
alternative model for water provision that could be incorporated into the 
development of a new water and sanitation master plan for the region.  
 
However in the long term, encouraging the participation of 
ASICASUDD-EPSAS has not led to any substantial investments or 
reforms that have improved access to water or really engaged with, and 
funded, projects for the co-gestion of water services. The association’s 
president Abraham Grandiddyer reflected on this during our interview 
and surmised, “We have yet to see clear policies that serve peri-urban 
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groups”. To date there has been insufficient will and resources to really 
support and develop the DWCs as legitimate water providers in the 
Zona Sur.  
 
The DWCs and the right to water 
In the following section how ASICASUDD-EPSAS and its affiliated 
DWCs understand the right to water. Consultations are on-going around 
a new water law that is set to incorporate many of the institutional and 
constitutional changes that have already been made since 2006 (as 
discussed in chapter 4). These events have been organized across the 
country with social movements and associations of small-scale water 
providers. Some have been organized by influential NGOs such as 
Agua Sustentable, while others have been organized by the state. 
ASICASUDD-EPSAS committees have participated in several such 
events. During the Cumbre por el agua y el Saneamiento Basico in 
Cochabamba in June 2011 in which I participated, it was clear from 
speeches made by the president, Grandiddyer, and workshops with 
DWCs belonging to ASICASUDD-EPSAS, that DWCs agreed with the 
idea of the human right to water in Bolivia as a commitment to 
guaranteeing sufficient access to good water. However, they argue that 
in the Zona Sur a mix of public and community water networks 
premised on co-gestion is required for the right to water to be realised. 
Generally, they argued that communities and citizens must participate 
in water provision in order for the right to water to be recognised. Whilst 
they agree with the principle that everyone should have access to safe 
and clean water, the ‘right to water’ is not something they have fought 
for.63 While this is not necessarily incompatible with the current state 
rhetoric round community provision, they are in practice asking for more 
support (in the shape of resources and political will). 
 
Some felt that human rights do not exist in the peri-urban Zona Sur, and 
thus were not something that they should actively pursue to improve the 
                                                
63 Cumbre por el agua y el Saneamiento Basico, Cochabamba, 25 -26 June, 201Basico, 
Cochabamba, 26 June, 2010 
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water sector. “There are human rights in the cities but not here in the 
Zona Sur”.64 Others felt that the state’s deficiencies in the Zona Sur 
undermined the potential of a human rights approach “There can be no 
human rights when the state is absent”.65 As there is no track record of 
human rights making a difference here, DWC members have little faith 
in the idea of the human right to water. It is for these reasons that peri-
urban communities have not rallied to defend nor to demand their 
human right to water. In practice it appears they are suggesting that 
participation in the planning and production of water services could me 
more fruitful, and ultimately empowering. 
 
As outlined by the president of ASICASUDD-EPSAS, Abraham 
Grandiddyer; “What is written in the constitution, it does not mean 
anything in practice, local problems are not going to be settled by the 
right to water.”66 In other words, constitutional articles and laws will not 
solve peri-urban water provision on their own. The state, however, has 
a poor track record in ensuring water provision for peri-urban 
communities. It is for this reason that DWCs continue to lobby for 
community participation in water management and co-gestion, and not 
human rights. To surmise, the association has a precarious relationship 
with the state, it continues to struggle for legitimacy and agency. While 
it has provided a platform for state engagement, water provision in the 
Zona Sur is still significantly worse than in the centre of the city. Instead 
of struggling for state sanctioned human rights the organisation 
continues to pursue co-gestion, and a more participatory community-led 
system of water provision. The following section outlines some of the 
projects and funding that the association has secured in recent years to 
develop community-level water provision in the Zona Sur, and explores 
the impact they have had on water provision in the peri-urban interface.   
                                                
64 DWC Participant workshop on the right to water, Cumbre por el agua y el 
Saneamiento Basico, Cochabamba, 25 -26 June, 201Basico, Cochabamba, 26 June, 
2010 
65 DWC Participant workshop on the right to water, Cumbre por el agua y el 
Saneamiento Basico, Cochabamba, 25 -26 June, 201Basico, Cochabamba, 26 June, 
2010 
66 Abraham Grandiddyer President ASICASUDD-EPSAS, Cochabamba, July 22 2011 
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Coproduction in the peri-urban interface 
ASICASUDD-EPSAS has struck up a range of partnerships in order to 
improve the water systems of member committees in the Zona Sur. In 
reality the association produces water services with a range of state 
and non-state actors. Different actors have supported the organisation 
to tackle different aspects of DWC-led water provision.  
 
There are several international NGOs which undertake water and 
sanitation projects independently and in conjunction with the 
municipality within the Zona Sur, including Water for People and 
UNICEF. The Water War cast a spotlight on Cochabamba and revealed 
both the power of local communal providers, and the on-going water 
crisis facing the city. Since 2001 there has been an influx of NGOs and 
charities that either wanted to operate and provide projects in the Zona 
Sur, or to support and fund grassroots initiatives in the peri-urban 
interface. In the decade that followed, Cochabamba has become a 
hydric hotspot where research institutions, private businesses, and 
more recently, the state has operated to support water committees. 
Overtime, some NGOs have worked with the municipality, while others 
have come to support DWCs in a particular part of the Zona Sur, 
including those which belong to ASICASUDD-EPSAS. 
 
These non-state projects and interventions have been undertaken 
haphazardly across the region and there is little integrated coordination 
across the Zona Sur. When I first arrived in the Zona Sur I tried to map 
the different water and sanitation interventions and projects that had 
been undertaken in the area since 2001. I visited Water for People to 
begin with, an NGO that has been working in Bolivia for over a decade 
and it became apparent that NGOs work with certain partner 
organisations. They are not always aware of the work that other NGOs 
and organisations are doing nearby. They are not even necessarily 
aware of the other actors working on water and sanitation in the Zona 
Sur. It was clear that certain communities and NGOs establish 
 184 
partnerships and alliances and exclude others. Interventions and 
projects do not necessarily target the communities that have the worst 
access to water and sanitation. Instead their work often reflects the 
overarching politics or goals of the NGO or areas that are accessible, or 
where the organisation has pre-existing contacts. Using examples 
drawn from NGO projects in the Andes, Bebbington (2004) has argued 
that,  
…The geographies of (NGO) intervention do not reflect the 
geographies of poverty and livelihood in the Andes, and their 
strategies of intervention do not respond to the economic and 
spatial dynamics of poor people’s livelihoods” (ibid, 740).  
 
Bebbington argues that this is because the objectives of NGOs are 
often path-dependent and reflect “broader political economic dynamics” 
(ibid 733).  
 
If we consider the Zona Sur, DWCs generally exist in regions that have 
been excluded from mainline provision, they require participation and 
investment, the majority of the most deprived communities at the fringe 
of the Zona Sur rely solely on water vendors. There are several NGOs 
that support ASICASUDD-EPSAS because they are focused primarily 
on developing and supporting community-led provision. This is because 
it is in keeping with the overarching strategic objectives of the 
organisation, not because it targets the poorest communities that 
experience the most extreme water poverty.  
 
Many of the NGOs and initiatives that were established after the Water 
War did so with funding that came from foreign NGOs and trade unions 
that had witnessed and identified with the anti-privatization rebellions, 
specifically the Water War, from afar. These organisations have funded 
the establishment of NGOs such as the Fundacion Abril, and the Yaku 
al Sur project (discussed below), that support DWCs in the region, as 
an alternative ‘third way’ in light of the failure of privatization. Meanwhile 
pre-existing Bolivian NGOs that are focused on water such as Agua 
Sustentable have received further funding from organisations such as 
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OxfamGB. This NGO has not only advised the government on reforms 
to the sector throughout the decade (as discussed in the previous 
chapter), but also continues to undertake capacity building work with 
DWCs (discussed below).  
 
The Yaku al Sur project, coordinated by CEVI (Italian development 
organisation) and ACRA (Italian aid agency), provides support to 
ASICASUDD-EPSAS, to develop the practical and institutional capacity 
of the association. This is with the objective of improving access to 
water across the Zona Sur. The Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
funded this 36-month project for almost 2 million Euros. Its direct 
beneficiaries were the DWCs of ASICASUDD-EPSAS, thought to 
represent around 60,000 people, and indirect beneficiaries - the further 
population of the Zona Sur. In practice the project has focused on 
formalizing and galvanizing committees that have recently joined the 
association and needed support for the development of infrastructure 
and to build more robust institutions, and to support the day-to-day work 
of the association. Yaku al Sur works with 4 communities every year 
that have been selected by, and are affiliated with, ASICASUDD-
EPSAS, limiting the potential beneficiaries to those linked with the 
association. 67  These interventions do not necessarily reflect water 
poverty or needs, and in fact reflect the capacity of some of the more 
well-organised DWCs to cherry pick the projects and funds of NGOs 
operating in the region. 
 
While the physical objectives of the Yaku al Sur project are to develop 
infrastructure, the indirect consequence has been the fortification of 
communities as vecinos begin to work together to develop a more 
efficient water committee.68 The impetus for the development of a water 
committee doesn’t always come from within the community, instead, the 
agencies behind projects like Yaku al Sur often have to convince 
communities of the benefits of community water management. Further, 
                                                
67 Yaku al Sur project worker, Cochabamba, July 19th 2010 
68 Yaku al Sur project worker, Cochabamba, July 19th 2010 
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communities are not always adept at collective organising. A project 
coordinator with Yaku Al Sur explained:  
Poor management and a lack of community cohesion has been 
one of the main challenges of this project, this has been put 
down to migrational patterns and the idea that people just want 
simple basic services that are provided.69  
 
Projects such as these work to build systems of communitarian 
management, reflecting the overarching aims and objectives of the 
NGO. Yaku al Sur funds the development of communal systems of 
provision even when the community is fragmented, and sometimes 
disinterested in community-led solutions. This leads to the question, 
why pursue this sort of program, when the demand does not exist 
across the community. The Yaku al Sur project encourages the 
development of communal-systems in the Zona Sur, encouraging a 
rights and responsibilities approach to service provision that could be 
empowering. This has opened up new spaces for committees to 
engage with the state and with other NGOs, developing their political 
visibility and agency as a group. As outlined earlier, as a result of the 
ongoing capacity building work of CEVI in the Zona Sur, new DWCs 
continue to join. Nonetheless, the association only represents 42 of 
approximately 149 peri-urban committees. Meanwhile others in more 
rural parts of the Zona Sur have organised to form smaller regional 
associations to interact with the state. ASICASUDD-EPSAS emerged 
as a result of the post-Water War climate, and has undoubtedly 
benefitted from the diverse NGOs and institutions that are focussed on 
water in Cochabamba. This process has buoyed the DWCs and made 
ASICASUDD-EPSAS more formal over time. In the following section I 
consider the role that the association has played in reforms to the water 
sector since 2006 and the impact this has had on peri-urban DWCs.  
 
ASICASUDD-EPSAS and the state 
As a result of collaborations with NGOs and state consultations around 
projects and reforms to the water sector ASICASUDD-EPSAS has 
                                                
69 Yaku al Sur project worker, Cochabamba, July 19th 2010 
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become something of a gatekeeper to the Zona Sur. As the state 
embarks on initiatives to improve access to water in the peri-urban 
interface and to engage with informal providers, it does so through the 
association. ASICASUDD-EPSAS is now an intermediary for 
government institutions that have emerged since 2006 such as 
SENASBA (discussed in chapter 4). SENASBA seeks to capacity build 
community providers in the peri-urban interface. As outlined by one 
SENASBA official,  
We had to go in through ASICASUDD-EPSAS, and with their 
participation, in reality ASICASUDD-EPSAS is the organisation 
that links up the committees and links us to the committees, and 
links the committees with all other institutions.70  
 
The association has been fairly receptive to these initiatives. This is 
partly due to the fact that DWCs are not wholly autonomous providers 
and they do not resist the encroachment of the state. The association 
makes the Zona Sur more tangible for planners and institutions that, for 
the first time, are endeavouring to understand and engage with this 
dynamic peri-urban area. 
 
There are certain interventions that neither the state nor NGOs can 
undertake independently, and so they commission the private services 
of institutions that can undertake technical assessments. CASA The 
Centre for Water and Environmental Sanitation is a department at the 
public university in Cochabamba. This research centre and laboratory 
undertakes investigations into environmental contamination, 
specializing in water in a variety of rural, urban and industrial settings 
across Bolivia. While this organisation belongs to the university, it 
provides consultancies and services to clients at a cost. As such the 
information it collects is not always publicly available. ASICASUDD-
EPSAS has a limited understanding of the aquifer that the water 
committees rely on, specifically information relating to water levels and 
contamination. While communities in the Zona Sur complain about 
saline water and wells that are running dry, neither the state nor the 
                                                
70 SENASBA official, La Paz, November 16th 2010 
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DWCs have a detailed understanding of the aquifer that they are 
exploiting. The association and NGOs such as Agua Sustentable have 
tried to develop a more technical understanding of the aquifers with the 
help of CASA. Agua Sustentable have commissioned the analysis of 
wells belonging to DWCs that are members of the association, which 
was published in a report (Gheilmi et al 2008) which is discussed in 
more detail in the following chapter. CASA is also a partner on the Yaku 
al Sur project, and on hand to undertake analysis or provide technical 
assistance where necessary. As such, members of the association 
benefit from this expertise. 
 
CASA also supports the work of SENASBA. One employee explains.  
What we found was that many of the DWCs provide water to 
users but without control over the quality of water provided...we 
have made an agreement with the university and CASA to test 
the water quality of 16 committees, as the first intervention, and 
the first assessment.”71  
 
They also held several workshops. Agua Sur, the DWC that is the focus 
of the following ethnographic chapter, were one of the 16 committees, 
they explained to me that SENASBA undertook the same water quality 
tests that had been undertaken by Agua Sustanetable in the past, while 
the workshop on how to maintain and protect a well, presented advice 
that they had already received through ASICASUDD-EPSAS 72 . 
SENASBA, it seems are not undertaking new work with the committees, 
and appear to be doubling up on work that has already been done by 
other NGOs and social organisations. ASICASUDD-EPSAS has 
secured funding from NGOs and donors to undertake practical projects 
to improve the institutional sustainability of DWCs. They have 
distributed account-keeping software, and communication systems in 
conjunction with NGOs, so that committees can operate more efficiently 
on a day-to day-basis. Meanwhile, the association has been able to 
further use its strength in numbers to negotiate reduced electricity fees 
from ELFEC, the local electricity provider, for water committees, to 
                                                
71  SENASBA official, La Paz, November 16th 2010 
72 DWC Water secratary, Cochabamba, June 14th 2011 
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reduce the overall operating costs of each system. 
 
While ASICASUDD-EPSAS is working with NGOs and the state to 
improve DWC-led water provision in the peri-urban interface, it is 
evident that efforts to improve water provision across the Zona Sur are 
not coordinated. Work is sometimes doubled up on and some NGOs 
engage with some groups and not others. Furthermore, it appears that 
the poorest most marginalized groups, which often rely on vendors, are 
rarely the subjects of interventions. We can surmise that the 
interventions to not reflect necessity, and might serve further 
marginalise already marginalised groups. 
 
Institutionalising co-gestion through the PASAAS project 
The following section considers impact of the EU funded PASAAS 
project. This is the project that comes closest to institutionalised co-
gestion between ASICASUDD-EPSAS and the state. ASICASUDD-
EPSAS relies on support from diverse providers, but continues to lobby 
for co-gestion as an alternative model for water provision in the Zona 
Sur. This alternative vision for the Zona Sur had some real potential 
between 2008 and 2010 when Rene Orellana was Water Minister. 
Under Orellana, it appeared that the MMAYA were exploring the idea of 
co-gestion, and devolving resources and some autonomy to the DWCs 
through ASICASUDD-EPSAS. During this period several initiatives were 
undertaken that clearly supported the DWCs, and the organisation 
ASICASUDD-EPSAS.  
 
Renee Orellana was instrumental in the development of new 
relationships between the DWCs and the MMAYA, which bypassed the 
established municipalized system. The EU funded PASAAS project 
provided a major source of finance for DWCs belonging to 
ASICASUDD-EPSAS to develop or upgrade their infrastructure for 
provision. In practice funds were distributed between 41 DWCs for the 
construction of tanks, upgrading and extending of pipelines, and the 
installation of sewage systems. Most projects were completed by the 
 190 
end of 2011 leading to 8280 connections, benefitting 41400 people in 
the Zona Sur (ASICASUDD-EPSAS 2012).  
 
Figure 8: Drain cover for a PASAAS funded water system embellished with 
ASICASUR (ex-ASICASUDD-EPSAS) and MMAYA  
However, while the infrastructure is now in place, several committees 
do not have sufficient or good enough quality water to fill the systems. 
At the time of writing, this program had not been followed up with further 
funding. After the departure of Rene Orellana, the association has not 
enjoyed the same level of interaction with the ministry or the ministers 
of water that have since been appointed. During conversations with 
employees at CEVI who works closely with ASICASUDD-EPSAS, I was 
told that under Orellana, organisations such as CEVI felt that the state 
had recognised the potential to develop the committees and 
ASICASUDD-EPSAS as viable water providers, but that this had not 
been the case under subsequent ministers.73 When I interviewed an 
employee of the planning department of the MMAYA soon after the 
departure of Rene Orellana, he played down the PASAAS project.74 
The funding for the project was a one off and the result of Orellana’s 
willingness to respond to pressure that was coming from the social 
movements to fund physical upgrading. There was funding left over 
from a EU grant to improve access to water and it was channelled to 
ASICASUDD-EPSAS. This has not however, subverted the idea of 
                                                
73 CEVI employee October 9th 2011 
74 Government employee at planning department of MMAYA, La Paz, November 17th 
2010  
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municipal management. One employee at the planning department of 
the municipality explained that for the time being the municipality will 
only fund community organisations using LPP funding directly to 
decentralised neighbourhood associations, or OTBs. The municipality 
does not directly engage with organisations like ASICASUDD-EPSAS, 
because they are perceived as private providers, because they are non-
state.75  Therefore, while the state might support DWCs through one off 
projects like PASAAS, ultimately water provision is still governed using 
a municipal system and LPP funding as it was prior to 2006. This 
appeared to be indicative of a disconnect between the rhetoric of and 
approach of central government and that of the municipality. 
 
Some commentators have highlighted this move to be part of a broader 
shift whereby community providers have been co-opted by the state, 
which could potentially weaken the political agency of social 
organisations and movements that have challenged the state in the past 
(III Feria Internacional del Agua 2011). Committee members do not 
necessarily reflect this sentiment, and have expressed significant 
gratitude for the funding that was brought in under Rene Orellana.  
Padre Javier had started this earlier for us and the other 
committees nearby. But the pipes were weak and of poor 
quality. Many of the networks needed updating and then, 
thankfully for the money that came from the EU through the 
project PASAAS, with the help of Rene Orellana (ex-water 
minister), praise be to God! 76 
 
This is symptomatic of the disconnect between the discourse of 
activists and the needs of DWC members, which, as we shall see in 
the following chapter are often operating under challenging 
circumstances, and in need of external support.  
 
I now move on to consider how the association has facilitated specific 
government policies and projects relating to licences and registries. 
                                                
75 Civil Servant Water and Sanitation Projects Cochabamba Municipality November 22 
2010 
76 Water secretary, Cochabamba, June 14th 2010 
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This is important because DWCs will ultimately be managed and 
developed through a system of regulation as outlined in chapter 4. To 
be regulated the DWC must have a licence and ASICASUDD- EPSAS 
has been facilitating this process. 
 
Licenses and registries 
Beyond some funding initiatives and the development of new 
institutions to capacity build and regulate the sector, the state has 
continued to roll out a system of licenses and registries from DWCs and 
small-scale providers more generally. In theory this provides small-
scale providers with the right to access water sources and/or provide 
water services. This scheme has been in place since the Water War 
ended. As outlined in chapter 4 ASICASUDD-EPSAS has two 
representatives working for CTRL (The Technical Committee for 
Licences and Registries in Cochabamba), the organisation that 
administers the licenses and registries, and it encourages DWCs to sign 
up. However, having spoken to the members of several DWCs that 
have licenced, the systems have yet to have any real effect on the day-
to-day activities of DWCs in the Zona Sur.  
 
Some researchers have expressed concern towards the idea of 
licensing and registering providers in light of the conflict that has arisen 
in rural settings amongst irrigator communities (discussed in chapter 2). 
State-sanctioned collective rights, specifically enclosed rights to water 
sources for each community, have been greeted with some caution. 
Granting collective and community rights to water means enclosing 
access to water for one community, which has knock on effects for 
others. Formalizing DWCs through licensing means defining who has 
access to those water sources, and in turn legitimizes exclusive 
appropriation, which is arguably a form of privatisation. Indeed and as 
outlined above, the municipality perceives the DWCs as private water 
providers. The constitution recognises the role of community providers, 
and prohibits exclusive private sector participation in the water sector, 
but often the line between community and private provision is blurred or 
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not recognised. 
 
Bustamante (Bustamante 2007) has highlighted the impacts of licensing 
and registering the irrigation systems of rural communities in Tiqipaya. 
Reflecting on this she argues that granting collective rights does not 
necessarily lead to a revival of the commons, instead it undermines 
broader goals of sustainability and water equity and leads to increased 
incidences of conflict between communities (Bustamante et al 2012). In 
the Zona Sur, communities assert ownership over water sources that 
they have established though community wells. Communities have 
invested heavily in infrastructure to deliver water to households, and so 
they feel a sense of entitlement to the water they access through it. 
Neighbouring communities may share an aquifer, but the well tends to 
sit within the confines of the community. This, however, is not always 
the case. Some communities have wells in other communities and pipe 
the water over. However, over time, as the region has grown rapidly, 
residents reported that communities have tended towards enclosing 
access to the aquifer according to their community boundaries, and 
incidences of conflict between communities over water resources have 
increased. This calls into question the viability of community-led water 
provision in the Zona Sur.  
 
One DWC water secretary explained that during the 1980s and 1990s 
ample water supplies meant that there was little conflict over water 
supplies, and communities could share water sources.  There used to 
be an abundant water source in one of the barrios behind her barrio, 
and both communities had been in discussion around constructing a 
pipeline that would channel water down from communities on higher 
ground. However, relations between barrios have since changed as 
water resources have grown scarcer; “If we went there now to ask for 
water, the people up there, they would lynch me”.77 An employee of the 
NGO Fundacion Abril also told me that there is anecdotal evidence to 
                                                
77 Treasurer Agua Sur DWC, Villa 15 de Febrero, June 1st 2010 
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suggest that communities that have their water access points within the 
parameters of other barrios are now engaged in discussions around 
who has rights to that water source. While multiple DWCs share an 
aquifer, water rights are tied to land rights. During an ASICASUDD-
EPSAS workshop on reforms to the water sector, one DWC leader 
expressed his unease with the system of licences and registries,  
The water is for everyone, no one has the right to be its dueno 
(owner/landlord) so water sources or rights to access water 
sources should not be granted to anyone, or made anyone’s 
property.78  
 
Licences and registries had not taken full effect when this research was 
undertaken, but the challenges linked with this approach were already 
becoming evident. This will inevitably have implications for the viability 
of community-led provision in the Zona Sur.    
 
Reaction to reforms 
State reforms to the water sector since 2006 and consultations around 
a new water law and the right to water challenge the status of the 
DWCs, as the state attempts to negotiate legitimacy in the Zona Sur, 
and formalise the informal. The reforms have been met with some 
unease from ASICASUDD-EPSAS, particularly the system of licences 
and registries that has been implemented. 
 Community-led systems are finding it difficult to undertake all 
that the state is asking of them, they do not have adequate 
water, nor do they have enough money”.79   
Further, the policies and projects to date have not really improved 
access to water for the committees belonging to the association, 
because they have failed to tackle the core challenge which is ensuring 
an affordable, clean and plentiful water source for the committees. 
 
Conclusion 
While ASICASUDD-EPSAS is now aligned with the state to some 
                                                
78 DWC Participant workshop on the right to water, Cumbre por el agua y el 
Saneamiento Basico, Cochabamba, 25 -26 June, 201Basico, Cochabamba, 26 June, 
2010 
79 Abraham Grandiddyer , Cochabmaba July 22nd 2011 
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extent, we must keep in mind that the platform was based on principles 
of co-gestion, and set out to create partnerships with the state and other 
organisations to develop water services. The broad social and 
environmental challenges that undermine the capacity of the peri-urban 
DWCs on a daily basis, cannot be dealt with at the level of the 
community, nor even collectively by ASICASUDD-EPSAS. The 
association has entered into a relationship with the state, hoping that it 
would improve the capacity of the DWCs. In practice the state has not 
been willing to relinquish sufficient control nor resources for the 
partnership to come to fruition. The relationship is not, however, 
clientalist in the same way that the irrigators’ federation FEDECOR has 
been portrayed. The organisation presents an alternative peri-urban 
system of water governance, but which has the potential to facilitate 
further state interventions and reforms linked to the right to water. 
 
This chapter demonstrates that the human right to water is difficult to 
implement in the peri-urban interface because the state has historically 
been unable to guarantee provision, and state-citizen relations are 
weak. Several decades of urbanisation without infrastructure now 
makes it difficult for the state to roll out ‘traditional’ water infrastructure 
in the Zona Sur. Community water systems could be a solution. 
ASICASUDD-EPSAS developed in an attempt to encourage and 
galvanise community water systems in the Zona Sur. Peri-urban DWCs 
have thrived but only with the support of NGOs and external agencies. 
While the association developed to improve water provision, it has over 
time developed some political agency. It has become something of a 
gatekeeper to the peri-urban interface for the state as it rolls out reforms 
linked to the right to water. In practice that which is unfolding is not co-
gestion, it is something of a compromise. The state has not devolved 
sufficient resources nor garnered sufficient political support and will to 
adequately support the DWCs. This illustrates some of the difficulties in 
implementing the right to water and tackling water provision in peri-
urban areas of the Global South. 
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Chapter 7: The Drinking Water Committee  
 
The preceding chapters have described reforms around the right to water 
and the alternative ideals around community management, or the co-
gestion of water services advocated by ASICASUD-EPSAS. This chapter 
attempts to assess the institutional sustainability of one DWC and their 
emerging partnerships with the state in the Zona Sur. This assessment 
specifically considers to what extent DWC-led provision can build local 
environmental integrity, ensure equitable access and also the impact of 
local power relations. This chapter draws on ethnographic data to explore 
the day-to-day realities of community-led water provision in Villa 15 de 
Febrero in the Zona Sur, and to consider these processes. I begin by 
setting out the historic development of one barrio, I then work through the 
challenges and opportunities linked to each of the four elements in turn. 
The purpose of this chapter is to consider the viability of DWC-led 
provision in the peri-urban interface, as part of an on-going program of 
reforms to realise the right to water through community water providers in 
the Zona Sur. 
 
Locating Villa 1580 de Febrero in the Zona Sur 
Cochabamba is characterized by socio-spatial inequality that unfolds from 
north to south. This can be observed by taking a bus ride from the north 
of the city to the poorest communities in the peri-urban Zona Sur where 
this ethnographic chapter is located. The bus sets off amongst the 
affluent mansions and walled gardens nestled in the foothills of the Andes, 
which are kept green and lush, even during the dry season, by household 
gardeners and automated sprinklers. The journey heads down into the 
city and takes in the new, gated high-rise apartment blocks that have 
sprung up just north of the centre alongside the new shopping malls and 
western style supermarkets. The bus then passes some of the colonial 
plazas that are typical of the architectural style in the centre of the city, 
before hitting the central market La Cancha. Cochabamba grew around 
                                                
80 Pseudonym 
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the market located in the middle of the department and in this thriving 
agricultural region. Today, people come to the market not only for food, 
but also for their flat screen televisions, coca leaves, tailored suits and 
carnival costumes. It is so expansive and congested it can take up to an 
hour to drive the one kilometre or so distance from one end to the other 
on market days. The bus then picks up at the south side of the market 
and there are normally groups of women waiting with bundles of flowers, 
fruit and vegetables wrapped in aguayos81 to take back to the Zona Sur 
and beyond. Once loaded up, the microbus sets off again to meet the 
Avenida Petrolera (Petroleum Road) and into the Zona Sur that stretches 
out towards the rural towns of Tarata, Cliza and Punata. Petroleum road 
is lined with warehouses, factories, gas works, building supply merchants 
and mechanics, with smaller roads branching off it to the city refuse dump 
and dairy farms. The scrubland is notably dry and dusty when compared 
to the fresh suburbs of the north, but adequate for the polluting industries, 
services and businesses that required cheaper land. The migrants that 
arrived to the city during the 1980s settled here because land and 
accommodation was cheap and thus Cochabamba began its rapid sprawl 
south. The region continues to displace the poorest to its peripheries, as 
new barrios emerge on the inhospitable hills that extend to the west and 
east of the Zona Sur. The time sequence aerial views of the Zona Sur 
reveal how the process is on-going (see appendix 1). 
Villa 15 de Febrero 
 
Figure 9: Villa 15 de Febrero 
                                                
81 A traditional indigenous multi-coloured cloth often used as a bag 
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This ethnography was undertaken in Villa 15 de Febrero (see figure 9), a 
barrio located eight and a half kilometres to the south of the city centre on 
the edge of district 8. The Zona Sur is generally accepted to be districts 6, 
14, 9, 7, 8 and 5 (see Map 4). District 8 has more urban and industrial 
features than District 9 and is made up of a mix of formal and informal 
settlements. Villa 15 de Febrero borders with several informal 
communities, and is not far from a petrol refinery. It is one of the 31 
formally recognised barrios in the district, but figure 10 reveals the extent 
of the informal barrios in the region.  
 
Figure 10: Informal barrios in the Zona Sur 
The barrio, like the Zona Sur as a whole, is socio-economically and 
culturally diverse: figures 11 and 13 highlight the distinct houses, services 
in and around the barrio and types of land use. Three storey houses with 
high security gates surrounded by barbed wire stand a few blocks away 
from adobe houses and one-storey two roomed houses, or subdivided 
houses providing separate housing units. Subdivided houses are popular 
with young people who have come to Cochabamba temporarily for 
seasonal work, or to take advantage of urban facilities such as schools 
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and colleges. It is commonplace for homes to double up as shops or 
services like grocery shops, or more informally selling cheese or honey 
from their rural places of origin. Other families use a front room for a 
surgery, dentist, or hair salon. Meanwhile small places of worship of 
diverse denominations have been built in amongst the houses and 
commercial properties. Villa 15 de Febrero has its own school and a 
small community centre that is run by the OTB (formal decentralised 
residents’ association), where community meetings are held: the barrio 
also absorbs businesses such as mechanics on the edge of the barrio 
(see figure 11) that benefit from the proximity to the highway coming in to 
Cochabamba. The great leveller is the lack of public water provision. The 
barrio, like most of the Zona Sur, does not have the same water 
infrastructure as the centre of the city and so its residents rely on water 
from private vendors or from the water committee.  
 
Figure 11: Mechanics on the edge of the barrio 
 
It is estimated that 50% of water provision in the Zona Sur comes from 
water committees (Ledo 2009); however the history, development, 
capacity and the social implications of these committee are poorly 
understood. Unlike the Water Fora of Caracas and the Cooperatives of 
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La Sirena in Cali, or even the water systems established by mining 
barrios in the north west of the city, the committees did not emerge as the 
direct result of corporatist policies or neoliberal reforms (as set out in 
chapter 5). The committees of the Zona Sur are the products of on-going 
struggles for water provision. Villa 15 de Febrero has had a drinking 
water committee, namely Agua Sur,82 since 1999 with Doña Petra as its 
secretary. I first met Doña Petra at a workshop for water committees held 
by ASICASUDD-EPSAS one Sunday; I approached her during the 
meeting and she invited me to meet in her office, in the front room of her 
parents’ house in the barrio. There is no written history of Villa 15 de 
Febrero, but over the course of an afternoon and a litre of coca-cola she 
gave me a short history of water in the barrio and the committee, based 
on her experiences. Her grandparents had a house here when the barrio 
was still scrubland during the 1970s, and Doña Petra had moved to the 
barrio with her parents during the late 1980s from a mining area.  
 
Historically, Villa 15 de Febrero had been part of a larger community but 
split acrimoniously with it in 1980. Traditionally the whole community 
would come together for at least two days at the beginning of May for 
celebrations that draw on indigenous Andean fertility festivals on a 
Catholic saint’s day. The vecinos (residents) came together in the May of 
1980 as usual, but the vecinos from the west of the barrio, who had 
settled earlier, were more inclined to celebrate according to more sombre 
Catholic traditions, whereas the vecinos from the east, more recently 
settled from indigenous and mining communities, wanted to dance and 
drink chicha83. As a result they were turned away from the celebrations. 
An emergency meeting was called by the vecinos who were outraged that 
they would not be allowed to dance. One barrio elder explained: “The 
virgin festival is a pagan festival; like all of the festivals here in Bolivia. 
We dance for Pachamama every May”, and so, on that day, Villa 15 de 
Febrero was established. The barrio is still defined by this day and 
                                                
82 Pseudonym 
83 Chicha is a corn fermented drink that has been drunk for centuries and continues to 
be drunk, often in a ritualistic fashion, today. 
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indigenous traditions such the monthly K’oa are observed, as well as 
carnival where vecinos dance regional indigenous dances during the 
summer months. Similar practices are also observed in other barrios in 
the Zona Sur and in the centre of the city. 
 
Doña Petra and I spent an afternoon together, but she, like everyone else 
in the barrio, was wary of me at first. Slowly, we got to know each other 
after I offered to accompany her on her rounds to collect bills and 
payments for the water committee the following week. Our relationship 
was reciprocal, she asked me to help her clean out the water tank early 
one Sunday morning, or to help out painting the school, and I was 
gradually introduced to the community and able to begin my data 
collection. This was how my peri-urban ethnography began. 
 
The right to water and community water provision in Villa 15 de 
Febrero 
I began my fieldwork by trying to get a sense of people’s ideas on the 
human right to water. When I first arrived in the barrio in 2010 most 
vecinos were not aware that the human right to water was enshrined in 
the constitution, and the implications that this could have for the water 
sector: those who were familiar with the human right to water explained 
that they would be unlikely to benefit from it considering the government’s 
neglect of peri-urban communities in the past. This very much reflected 
the discourse of ASICASUDD-EPSAS, as discussed in the previous 
chapter. Vecinos were, however, certain that the community should 
participate in local water governance. It was commonplace to hear that 
the community was best placed to manage and provide water in the 
barrio, but that they required the help of the state to do so; in essence the 
idea that ‘co-gestion’ and the participation of the community in water 
resources is the only way that the water needs of the community will be 
met. One barrio elder explained: 
 
I arrived at the barrio 30 years ago, when there was nothing here, 
we cleared cactus and built roads together. So many local 
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politicians have come to this barrio and promised to pave our 
roads, but we have had to do everything, pave roads, bring 
electricity, and sort out the water supply. When I first arrived 
there were just 2 aguateros for the whole zone, now there are 
tens. The communities of the Zona Sur have had to manage 
their resources and so have become good at it; we should be 
supported in doing this.84 
 
This was often exemplified with explanations about how they had 
frequently been let down by the state and so it is only through local 
management that communities can make sure that their interests are 
represented. This was expressed by several vecinos: 
 
The state should provide the water, but it can't: it has failed us 
and so we have had to provide it.85 
 
“I think a committee is the best to manage a water supply, they 
are the most capable, they are the ones who have been 
managing water in this region for the longest.86 
 
This sentiment echoes that of ASICASUDD-EPSAS, but does not mean 
that they reject state interventions, or that the community had strong 
inclinations towards autonomy. Agua Sur was a member of ASICASUDD-
EPSAS and had been the focus of several state-led capacity building 
interventions. While I was in the barrio, the community was using 
PASAAS funding from the Ministry for Water and the Environment via 
ASICASUDD-EPSAS (details/background to this project are in the 
previous chapter) from 2008 to construct an extended replacement for the 
existing pipeline. Thus, state funding for the project was designed and 
managed by the committee. This provided me with the opportunity to 
explore how the relationship between the MMAYA and the committees 
was unfolding in practice. Given that the water committee was out of 
service due to the construction of the pipeline, it also gave me the chance, 
to understand how water provided by a committee compares to the 
service provided by the water vendors, or the aguateros. While the new 
pipeline was under construction, the vecinos of Villa 15 de Febrero relied 
                                                
84 Barrio elder, Villa 15 de Febrero, May 2nd 2010 
85 Barrio elder, Villa 15 de Febrero, May 5th 2010 
86 Barrio elder, Villa 15 de Febrero, May 5th 2010 
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exclusively on water from aguateros. In the following section I set out the 
difference between water bought in from the aguateros and the service 
provided by Agua Sur. 
 
The service 
Before exploring the viability of the committees, I first set out the sort of 
service available from the other principal provider in the Zona Sur, the 
aguateros. Aguateros (see figure 12) delivered to the barrio 7 days per 
week, they are readily available, but the water quality of the water 
provided is not reliable, as it often smells or looks bad. There are multiple 
aguateros operating in the villa and so for vecinos to give their custom, an 
aguatero must develop a reputation for selling ‘good’ water: ‘good’ water 
is not necessarily clean, but it must look, taste and smell clean.  
 
Figure 12: An aguatero in the barrio 
 
All vecinos who took part in the household survey described how 
sometimes they had bought water that looked, smelt, or tasted so bad 
that it could only be used for cleaning the house. When water is bad 
households have to buy water again, there are no returns or refunds from 
aguateros, and so residents pay double for dirty water. Furthermore, 
water sold by the aguateros is the most expensive water in Cochabamba. 
In July 2011 water prices were as follows: 
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SEMAPA: Public Water Provider 
to the city centre 
36p per cubic meter 
DWC Agua Sur  
 
50p per cubic meter 
 
DWC APAAS – Villa Pagador 
 
40p per cubic meter 
DWC Valle Hermoso  20p per cubic meter 
DWC Villa Venezuela  24p per cubic meter 
Aguateros  50p – £1.40 per turil/barrel (1 
turil=200 ltr) Price increases 
depending on the elevation of the 
barrio 
Table 1: Price of Water 
 
Water from the committees is always cheaper than water from the 
aguateros, which is one reason why community-run water committees are 
so common across the Zona Sur. However the price does vary from 
committee to committee, and as I will explain later in this chapter, water is 
not consistently available and can be saline. Joining fees can also be 
prohibitive. Not every community has a water committee, and some 
barrios or residents chose to buy water from vendors if their DWC is 
affected by water shortages, contamination, or perhaps if they are 
unwilling to participate in the DWC. All of these factors are discussed in 
more detail later in the chapter. 
 
There is a significant disparity in the amount of water used and how it is 
accessed by vecinos in the barrio. The data is gathered in relation to 
water purchased from the aguateros, as the water committee was out of 
action while I was collecting data. Water use in the barrio ranged from 11 
litres to 95 litres per person per day, with an average of 52 litres. This is 
considerably less than the estimated average of 150 litres per day used 
by SEMAPA customers. 35 of the 90 respondents were consuming less 
than the World Health Organisation threshold of 20 litres of water per 
person per day (World Health Organisation 2012). The difference in water 
use reflects the socio-economic diversity in the barrio. The development 
and growth of the barrio has been uneven, and as a result certain parts of 
 205 
the barrio are more developed and attract wealthier newcomers. Wealth 
from remittances, and coca crops in the Chapare has funded the 
construction of salubrious houses of up to 3 storeys throughout the north 
and central parts of the barrio. Meanwhile in the east and south-eastern 
fringes of the barrio there are more traditional adobe houses that are 
common in rural areas, and simple one storey constructions of 
breezeblocks.  
 
 
Figure 13: Diverse housing types 
 
This socio-economic inequality is also reflected in how people store and 
access water in their homes. Wealthier vecinos have installed large 
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storage tanks and pump water to a tank on a roof, which is then 
distributed around the house to supply appliances such as washing 
machines, showers and flushing toilets. Poorer households rely on turiles 
(barrels with a capacity of 200 litres) that are generally left outside their 
house, often uncovered and therefore more prone to contamination. 
Water is taken by bucket and used sparingly as and when it is needed. 
While water use varied between households, all 90 households that 
responded to the survey re-used water to some extent: dishwater is 
reused to clean floors, water from washing clothes to flush the toilet, while 
cooking water was often used to water plants. This could only be 
explained as a result of a common culture of water preservation.  
SEMAPA customers in the centre and north of the city experience water 
shortages during the dry months, and undertake similar water saving 
practices. 
 
As outlined in previous chapters, Cochabamba experiences a short, 
intense rainy season, with the heaviest rains falling between December 
and February. Appendix 1 highlights the difference between the driest 
months and the rainy season. Even some of the wealthier households 
regularly harvest rainwater during the rainy period, with 57 out of 90 
survey respondents doing so, for economic reasons and for convenience. 
Instead of relying solely on water from the aguateros, families could 
collect water directly into containers placed in their yards, or more 
strategically, by using a guttering system to collect water off their roofs: 
rainwater is used for clothes washing and cleaning the house but never 
for human consumption.  
 
 
Aguateros are unregulated, an unknown quantity, with water of variable 
quality and so it pays to get to know your aguatero. Vendors draw water 
from various sites and sources around the city; in the north of the city, in 
the wealthy suburbs of Cala Cala there are numerous subterranean 
sources that are exploited through private wells, aguateros can be found 
queuing here on a daily basis to fill up before distributing to the Zona Sur. 
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There are also other wells further afield, in the more rural regions to the 
north and west of the city. Then there are the more dubious stories of 
aguateros who fill their tanks with the dirty water from swimming pools in 
the northern zone; a story that was often re-told to me in households not 
only in 15 de Febrero but throughout the Zona Sur. Whether there is any 
truth in the story it is impossible to know, but it is not inconceivable to the 
vecinos, considering the quality of water many households have received 
in the past. Vecinos not only report dirty-smelling water but also chemical 
smells, furthermore, while living in Cochabamba I often saw aguateros 
filling up from dirty rivers and streams. It was commonplace to hear 
vecinos complain about receiving water that was cloudy, green, brown, 
smelt bad or tasted strange, or had insects or small animals in it. Vecinos 
were more likely to receive bad water during the dry winter months, from 
June to September, when there is less water available to the aguateros.  
Also vendors increase the price of water during these months, with some 
aguateros adding 10 pence per turil during the dryer months. Families, 
particularly mothers who were generally responsible for buying water, 
have become discriminating because it’s too costly not to be; they could 
point out the aguateros on the streets that were generally trustworthy. 
Single men, however, were less particular about their water sources. 
While all vecinos consulted had received bad deliveries of water at some 
point, most were now accustomed to the type of service and thus are 
used to the water they buy from the aguateros. Households use water 
only if it has been boiled or cleaned using the Sodis UV filtration method. 
 
The drinking water committee 
The committee is based on core principles of mutual aid, and thus, unlike 
the aguateros, it was not established as a service that is bought in. 
Instead, a community secures the local right to a water source and/or to 
provide a water service to its members known as socios.  
Agua Sur is a non-profit making civil association, of 
communitarian character that represents the interests and 
responsibilities of the community in relation to basic services 
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(water).87  
 
In the absence of state infrastructure and water provision, the community 
has become the legitimate provider in the eyes of peri-urban residents, 
and increasingly, as highlighted in previous chapters, a potential solution 
to water provision in the peri-urban interface. 
 
In rural settings, indigenous councils or community-based organisations 
tend to control aspects of everyday life. A neighbourhood council might 
make decisions on water provision, but also education and other basic 
services as well as cultural and social decisions. These organisations 
exist in the absence of the state, but also in parallel with the state, a 
feature of the juridical pluralism that is said to characterise Bolivia. In peri-
urban areas this juridical pluralism is more fragmented. In the Zona Sur, 
in communities such as Villa 15 de Febrero, there is a Residents’ 
Association, but it does not manage the water supply. The water 
committee manages only one aspect of everyday life. Meanwhile the 
school, for example, is provided by the state. Control over basic services 
tends to be managed collectively, but sometimes it is through a conduit 
established by the state, such as the formal resident’s association, other 
times it is through grassroots organisations such as the DWC that tends 
to undermine the state (this is discussed in more detail later in the 
chapter). 
 
The DWC is based on a collective structure of management based on 
rights and obligations. To be a member of the committee, members must 
participate in the management and maintenance of the system. The 
committee board operates by consensus of committee members. It 
consists of a president and treasurer (both elected voluntary positions), 
while a water secretary, in this case Doña Petra, is paid to undertake the 
day-to-day running of the committee. The committee also has an 
engineer who is casually employed when required. When it was operating, 
                                                
87 Agua Sur Norms and Regulations 2001.  
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Agua Sur provided a cheaper service than the aguateros. The committee 
provided water at 50 pence per cubic meter (1000 litres), while aguateros 
deliver at 50 pence per 200 litres. To become a member of the water 
committee you must have property within the territorial remit of the water 
committee, and pay a joining fee of around $250 per household, payable 
in instalments if necessary. There are also negotiable favourable rates for 
community organizations and services, for example schools or churches. 
Here the meaning of ‘usos y costumbres’ at the level of the community 
becomes more tangible. Furthermore, if certain members are unable to 
pay their bills the water secretary has the ability to allow payment by 
instalments. It is only during recent years that the committee has started 
to consider the idea of cutting off the supply to members who have 
repeatedly failed to pay their bills. 
 
To be a socio of Agua Sur, members have a series of obligations to the 
committee. They are expected to participate themselves, or send a 
representative of the household, to the meetings when called. Women 
and men participate equally in these meetings, which generally happen 
on a monthly basis, but can be held more or less frequently as required; 
the secretary pins notes to the doors of committee members when 
emergency meetings are required. Vecinos were also required to 
participate in workdays such as cleaning out the water tank and to 
participate in marches organised by ASICASUDD-EPSAS or other events. 
While I was in the field a march was held to commemorate a decade 
following the Water War and to highlight the on-going water shortages 
experienced in the Zona Sur. Although women tend to buy, and be 
responsible for, water use in the house, they are rarely elected as 
president or leader of a water committee. Consequently, during the 
annual national water meeting of leaders from water committees, 
cooperatives and social movements the only women present are a few 
treasurers and secretaries, like Doña Petra. Failure to attend workdays, 
meetings or ASICASUDD-EPSAS events leads to a fine of 3 bolivianos, 
which was around 30 pence at the time of writing.  
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Every water committee is different and has developed according to the 
community’s uses and customs. The management structure of Agua Sur 
is not a carbon copy of the other water committees that operate in the 
Zona Sur, but it bears similarities. In almost every committee attendance 
at meetings and workdays is obligatory, and each committee collectively 
decides upon its rules and regulations and the structure of management, 
creating the ‘norms’ for water management in the barrio according to their 
‘usos y costumbres’. There are then some minor differences in how the 
committee functions. Some committees might not have a paid water 
secretary, but insist that an elected member of the barrio takes on the 
work, while others may have short terms for committee presidents, to 
ensure that as many vecinos as possible have the opportunity to 
participate in the directive at some point.  This section has outlined some 
of the backdrop and norms that frame the DWCs in principle. In following 
section we begin to consider some of the elements that affect the 
sustainability of DWC water provision in peri-urban areas. 
 
The sustainability of DWCs in the peri-urban interface 
As outlined in the preceding chapters, NGOs, social organisations and 
newly formed public institutions have attempted to support and develop 
DWCs as water providers in the Zona Sur, generally addressing certain 
elements that impact on the sustainability of water provision. For the 
remainder of the chapter I explore some of the challenges and 
opportunities for enhancing sustainable water provision in the peri-urban 
interface. I develop a qualitative understanding of the opportunities and 
challenges to the building of sustainable water provision in peri-urban 
areas, and the implications that this has for local environmental integrity. I 
also explore the often-ignored challenges and opportunities to build 
equitable access and social justice. Throughout this section I consider the 
shaping impact of the dynamic social relations that characterise the peri-
urban interface. 
 
DWC-led provision and local environmental integrity 
The diverse water providers of Cochabamba rely on surface water and 
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alluvial aquifers for water; in 1996 it was estimated that 60% of the 
region’s water for productive and consumer uses came from surface 
stores and 40% from aquifers (Anton 1996). The drinking water 
committees of the peri-urban south were established on wells that extract 
water from the aquifer, but the committee members have a very limited 
understanding of the water that they extract and distribute. The presence 
of numerous unregulated private and community-owned wells, alongside 
industry, agriculture and agri-business many of which use the aquifer and 
dispose wastewater into surface water areas, means that vecinos and 
DWCs suspect that water levels have become depleted and 
contaminated. This is evidenced by the volume and quality of the water 
supplied by the DWC. However, there has been no broad assessment of 
the impacts of the diverse actors that co-exist in the Zona Sur on the 
aquifer, nor of the water extracted in the Zona Sur and the wider aquifer. 
Regional analysis of some wells have been made by the Gheilmi et al 
(2008) for a report commissioned by ASICASUDD-EPSAS into the quality 
of the water of DWCs belonging to the federation. 
 
The topography of the Zona Sur means that in some areas parts of the 
aquifer are more susceptible to contamination from wastewater from 
industry, and also from domestic wastewater from the local community. 
(Romero, Vandecasteele et al. 2000). Industries in the region that 
produce biological wastewater include two prominent slaughterhouses. 
This wastewater is dumped in the River Rocha and indirectly into the 
Tamborada river. Both of these rivers are within the aquifer that feeds the 
DWCs of district 8 and 9. There is also a tannery and two plastic factories 
that produce chemical wastewater in the region of the aquifer, but it is not 
clear how or where their wastewater is disposed (Gheilmi et al 2008: 28). 
At the level of the community, domestic wastewater and seepage from 
poorly lined septic tanks are sources of contamination. The following map 
highlights the regions that are most at risk of contamination according to 
the GOD scale. The GOD scale has been used widely across Latin 
America, it is based on the confinement of the aquifer, the type of 
overlying rock and the depth of the groundwater (Foster et al 2002: 19) 
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Agua Sur’s well is located on a point of the aquifer that is at high risk of 
contamination.  
 
 
Figure 14: Contamination risk in the Zona Sur 
 
ASICASUDD-EPSAS commissioned the referenced investigation so that 
the barrios of the Zona Sur can understand the nature and vulnerability of 
the water sources that they exploit, and thus plan to protect the water 
supplies that are most vulnerable or avoid sources that are contaminated. 
Agua Sur thus knows that the water it exploits is contaminated (the 
sources of which are discussed in more detail below), but it has limited 
capacity to tackle the sources of contamination and treat the water. The 
state has not undertaken extensive sampling of the aquifer and has yet to 
acknowledge the levels of contamination in the water that the DWCs rely 
on. The aquifer that the DWCs exploit extends far beyond the Zona Sur, 
and thus the sources of contamination and dwindling water levels is a 
consequence of extraction and contamination across the aquifer. The 
committees are unable to tackle these problems that exist on a larger 
scale than the community, like over extraction and contamination of the 
aquifer. Furthermore, the on-going urbanisation of the region, beyond the 
peri urban zone continues to impact on it. Planned and unplanned 
construction of houses, businesses, roads and new barrios on the alluvial 
fan, which is the natural recharge area of the aquifer, affects capacity to 
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recharge. It is the principal water source for peri-urban DWCs.88 This 
further demonstrates how the peri urban zone cannot be divorced from 
the urban centre, and how the continued development of the centre has a 
lasting affect on the broader aquifer. 
 
While vendors and the DWC have been able to develop infrastructure 
and a service to meet the water needs of communities in the Zona Sur, 
the same cannot be said for sanitation. Ultimately the sustainability of any 
water provision is dependent on wastewater management. Households in 
the barrio tend to use septic tanks that are often poorly lined and not 
regularly emptied, while wastewater is thrown out into the lanes and 
roadsides. Households have no other choice than to get rid of their 
wastewater this way, but the implications for the local water supply are 
severe. In a recent study of wells in the region, it was found that faecal 
matter was the most commonly found contaminant in committee wells 
(Gheilmi et al, 2008). Agua Sur is aware of this, along with many of the 
water committees of ASICASUDD-EPSAS. In conjunction with NGOs 
such as Agua Sustentable, Yaku al Sur and the Fundacion Abril, the 
committee leaders have attended workshops on how best to protect a 
well against such sources of contamination, but the DWCs that participate 
do not represent all the communities in the Zona Sur, and access to 
sanitation is a problem across the whole region.  NGOs are trying to 
support DWCs so that they can tackle some of the impacts of 
contamination or over-exploitation. However, they do not engage with all 
DWCs. Ideally a state-led initiative would engage with all DWCs. 
 
The idea of the basic right to sanitation is gaining ground amongst the 
committees, meaning that the communities need to start organising and 
securing funds for sanitation systems as there is little hope that the state 
will extend the city system to the Zona Sur. Doña Petra, the committee 
secretary believes that access to sanitation should be the next issue to 
mobilise the water committees of the Zona Sur; currently sanitation, 
                                                
88 NGO-affiliated Engineer, Cochabamba, May16th 2010 
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reaches fewer people than potable water in this area of the city, see Map 
8. Several water committees and OTBs in the Zona Sur, such as Villa 
Pagador, have constructed their own sanitation systems, but water 
continues to takes priority, as many water committees continue to 
struggle to maintain and develop their system of water provision. Reforms 
to build the capacity of DWCs have failed to address local sanitation 
provision and wastewater disposal, while the limited financial and 
institutional capacity of the water committees means that communities 
continue to contaminate their own, and surrounding water supplies. Again, 
the broader processes that characterise the peri urban zone, specifically 
rapid urbanisation without infrastructure development, undermine 
community-focussed provision. These processes need to be understood 
if community-led provision is to become a viable method of provision in 
the Zona Sur. 
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Map 8: Sanitation coverage Cochabamba 
The absence of efficient basic services across the region affects the local 
environment and the broader aquifer. The state operates an unreliable 
refuse collection service, which means that vecinos are often left with 
weeks’ worth of rubbish in their back yard with no idea when the next 
collection will be. When this happens, particularly during warmer summer 
months, vecinos will dump rubbish away from the barrio, or if they have 
access to a vehicle, they will take their rubbish and dump it by the River 
Rocha, therefore polluting a water source that feeds the aquifer that 
DWCs rely on. Water committees and industry both contaminate surface 
and subterranean water levels and water quality in the region albeit on 
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very different scales. Vecinos in the region do so out of necessity, 
because they lack the services and infrastructure to be able to do 
otherwise. Industrial contamination persists because the state does not 
regulate efficiently. This demonstrates that while the community can 
manage water resources, their efficiency and capacity to deliver clean 
water can only be actualised if the state ensures the provision of other 
basic services, tackles sources of contamination and regulates the 
behaviour of other polluting actors in the region.  
 
Water committees were established to meet the needs of the 
communities that they serve; wells were not excavated with any 
consideration for the water needs of neighbouring barrios. Decisions 
around where to drill for a well were often hunches based on local 
knowledge and understandings of the aquifer. Agua Sur were fortunate to 
find water with their first well, but they excavated a further three none of 
which had sufficient volume to be able to supply the barrio. Map 9 
highlights the wells that the municipality knows about in the Zona Sur in 
2001, while many more wells have been perforated since then. There are 
hundreds of wells throughout the Zona Sur, many of which are too close 
to each other, or are over-extracting water from the aquifer89. The water 
committees of ASICASUDD-EPSAS are aware of this, and so there have 
been recommendations made by engineers working for local NGOs to 
establish minimum distances between excavated wells, and maximum 
volumes of exploitation of the aquifer in the region. Agua Sur water has 
been saline for several years as a result of over-exploitation. Vecinos 
explained that water was running like milk from the taps when the DWC 
was operating. The assessment made by Agua Sustenable corroborated 
this, and the water of the committee was deemed unfit for human 
consumption, one element of this was that it was overly saline. While the 
water in the Zona Sur is often saline, vecinos describe how the water has 
become more saline over time. Over-extraction of the aquifer locally leads 
to the salinization of wells. A coordinated response could help prevent the 
                                                
89 NGO-affiliated Engineer, Cochabamba, May 16th 2010 
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decline of the phreatic level/the water table, a process which could lead to 
the infiltration of water contaminated from the rivers community and 
Rocha Tamborada (Ghelimi et al, 2008), which are heavily contaminated 
as outlined in the previous pages. ASICASUDD-EPSAS runs regular 
workshops and training on the most sustainable ways to exploit the 
aquifer, giving advice on the most efficient pumps to avoid over-
exploitation of the aquifer, but the coordination of all water committees in 
the region is necessary for this approach to work effectively. These 
workshops embody an attempt to tackle some of environmental factors 
that undermine DWCs in light of the state’s failure.  
 
The constitution recognizes citizen’s rights to a clean environment and 
the protection of water resources against contamination, but this has not 
yet been developed into policy or laws to protect peri-urban communities. 
In the Zona Sur, the aquifer continues to be contaminated by industries, 
abattoirs and agro-industries located here, as well as contaminating 
services such as the refuse dump that are located here. Committees in 
the Zona Sur have sought to lobby to defend the aquifer against 
contamination; K’ara K’ara, a municipal waste dump, is the most prolific 
contaminant in the region, having been declared an environmental 
disaster zone by the municipality, the map below highlights the proximity 
of the dump to the barrio and its well 
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 Map 
Map 9: Known wells in the Zona Sur 2001 
.  
Agua Sur has been identified as being particularly vulnerable to 
contamination according to the GOD index. It is thus physically vulnerable 
to the impacts of accumulating sources of contamination.  The barrio is 
also on the periphery of the contamination zone of K’ara K’ara. Numerous 
communities have emerged around K’ara K’ara since the early 2000s, as 
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highlighted in appendix 1. The contamination from the dump was not a 
surprise to vecinos who live with the stench and flies of K’ara K’ara on a 
daily basis, which intensifies during the warmer months. They have 
always suspected that the dump must be affecting their water supply. The 
2008 report by Ghielmi et al on behalf of committees belonging to 
ASICASUDD-EPSAS stated that the Agua Sur was one of the 
committees whose water supply was likely to be affected by 
contamination from the dump. Communities and committees surrounding 
the dump have been calling for its closure and for it to be sealed since the 
late 1990s. The campaign manifested itself in a high-profile series of 
blockades in late 2009 that filled the streets of Cochabamba with rotting 
waste for weeks during the hottest driest months of the year. This led to a 
declaration by the supreme court of criminal justice in favour of the local 
residents, and an order that the dump be closed and sealed. In 2011, the 
dump continued to receive waste from the city: the municipality simply 
hadn’t enforced the closure because it hasn’t established an efficient way 
of sealing the site or an alternative space for a new refuse dump. The 
continued contamination of local land and water resources by K’ara K’ara, 
which is one source amongst many, highlights the inconsistency in 
government policy towards the Zona Sur and the water committees. 
Policies and projects that support the work of water committees are 
compromised by the continued preference by the state for the needs of 
those living in the urban centre and industries located in the Zona Sur. 
This in turn undermines the capacity of water committees to provide 
sufficient and safe water. The state has yet to tackle the diverse sources 
of industrial contamination that affect the aquifer. 
 
A more coordinated effort to understand the nature of the aquifer, the 
principal sources of contamination and how they impact on the aquifer 
and the location of wells throughout the Zona Sur has never been 
attempted. The Centro CASA (outlined in the previous chapter) at UMSS 
have worked with The Fundaccion Abril, Agua Sustenable and 
ASICASUDE EPSAS’ committees to sample and analyse committee 
water sources. However, these are small-scale studies that have been 
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commissioned on behalf of organisations and committees, as such their 
findings are not publicly available. A principal researcher at the Centro 
CASA explained that the state had never undertaken a broad diagnostic 
investigation of the aquifer, as it would mean that they would be obliged 
to recognize some of the underlying sources of contamination affecting 
water supplies in the area90. In doing this they would have to tackle the 
failure to provide a sanitation system, the unregulated contamination by 
the private sector and also the state’s failure to adequately plan for city 
refuse disposal. While the information that reveals the sources of 
contamination is not in the public domain the state is allowed ‘off the 
hook’. 
 
In summary, DWCs extract water in an uncoordinated and unregulated 
fashion that is not dissimilar to that of the other industrial and agricultural 
actors that share the aquifer, this has led to the depletion of water 
resources. The aquifer is contaminated by industrial wastewater as well 
as domestic wastewater as a result of the absence of basic service 
provision. Additionally, the state has been unwilling to close or address 
the contamination from the municipal waste dump. The basic needs of 
peri-urban communities here have been largely ignored, and the state 
has failed to plan for, and consider, the temporal and spatial impacts of 
environmental pollution. Despite all of this, the state continues to support 
and develop DWCs as alternative providers in the Zona Sur, even though 
this uncoordinated use of the aquifer is evidently unsustainable. Gheilmi 
et al’s (2008) report concluded that the water from Agua Sur’s well was 
unfit for human consumption, using the Bolivian established Norms for 
Potable Water (NB512/04).91 The well does not comply with the national 
standard for sulphates, ammonium nitrate, magnesium, and chlorides. 
The waters are saline and nickel has been found in trace amounts, the 
well also contained contamination from organic (thought to be faecal) 
                                                
90 CASA employee, Cochabamba May 20th 2010 
91 This is the national standard for drinking water in Bolivia, established by the Ministry 
for the Environment and Water 
http://www.mmaya.gob.bo/vapsb/biblioteca/DOCS/NORMAS/NB%20512,495-
496%20CalidadAgua%20-%20oct2004/NB512%20AP_Requisitos.pdf 
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matter and wastewater, while the general hydro chemical characteristics 
suggest the presence of an important hydro chemical alteration. Of the 25 
wells sampled, Agua Sur’ water supply was one of the five that rated 
worst, and the report recommended strongly against consuming the water. 
 
I interviewed one engineer who worked for Agua Sustentable and who 
regularly gave workshops and talks to water committee leaders and 
asked him what he thought was the best way to exploit the aquifer 
sustainably, He responded that he thought the aquifer could meet the 
water needs of the committees, if it was managed efficiently and water 
use was regulated.92 This is not dissimilar to the approach discussed in 
the previous chapter that is advocated by SENASBA. This would include 
ensuring that wells were built with sufficient distance between each other, 
that they are lined efficiently, and that sources of contamination were 
curtailed. Reforms to support the work of committees highlighted in this 
thesis, have focused on developing the DWCs but have failed to address 
some of the local and more regional sources of contamination and over-
exploitation. It is estimated that there are at least 120 water committees 
and associations operating in the Zona Sur, using the aquifer or 
transported water to supply their communities. Some of these distribute 
water for human consumption and for livestock, but each one is working 
towards the interests of their own communities. Committees, however, do 
not exist in isolation and co-exist with the urban and rural services and 
actors that are located here, with industry, agro-industry, and businesses 
such as slaughterhouses. There is insufficient understanding of the water 
needs and practices of each of these diverse actors, this combined with a 
failure to develop policies and regulation that regulate the needs of each 
of these actors, leads to the depletion and contamination of the aquifer.  
 
There has evidently been a complete lack of regional planning or 
integrated development by the state. This scenario also suggests that the 
committees’ future is dependent on the state playing a more active role to 
                                                
92 NGO-affiliated Engineer May 16th 2010 
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protect and possibly provide water sources for the committees. The 
DWCs cannot tackle regional problems that affect the whole aquifer 
independently. This is why co-gestion or co-management is the core 
discourse promoted by community water providers in the Zona Sur, and 
not demands for autonomy. The discourse of co-gestion does not consist 
of an equal partnership between committees and the state for water 
management in the Zona Sur, as it is heavily dependent on the role and 
will of the state. Water committees do not have the institutional capacity 
or financial resources to be able to address the broader sources of 
contamination that impact on the aquifer. Government reforms to date 
have focussed on low-level capacity building and infrastructural projects, 
and have yet to tackle sources of contamination to the aquifer, or to 
secure access to water sources other than the aquifer. Failing to do so 
undermines plans to improve access to water and recognise the right to 
water in the peri-urban interface. Furthermore it continues a pattern of 
unsustainable water provision, which negatively affects local 
environmental integrity. It appears that this is largely the result of a lack of 
resources, information and data on the Zona Sur, and also political will. 
 
Equitable water access 
In the following section I consider the challenges and opportunities for 
DWCs in providing equitable access to water in the peri-urban interface, 
examining the historic development of the barrio to suggest some 
reasons why access to basic services including water is often unequal. 
The power relations that define community-based organisations have 
been well documented. Peri-urban DWCs are no different. The following 
section considers the socio-political context that has led to the 
development of the DWC and the unequal provision that characterises it. 
If DWCs are to play a role in water provision as part of reforms under the 
right to water, factors that influence the equity of water provision need to 
be understood. I go on to argue that the emergence of the peri-urban 
interface and the accompanying peripheralisation of poverty is mirrored at 
the level of the barrio. There had been a tendency to romanticise the 
capacity of community-based organisations to meet the needs of the 
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community. The ‘small is beautiful’ myth that is often applied to 
community based natural resource management in rural settings, has 
more recently been dispelled (Blackie 2006). The phenomenon of 
collective organising around natural resource management and basic 
service provision in the peri-urban interface has not been given due 
attention, even though DWCs are coming to play an increasing role in the 
production and co-production of water services across Latin America 
(CLOCSAS, 2012). In the Zona Sur DWCs reflect the demands of rural 
irrigation systems but also that of urban citizens who lobby to participate 
in the management of public water providers. Committees have emerged 
to meet the water needs of the community according to local uses and 
customs and vigorously defend the rights of the community to provide 
water locally, in a similar way to the irrigator groups, as discussed in 
previous chapters. DWCs also lobby for the right to participate in and 
influence the development of water provision in the southern zone in the 
same way that spaces have been opened up for the participation of urban 
citizens in public utilities in Cochabamba. The peri-urban interface has 
always been a space of urban and rural linkages, and the DWCs that 
have emerged reflect these processes. 
 
It is tempting to conclude that rural and mining practices and traditions 
have been transplanted and mixed with urban practices to forge new peri-
urban communities and practices, the process is, however, more 
complicated than that. There has been some research in the Zona Sur 
about the impact of migratory patterns and their impact on the extent to 
which vecinos cooperate and work collectively for the needs and basic 
services within the community. In the Zona Sur there are several barrios 
de los mineros (miners barrios) that settled en masse as a result of the 
closure of the mines during the 1980s. These barrios are known locally 
for their efficient organising around basic service provision, drawing on 
their experience of syndicalism while living in mining regions, but also 
because they have a shared history with their neighbours and come from 
the same places, or have worked in the same industry. They do not, 
however, constitute the majority of barrios in the Zona Sur. A 
 224 
representative of an NGO that supports DWCs, whose role is to 
coordinate capacity building projects with diverse water committees 
across the Zona Sur explained the phenomenon as follows: 
Some barrios have stronger cultural base than others; and you 
really can’t make comparisons between barrios. For example in 
Villa Pagador there are lots of Orurenos and Pacenos who have 
managed to cooperate and work together for lots of different 
basic services. When you compare my barrio to Villa Pagador, 
Villa Pagador has only been here for about 15 years, and I am 
ashamed of my barrio compared to it. My barrio has been here 
for 30 years and it does and has nothing. is a very strong 
indicator as to the sorts of social organising one will see in a 
barrio. Barrios that have a strong mining and rural presence have 
a very strong sense of organisation.93 
 
Barrio 15 de Febrero is not a mining barrio, and is made up of migrants 
from across the country. During the last census undertaken in 2001, Villa 
15 de Febrero had a population of 1657. Migrants predominantly came 
from Oruro 160, Potosi 168, La Paz 236 and the broader department of 
Cochabamba 126 with other vecinos coming from diverse location all 
over the country.  
 
Figure 15: Migration into the barrio 
 
Data gathered through household surveys shows that inter-departmental 
migration from rural areas to the south of the city has accounted for the 
                                                
93 NGO employee, Cochabamba, July 29th 2011 
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majority of migration to the barrio during the last 5 years. While this thesis 
does not have the scope to explore how migration affects patterns of 
organising within the Zona Sur, it is widely recognised that not all barrios 
are as homogenous as the mining barrios. Many, like Villa 15 de Febrero, 
are populated in a disjointed manner as a result of multiple waves of 
migration from across the country. Consequently, they do not have the 
collective memory and shared identity, on which mining barrios can draw. 
 
Vecinos began populating the region haphazardly in the early 1980s 
when plots of land were available to purchase. While there is no 
documentation of the history of the barrio, the following section draws on 
group discussions with a several barrio elders. A group of enterprising 
loteadoras acquired different parts of the Zona Sur illegally, each one 
forming a new barrio. The land that is now the barrio had been 
appropriated illegally by one loteadora who did not live in the barrio. Land 
was divided into lots that were sold on for profit. Newcomers could buy a 
block or ‘manzana’ of between 250 – 300 square meters for 1500 bs 
(roughly £150), this would then be divided into 8 lottes so that it could be 
built on or resold to families for building. The municipal government 
pursued a policy of exclusion as opposed to inclusion of informal 
communities during the 1980s (Goldstein 2004: 79), which allowed the 
loteadoras to flourish without regulation and meant that vecinos began 
organizing amongst themselves to develop the community in the absence 
of the state. In Villa 15 de Febrero, weekly gatherings in which the 
loteadora could collect debts owed, developed into organising meetings, 
where the vecinos would make decisions about where lots should be and 
how they should be divided. This provided further opportunities for 
vecinos to discuss and plan infrastructure and necessary basic services 
and became the precursor of the future residents’ association meetings. 
The loteadora had constructed simple pathways primarily to facilitate the 
sale of lots, but not to satisfy the needs of the vecinos. The barrio was 
thus based on fragmented foundations, the barrio developed one 
manzana at a time, often at a varying pace, and this created socio-spatial 
inequalities from the outset. Indeed, while the community worked as a 
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whole to build and develop some services and infrastructure such as 
pathways, roads, and a minibus service, vecinos were also 
simultaneously organising at the level of the manzana. This led to 
unequal development and access to certain services, undermining the 
unilateral development of the community.  
 
While the barrio was by no means a ‘mining barrio’, the first wave of 
mining migrants who arrived in the mid 1980s boosted the population 
dramatically and thus the development of the barrio, according to vecinos 
who lived there during this period. The loteadora meetings eventually 
made way for a Junta Vecinale, (Residents’ Association) which would 
make decisions about basic service provision and the development of the 
barrio. Following the trend observed throughout the Zona Sur during this 
period where loteadoras or their spouse or children became the first 
dirigente (leader) (Nelson, 2007). In Villa 15 de Febrero the wife of the 
loteador became the neighbourhood dirigente, illustrating how much 
influence the loteadoras continued to have in the region, even after all 
lots were sold off and barrios were consolidated as one under each 
neighbourhood association. 
 
Piecemeal development of the barrio continued during the 1990s. As the 
population of the Zona Sur was growing and so were demands for basic 
services that only the state could supply. Electricity, as an example, was 
put in place one manzana at a time, and not by the community as a whole. 
The first electricity posts arrived in 1990 and were erected along the main 
roads to the barrio bringing street lighting to the centre of the barrio. One 
mother, who moved to the barrio in 2000, explained how she and her 
neighbours organised to bring electricity to the southeastern corner of the 
barrio soon after she arrived. She was one of several parents who 
wanted to secure electricity for their children to be able to do their 
homework at night, and so that they could walk back from classes safely 
in the evening. Together, they lobbied the neighbourhood association to 
approach the municipality to expand electricity provision in the barrio. 
Each family contributed $50 for the posts required to bring light and 
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electricity to their streets. Vecinos have thus driven the gradual 
development of the barrio, but not always as a whole as development of 
services, and the demand for those services, has been fragmented at this 
level. Consequently development and basic service provision has and 
continues to be uneven. Development according to manzana re-enforces 
the disconnectedness of the community and throughout this chapter I 
argue that this pattern on manzana by manzana development, and the 
fragmented social fabric has undermined community-wide approaches. 
Piecemeal development has meant that some areas became more 
desirable than others and that some areas are thought to be more 
dangerous; as a result vecinos tend to work for the benefit of their 
manzana for their security. Today, in the north of the barrio several 
streets have built blockades at either end of their streets, which they 
patrol to defend their property from thieves and gangs and to keep non-
vecinos out.  
 
Agua Sur provision is similarly unequal. First, not all vecinos are socios. 
When Agua Sur began operating in 1999, vecinos and Doña Petra have 
described to me how water was available to all members for at least a 
few hours every day, and that during this period almost all vecinos were 
members. Today, it is estimated that 370 households over 2 barrios have 
access to the system. There have always been parts of Villa 15 de 
Febrero that have relied on aguateros for their water. As the Zona Sur 
has grown, the committee has not been able to provide to everyone as a 
result of dwindling water supplies and infrastructural deficiencies. Socios 
who had been in the barrio longer and who lived closer to the tank had 
better access to the service. The committee president Don Faustino94 
explained that just before they started upgrading the system in 2009, 
water was available twice a day for most vecinos, depending on where 
they lived in the barrio. Vecinos, however, recalled that water was often 
only available a few times a week. We can conclude that water was not 
available continuously, and moreover, some residents had better access 
                                                
94 Pseudonym 
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than others, with those living closer to the tank able to access more water 
at the expense of the vecinos further away. This problem was often 
exacerbated by vecinos who installed large water storage tanks that they 
would fill with committee water and use for the week and were not 
perturbed about restricting the water available to other committee 
members.  
 
The inequity of the system was exacerbated over time, the community 
outgrew the original water system. New migrants to the substantially 
cheaper areas on the fringe of the barrio had more limited access to basic 
services including water, as the original system did not reach them further 
compounding the inequality. These vecinos on the fringes have always 
depended solely on water from aguateros, with most households relying 
on the water bought and stored in turils (barrels). Third, and significantly, 
the join up fee for the DWC has increased over time. The PASAAS 
project funded the expansion of the water system to the whole barrio, but 
those who were not already members were faced with a join-up fee of 
$250, a common and contentious fee throughout the Zona Sur, which 
meant that the poorest vecinos on the south-eastern fringes could not 
afford to join. The sign up fee seemed unfair to new residents, because 
original members paid small contributions of between $30 and $40. 
Although water committees are non-profit making organisations, 
membership costs are in place because the original vecinos have 
contributed physically through workdays and by attending meetings. Agua 
Sur feels it would be unfair to let new members join without contributing 
something, and the contention arises because this contribution is 
generally financial, there are no options to pay in kind, and it isn’t always 
clear how the money is used. This not only excludes the poorest vecinos 
in the barrio, but, for newcomers to the barrio, the lack of transparency 
undermines the idea that the committees of the Zona Sur are based on 
communitarian and non-profit orientated principles 
 
Institutional sustainability 
The following section considers some of the factors that affect the 
 229 
institutional sustainability of water provision in the peri-urban interface. 
The endeavours of state organisations such as SENASBA, social 
organisations such as ASICASUDD-EPSAS, and the NGOs that support 
them have focussed on building the institutional sustainability of DWCs. 
This section considers some of the factors that impinge on the 
institutional sustainability of DWCs. Chapter 2 discussed how the 
sustainability of water provision in rural areas has highlighted the need to 
encourage and support the participation of communities in water systems 
to ensure institutional sustainability. In the following pages I discuss why 
communities chose to continue to participate in their water systems 
despite their failings and weaknesses, the implications of this, and some 
of the specific social dynamics that characterise the peri-urban interface 
that can undermine the institutional sustainability of DWCs. 
 
As highlighted in previous chapters, neoliberal reforms focussed on 
decentralisation during the 1990s galvanized the idea of the community 
as provider in urban and peri-urban areas through the Ley de 
Participacion Popular law (LPP, discussed in chapters 3, 4, and 5). 
Decentralising decision-making to formally recognised community 
organisations called OTBs (Base Territorial Organizations) was billed as 
a method of enabling the participation of communities in local politics and 
developing and democratising the state (McNeish 2006). This was also in 
keeping with the neoliberal trends of the time to build inclusive 
multicultural societies (Albro 2010). Villa 15 de Febrero achieved OTB 
status in 1998, but like many other OTBs in the Zona Sur, was unable to 
deliver basic services such as water because they decided not to use 
their allocated funding from the municipality to do so. Some claimed it 
would not have been enough money to build a water system, while others 
told me they chose to spend it on other services. This contributed to the 
emergence of the water committees as alternative local providers in some 
parts of the Zona Sur, but not everywhere. Thus, while LPP reforms 
decentralised some agency over local development to communities, for 
the communities of the southern zone, these reforms were not enough for 
vecinos to be able to improve barrios, nor to enable and fund the 
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integrated development that vecinos were demanding. Speaking on 
behalf of the Movement of the Men and Women of the Zona Sur, in 2006, 
12 years after the introduction of the LPP, Abraham Grandiddyer 
explained some of the popular misgivings of some vecinos towards OTBs 
in the Zona Sur: 
We want to build our own future, our own destiny, and make 
decisions on what we want about what we pay, because the 
taxes we pay selling our goods at the markets in the centre of the 
city are not making it back to the south. These financial 
resources are not returning to the Zona Sur. Instead they have 
been spent corrupting a group of leaders who are only concerned 
with the power of working for the state, and all we are left with 
are the crumbs of "popular participation" which brings a small 
playing field to a barrio, but not integrated development to the 
region. (Grandiddyer 2006:350)  
 
The development of DWCs and alternative community-led organizations 
for basic service provision in the Zona Sur demonstrates that there has 
been a bottom-up movement seeking an alternative development 
paradigm that devolves more agency, and autonomy to the barrios. It has, 
however, emerged out of necessity. From early on the demands relating 
to water have not necessarily been straightforward demands for the 
fulfilment of civil rights, human rights or state-led development; instead 
there has been a drive for further decentralization of funds and increased 
agency in local development, but not necessarily outright autonomy. 
 
Undertaking a micro-level analysis of one DWC one can really explore 
how the DWCs emerged, but also how autonomous DWCs really are. 
ASICASUDD-EPSAS has created an identity based on more autonomous 
notions, creating a hybrid communitarian logic that has evolved as a 
result of the coming together of rural and mining migrants in the southern 
zone and a broader idea of peri-urban uses and customs.  
 
The communitarian logic that exists widely here comes from 
our rural and union traditions but which have come to adapt 
and exist in urban areas, we are distinctive to water 
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cooperatives, existing in a more traditional form, which the 
government often fails to take into consideration.95 
 
This is a useful discourse to unify the DWCs under ASICASUDD-EPSAS, 
and it taps into the state discourse of uses and customs established by 
the indigenous social movements but enshrined in the constitution. In 
practice almost all of the ASICASUDD-EPSAS DWCs first developed as 
a result of interventions by the church during the 1990s and early 2000s 
to support communities in their endeavours to improve access to water in 
the Zona Sur. This was in keeping with the political reforms to the water 
sector during the 1990s and 2000s which promoted NGOs and CBOs and 
their capacity to support the development of the water sector, as part of 
efforts to streamline the role of the state.96 In the opinion of the president 
of Agua Sur, the emergence of the committee was less strategic; in his 
eyes and in light of the history of Agua Sur, the committees evolved as a 
coping mechanism in the face of state failures, and they have been highly 
dependent on the impetus and support of the church.  
 
They are not an expression of citizen-led development and 
autonomy. “This committee emerged out of an absence of 
provision by the municipality and SEMAPA… it’s because the 
devolved OTB systems and their relationship with the state were 
not developed sufficiently to improve access to water in the 
barrio. We emerged as a result of that failure, which is why there 
is some tension between the OTB and the committees… 
throughout the Zona Sur. We started as a small committee with 
the help of the church that brought us together… ufff…. if you 
need water in your house, what are you going to do”. 97 
 
Doña Petra believes the development of the committee was as a result of 
the interventions made by one priest: Padre Javier, and that the 
committees persist because of the support they receive from NGOs.  
 
It was all down to Padre Javier that we have the system; thanks 
                                                
95 Abraham Grandiddyer speaking at a meeting Water and the process of Legislative 
and Institutional Reform: Between the Right to water and the Commons 25th to 26th of 
July 2011 
96 Senior NGO employee, Cochabamba, December 1st 2009. 
97 Water Committee Director, Cochabamba , May 30th, 2010 
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to him we have the committee… These institutions (churches, 
NGOs) really help us, they come in and they help us to be able to 
pursue our project, and they should be applauded and thanked.98 
 
While the well was owned and managed by the community, Padre Javier 
had a substantial degree of influence over the formation of Agua Sur. He 
suggested that if the neighbouring barrios of 15 de Febrero and 17 de 
Noviembre (which acrimoniously split in 1980) work together they would 
be better placed to develop a system that could serve the needs of both 
communities. The vecinos who wanted to be part of the committee 
contributed $40 for the construction of a pipeline and the unsuccessful 
excavation of a second and third well, which did not have sufficient water 
volume to become operational. Nonetheless, barrio elders talk proudly 
about being involved in the water committee from the outset.  
 
There were some vecinos who didn’t believe that there was 
water there. They asked where is the water going to come from 
and honestly they didn’t want to spend the money.  But I believed, 
I put $40 in at the very beginning.99 
 
The vecinos constructed the foundations of the system; they dug ditches 
for pipelines and helped construct the water tank (see figure 16). They 
oversaw the excavation of the well and the laying of the pipes. Once the 
system was up and running, Padre Javier and the church left the 
management and development of the system in the hands of a water 
committee. The foundations of the committee were built collectively with 
the help of the church, and vecinos talk proudly about those early days. 
The broad aim of the water committee is to be able to supply water to all 
vecinos in the barrio, using a statute of rights and obligations that were 
agreed collectively by the original committee members. 
                                                
98 Water Committee Secretary, Cochabamba, June 12th, 2010 
99 Resident’s Association treasurer, Cochabamba, July 1st, 2010 
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Figure 16:Water Tank 
 
Amongst the vecinos of the barrio, the idea of uses and customs that 
draw on transplanted union and indigenous traditions brought by groups 
of migrants during the 1990s does not apply in the same way as in other 
parts of the Zona Sur, or in the case of El Alto, which has been well-
documented (Lazar 2008). Instead vecinos draw on an idea of uses and 
customs distinctive to the peri-urban Zona Sur. 
El alma’ (the spirit of) usos y costumbres in the peri-urban south 
is based in the collective management and decision-making 
process around the management of water in the barrio. The idea 
of usos y costumbres has generally been linked to rural water 
systems (consumer and irrigation), but that is not to say we do 
not have an essence of ‘usos y costumbres’ here in the Zona Sur. 
We have norms, rights and obligations that shape and define 
each committee, but they are dynamic and changeable, and 
reflect the fast changing circumstances that committees operate 
under.100 
 
This somewhat romantic idea of peri-urban ‘usos y costumbres’ forms 
part of an identity and agency that the DWCs, specifically those who are 
members of ASICASUDD-EPSAS, have developed over time. This 
emerged during the Water War when it became politically unviable for the 
state to co-opt or usurp local water providers, and communal providers 
                                                
100 NGO employee and DWC member October 2nd, 2011 
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recognised the agency that they now have in light of this political shift. 
Peri-urban DWCs are thus using the language of usos y costumbres, 
which has traditionally been adopted by the irrigators in relation to water 
(Perreault 2008), and indigenous social movements that are seeking to 
defend communal structures of organisation. It is used by the peri-urban 
DWCs similarly to define and defend their water systems and right to 
provide water.  
 
This has been further consolidated by on-going struggles to secure the 
water rights and future of DWCs by organisations such as ASICASUDD-
EPSAS, even if many of the DWCs (Including Agua Sur) weren’t part of 
the Water War. Historical narratives and popular culture surrounding the 
Water War set out how the DWCs played a considerable role in the 
rebellion, standing alongside the irrigators in defence of rights to local 
water resources (Terhorst 2003), but this was not strictly the case,  
We never participated in the Water War – it was 2 years after the 
committee was established, it was mainly the people of the city 
and the barrios nearer the centre, no one from the committees 
around here participated. Some may have participated 
independently, but no one came here and invited us to 
participate…101 
 
Doña Petra reveals how the mythology that the Water War brought all 
communal providers together in defence of their local water rights is not 
wholly accurate. This paints a somewhat different picture of the Water 
War as a struggle that was led by the urban barrios from the centre of the 
city, who fought alongside the rural irrigators, while the emerging peri-
urban DWCs were still establishing themselves. The Bechtel concession 
encompassed Villa 15 de Febrero, but during the year that it was 
responsible for water provision, its influence did not reach as far south as 
the barrio, as such, the residents here remained unaffected by the 
privatisation. In sum if we take a closer look at the intricacies of the Zona 
Sur we discover that there are different strata of exclusion and 
marginalisation. While communities here do not have the same ‘rights to 
the city’ as those living in the centre, some have better coping 
                                                
101 Water secretary, Cochabamba, September 10th 
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mechanisms to deal with basic service provision; others are better 
organised and ready to defend local water rights and water systems; 
others have lived in isolated pockets without a DWC or even a 
neighbourhood association. For those more marginalised communities 
the Water War was something only those who were close to the city could 
participate in. 
 
Nonetheless, post- Water War, the political climate and the formation of 
ASICASUDD-EPSAS buoyed the DWCs as they attracted funding, were 
able to offer collective support, and ultimately developed strength in 
numbers. Agua Sur was one of the first committees to join ASICASUDD-
EPSAS in 2004 at a time when they were in need of support.  
 
The problem is that we have always been underfunded… then 
ASICASUDD-EPSAS came to us and told us that they could help 
us to bring water to the barrio, whether by bringing it from other 
regions or by digging other wells, there were a whole range of 
solutions that were put forward, and that they could work with us 
to bring better water to the region… This brought the possibility 
of new projects…like the new water pipeline102 
 
The organisation thus provided the water committees with the opportunity 
to cooperate in order to improve their water systems and share 
experiences of water provision, to learn how to make their committees 
more sustainable as institutions, but also to focus on how best to exploit 
and protect the water resources that the committees are formed around. 
Doña Petra’s words also reveal how the role and influence of the Minister 
for Water Rene Orellana between 2008-10 was felt and appreciated right 
down to the level of the community, as discussed in the previous chapter. 
 
The committees are encouraged to attend workshops and events that are 
held with the participation of other NGOs and research institutions with an 
interest in the Zona Sur. The NGO Agua Sustantable put on a series of 
workshops on how best to manage and protect a committee well, while 
there is a network of NGOs that work specifically on projects to support 
                                                
102 Water secretary, Cochabmba, June 14th 2010 
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and build the capacity of water committees in the Zona Sur. 
ASICASUDD-EPSAS brings committee members together so that they 
can learn together, organising visits to exemplary communitarian water 
systems in the Zona Sur, but also further afield in other peri-urban 
regions of Bolivia. At the level of the community, water workshops have 
provided Agua Sur with opportunities to work with other water committees 
in the region, linking them to communities that they previously had no 
contact with. Doña Petra spends her Saturdays working with a recently 
established water committee a mile north of Villa 15 de Febrero. They 
rely on water that is delivered by tanker twice a week, and Doña Petra 
helps administer payments from the vecinos on a voluntary basis.  
 
Agua Sur is the product of several non-state interventions in the Zona Sur, 
and has never been truly autonomous, relying on the support of the 
church, ASICASU-EPSAS, and as we shall see later in this chapter new 
initiatives by the Ministry for Water and the Environment. While the DWCs 
have been able to develop capacity, and receive further support through 
their membership of ASICASUDD-EPSAS, both the historical 
development of the barrio and the physical and institutional development 
of the water committee explain why provision has always been uneven 
and insufficient. It is clear that some of the social dynamics and 
processes that characterise the peri- urban undermine the capacity of 
DWCs to provide universal access across the barrio.  
 
 
Peri-urban dynamics and the institutional sustainability of the DWC 
Participation in the management of the committee is a method of 
fostering a sense of ownership amongst the vecinos. It also helps embed 
the committee in the barrio, and secures its future. Without the support of 
the vecinos the committee would cease to exist. However, the nature of 
participation in the day-to-day management and development of the DWC 
has changed over time, and the opportunities for participation of socios in 
workdays are limited. In the peri-urban regions of Cochabamba with more 
rural characteristics such as La Maica, where there is water (although 
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saline), it is still possible for socios to participate in workdays, and 
participation in meetings is commonplace. In Villa 15 de Febrero, where 
the region is more densely populated and water is scarce, the water 
committee has had to bring in outside water sources. Contractors and 
builders under the direction of the directive board now excavate pipelines 
and wells (see figure 17). Workdays have become less frequent, and 
membership has become increasingly dependent on financial 
contributions as opposed to participation in workdays and planning 
meetings. During the time I was in the barrio there was just one work day 
to clean out the water tank, requiring only a few people, whereas when 
the first pipeline was installed, there were lots of opportunities for vecinos 
to contribute physically. Now the committee has brought in outside 
contractors for work such as the new pipeline. In part this is because the 
committee has increasingly come to rely on more technical solutions, for 
example installing meters. Participation in water management has been 
advocated as a method of developing the institutional sustainability of a 
water system (Mehta, Marshall et al. 2007), but with limited opportunities 
to participate, there are fewer opportunities for vecinos to foster a sense 
of ownership over the system.  
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The fine system for failing to 
turn up to meetings, 
marches and workdays has 
never been rigorously 
implemented and as a result 
many vecinos have unpaid 
fines that date back years. 
As vecinos come to 
participate less and less in 
the running of the 
committee, they 
increasingly see the DWC 
as a paid basic service 
provider, rather than a 
community owned and 
collaboratively managed 
water source. It is 
commonplace to hear the 
vecinos refer to the 
committee as ‘a service’, or 
‘the level of service’ that 
they have received from the 
committee. They make 
comparisons between the 
service and water provision 
in the centre of the city. There is little sense of ownership and 
participation in meetings is seen as a chore. 
 
“When there was water here, it was dirty. I still participate in the 
meetings but only because I have to”103 
 
We used to have saline water running from the taps, I rarely 
participated in meetings back then, I participate less now 104 
                                                
103 Barrio resident, Cochabamba, May 12th 2010 
104 Barrio resident, Cochabamba, May 13th 
Figure 17: New pipelines and connections 
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The committee’s relationship with the vecinos had started to deteriorate 
with the decline in water quality and quantity. As outlined earlier in this 
chapter, the arrival of the PASAAS project to extend the water network, 
meant that the water committee was out of action for over a year, 
consequently, meetings reduced to once every few months to update 
vecinos on the progress of the project and most decisions relating to the 
project were made by the committee leaders and outside contractors. 
Participation in committee meetings declined to about 60% of Socios 
while the water pipeline was under construction. Declining levels of 
participation has negative impacts on the institutional sustainability of the 
DWC. Plans around developing and capacity building peri-urban DWCs 
are likely to be thwarted if community members are unwilling to 
participate or don't feel a sense of ownership over the DWC. 
 
By the time I left the barrio in December 2010, the pipeline was complete. 
During the last committee meeting of the year it was agreed that vecinos 
would each pay for the installation of their meters and then in the New 
Year the pipeline would be inaugurated. After the meeting I spoke with 
Doña Petra, and asked her where the water was going to come from. The 
well had become increasingly saline, and the results of the Agua 
Sustentable report had deemed the water unfit for human consumption. 
She explained to me that they would probably buy in water in bulk several 
times a week. ASICASUDD-EPSAS could help them set up a contract 
with SEMAPA or perhaps a private water vendor in the north of 
Cochabamba. I was surprised at this decision, particularly in light of 
stories I had heard about Agua Sur’s past experiences of buying in water 
in bulk.  
 
Specifically, in 2007, the water committee entered into an agreement that 
enabled them to hire a water cistern from ASICASUDD-ESPAS that 
would deliver clean water from the SEMAPA plant. The cost to socios 
was 35 pence per turil (200ltrs), which was 15 pence cheaper than the 
aguateros, but was guaranteed to be of the same quality as the water 
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used by the Cochabambinos living in the centre of the city. This was 
hailed in the local press as a breakthrough for water provision in the Zona 
Sur. Water committees were now able to continue to manage the water 
supply within the barrios, with a clean and reliable water source. However, 
there were immediate problems with this system; Don Faustino 
explained:  
The first week our deliveries provided the vecinos with too 
much water, but by the second week, there was not enough 
water to go around.  
 
Don Faustino called an emergency general meeting, to ask if anyone 
knew where the water had gone.  
No one spoke up during the meeting, and during the following 
weeks the water continued to disappear before households in the 
north of the barrio had received any. It was obvious that some 
vecinos were filling large water tanks up when the water arrived, 
leaving the rest of the barrio with nothing105.    
 
Furthermore vecinos who were not part of the committee had set up 
clandestine connections, to steal water.  
 
While the committee is technically owned and managed by the vecinos, 
theft by deception, or evasion of bill paying by committee members is 
commonplace. Many vecinos are happy to cheat and undermine the 
system, for example tampering with meters, without regard for the effect 
on other members. The president explained that there was one incident 
when some vecinos collected gallons of water without paying and sold it 
on for a profit; others have claimed a problem with their meter in an 
attempt to avoid paying for water consumed; and other vecinos just avoid 
paying106. Doña Roxana spends many mornings collecting debts, but 
some vecinos refuse to open the door to her and hide, or even run away 
from her. Beyond the financial implications, this has further detrimental 
affects on the committee because debtors avoid committee management 
meetings. Some other non-committee members have installed 
clandestine connections to the water network, either by tapping into the 
                                                
105 Water Committee President, Cochabamba, May 30th 
106 Water Committee President, Cochabamba, May 30th 
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pipeline, or more recently, by persuading contractors who are fitting the 
new pipeline that they are paid members. This has been further 
compounded by the fact that many vecinos did not pay for their water on 
time. As a result, three months after the water cistern arrived, the 
committee had accrued so much debt due to non-payments that they 
could no longer afford to pay for the water deliveries. The committee then 
went back to using water from the well, which was saline, contaminated 
and only able to provide an estimated 30% of the water needs of the 
barrio.107 The experiences of 2009 suggest that some vecinos do not feel 
any collective ownership, as they are willing to cheat the system and steal 
from it. This has considerable implications for any reforms focussed on 
developing and advocating community-led water systems in the peri-
urban interface. 
 
The impact of diverging urban aspirations on institutional 
sustainability 
The changing aspirations and desires of peri-urban communities also 
appear to affect the institutional sustainability of water provision in the 
peri-urban interface. An employee of an NGO that works to support the 
work of the DWCs, explained how broader patterns of migration to the 
region can undermine the institutional sustainability of DWCs 
…They (the vecinos) have a very different idea of development 
and what it is to live in a city, different to those from the west 
(mining regions)… their vision of development is very urban… 
they have a different idea about what it means to live in a city108. 
 
These words are particularly insightful. In Villa 15 de Febrero there are 
diverging aspirations that are reflected in the ways that vecinos want to 
access water. There are those who want to be equal to those who live in 
the centre of the city, they want the basic services and rights that 
Cochabambinos in the centre of the city have, akin to the right to the city 
(Harvey 2006). This is evident amongst the younger generation who 
have a more individualist perspective on provision. They feel that they 
                                                
107 DWC Leader, Villa 15 de Febrero, June 15th 2010 
108 NGO employee, Cochabamba, September 10th 2010 
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should not have to participate in the water committee, and instead water 
should come from a provider. Carlos who has been a water committee 
dirigente for several years set out how he found that within his barrio 
migrants that had been to Spain, which is a common phenomenon in the 
Zona Sur (Cielo and Cespedes 2008), were unwilling to participate in 
water meetings and the committee when they returned, preferring to pay 
for their water to come from the aguateros, and with aspirations that 
SEMAPA would arrive one day. He explained this to me as people 
becoming ‘more urban’; that the water committees nearest the centre 
were increasingly willing to give up their systems if SEMAPA could 
expand provision to the region. Migrant populations often returned, to 
build their big ‘modern’ houses where their old adobe houses once stood. 
Amongst these returning migrants, there was less willingness to 
participate in water committee meetings, preferring to install a water tank 
and have an aguatero fill it every so often. Declining participation affects 
some of the barrios closer to the urban centre, but it is a sentiment that is 
increasingly apparent further from the centre, particularly as the standard 
of provision has declined and solutions to water provision become more 
elaborate and less grounded in the community. During one of my final 
meetings with the leader of a neighbouring water committee, I asked him 
what he thought the biggest threat to the water committees would be in 
the future. He explained:  
The people, they are becoming more urban; more 
individualistic in their outlook they have a different mentality 
to before…. The youth they are willing to criticise the water 
committee, but they are not willing to participate in the 
meetings or become a member of the directive109.  
 
As this chapter has highlighted, Villa 15 de Febrero has always been a 
socially fragmented space, where vecinos have resorted to individual and 
collective strategies for basic service provision in different contexts during 
different periods. As the region becomes more urbanised and the 
committee becomes less effective, the vecinos appear to be turning to 
more individualist strategies. Being so close to the centre of the city, 
                                                
109 DWC leader, Cochabamba, 20th September 2011 
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many in the Zona Sur increasingly feel that they should be entitled to the 
same services as those living in the centre.  
I have been a member for 2 years, there used to be water on a 
Sunday, but it was quite saline, we used to have to participate in 
the water meetings, but we have to participate in lots of meetings 
for all our basic services… it’s not fair as it takes up so much of 
our time, not like those in the north… the jailones (derogative 
term for the elites), they don’t have to go to meetings to get 
water.110 
 
Having a water committee and having to participate in management 
meetings, is increasingly seen as a burden, and is also recognised as 
symptomatic of the inequalities that not only persist in the Zona Sur but in 
the city as a whole. For vecinos who feel this way, the policies to 
formalize the water committees only serve to re-enforce this inequality. 
This is symptomatic of a broader trend in the Zona Sur; the communities 
who became notorious for defending their right to provide water in the 
Zona Sur are now filled with ‘urban’ aspirations for equal water services. 
We in the Zona Sur we are the ones who have fought for water… 
but the vecinos today, they don’t care111 
 
Collective sentiments do persist, however, even though the capacity and 
future of the DWCs is not secure. As I have argued earlier in this thesis, 
DWCs may not always be efficient water providers, but they have created 
spaces for the participation of previously marginalized groups in policy 
and planning for the water sector. The committees have led campaigns 
that have focussed on improving access to water, but in a way that allows 
the DWCs to retain some agency and manage water supplies according 
to their own uses and customs. As the committee’s capacity to provide 
has become compromised, and the communities have developed, the 
aspirations of the vecinos, particularly the younger generation, have 
turned towards equality. For some vecinos the aspiration is now equal 
services and provision, which appears to undermine the role and future of 
the DWC.  
 
                                                
110 Vecino, Villa 15 de Febrero,  August 1st 2010 
111 Treasurer Agua Sur, Villa Juan 23, June 26th 2010  
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Local power relations and control over water services 
As outlined throughout this thesis, the peri-urban interface is 
characterised by juridical plurality. There are contested ideas about who 
should manage water services on a local level similarly to those that exist 
at the level of the Zona Sur and the municipality. This is particularly 
pronounced between the DWC and the residents association. I 
demonstrate how both actors mobilise the idea of the right to water in 
different ways to undermine the other. In the following section I explore 
how this affects the sustainability of water provision in the barrio. 
 
The idea of the right to water remains somewhat intangible and has been 
subject to diverse framings and interpretations. Within district 8, it has 
been mobilised locally for different political ends leading to conflict within 
and between communities. The notion of the human right to water is 
poorly defined by the government (as outlined in chapter 3), and 
contested by broader social organisations such as ASICASUDD-EPSAS 
(as outlined in chapter 4). As a result, in the barrio, social leaders and 
vecinos are unclear as to the significance of the human right to water and 
its implications for water provision. If they are familiar with the human 
right to water, they feel that considering the government’s neglect of peri-
urban communities in the past, it is unlikely that the government will 
recognise and enact their human rights. Conversely, there were some 
vecinos who thought the OTB and not the committee should manage the 
supply, highlighting the on-going conflict between the OTB and the 
committee. There were a few vocal vecinos who were keen to see the 
state, in the form of SEMAPA, provide water to the barrio; suggesting that 
if they were really equal citizens to those in the centre, they would receive 
the same service as them. These opinions represent the three competing 
ideas of water management that exist in Villa 15 de Febrero; community 
level management by the committee, or by the OTB, or a more  ‘urban’ 
idea that water should be provided to the community, and not by the 
community. 
 
Over the course of the few months that I was in the barrio vecinos 
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increasingly became aware of a right to water, but not by way of more 
projects and new water policies, instead it was shaped by the OTB and 
the Committee; both of whom had very different understandings of the 
right to water and what it might mean for the barrio.  
 
They told us about the right to water at the Committee, but I don’t 
really know what it means to me.112 
 
I heard about the Right to water at the OTB meeting, it means 
that water should be free.113 
 
There are people here who think the right to water means free 
water, that’s not the case.114 
 
In NVC, the OTB dirigente has tried to mobilize this idea that the 
water should be free, which is not true. We know that the water is 
free but the pipes are not free… they think that these services 
will just fall from the sky into their houses, well that isn’t the 
case.115 
 
Tensions have existed between the OTB and the water committee for 
some time; OTB leaders generally earn kudos and are able to retain their 
position as president if they bring projects to the barrio. Water provision is 
one such service, and some barrios have been able to use decentralised 
state funding to construct a water system, as outlined in chapter 5. The 
existence of a water committee in the barrio undermines the president of 
the OTB as they are filling a gap and providing a service that the OTB 
could provide. The community has organised and provides a service 
outside the established formal neighbourhood association. Consequently, 
the OTB and the water committee are very different entities; the president 
of the OTB is a paid position through decentralised funds through the 
state. Individuals who have political ambition beyond the barrio and within 
the municipality often pursue the position of president. The committee 
dirigentes are unpaid, and becoming committee president will not help an 
individual with political aspirations, in fact it is a position that most socios 
                                                
112 Barrio resident, Villa 15 de Febrero, July 10th 2010 
113 Barrio resident, Villa 15 de Febrero, June 21st 2010 
114 Barrio resident, Villa 15 de Febrero, June 22nd 2010 
115 Treasurer Agua Sur DWC, Villa 15 de Febrero, June 1st 2010 
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are unwilling to take up, because of the weight of responsibility attached 
to it. 
 
On the surface this would appear to be a confrontation between the 
apparatus of the state (in the form of the OTB) and the community. 
However, reforms that have been implemented since the Water War have 
also focussed on formalising and regulating the DWCs, as discussed in 
chapters 4 and 6. Since 2009/2010 Water Committees have been put 
under increasing pressure to formalise by the state, and obtain licences 
from the Comite Tecnico de Licencias y Registros, as outlined in chapter 
4 and 6. This is a local institution decentralized from AAPS (the national 
regulator) based in the city of Cochabamba, which is in charge of 
formalizing informal providers within the department with a view to future 
regulation. Agua Sur were one of the first committees in the Zona Sur to 
receive a license for the right to exploit a water source and provide to an 
agreed area, in March 2009, and was facilitated as a result of their 
membership to ASICASUDD-EPSAS. During this period, President 
Morales handed out licenses that guarantee and protect the usufruct 
rights of the water committee to water sources and cement their role in 
the community as water provider in a given area. This was much to the 
annoyance of the OTB, whose local president believes that water 
provision should be under the remit of the OTB.  
 
The president of the OTB openly discussed ‘appropriating’ the water 
system from the committee and on behalf of the OTB. During 
neighbourhood meetings he would criticise committee projects, and 
undermine the work of the water committee. The president of the OTB 
was highly critical of the PASAAS funded pipeline brought to the barrio. 
He attacked the project on the basis that the committee was charging 
vecinos who wanted to join the committee £200, to be paid in instalments. 
Mobilising the words of the constitution, ‘Water is a human right’, he 
argued that the state must provide, and as this is a state sanctioned 
project, he questioned why the vecinos of Villa 15 de Febrero should pay. 
Don Faustino, the leader of the DWC would address the vecinos during 
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the OTB meetings and explain that while the pipeline had been provided 
by the state, the membership fees would meet further upgrading and 
operational costs, and membership fees had always been a pre-requisite 
for joining the committee.  
 
There are thus two competing ideologies around water provision in the 
Zona Sur. The first is an argument for public water, funded by the state 
with limited inputs from the community, like that available to citizens in the 
centre of the city. This argument has been complicated by the OTB 
president’s talk of free water, despite no backing for this in the 
constitution. Then there is the enduring ideology of the committee that 
builds water infrastructure and manages its distribution. Again this idea 
has become somewhat opaque and confused by the idea of the human 
right to water and related reforms to the water sector that formalise water 
committees through licences, financial support and capacity building 
exercises. Doña Roxana 116  the Treasurer of Agua Sur told me an 
anecdote that demonstrates the different ideas that exist around water 
provision.  
I was in the street the other day and my neighbour approached 
me, he said ‘hey, why should we pay for water when President 
Evo says it’s free’, I responded, ‘The water may be free but the 
pipes and tanks and all the infrastructure is not free… you get 
Evo to come here and ask him where this free water is’, well that 
soon shut him up.117  
 
The community has been let down by the state on numerous occasions, 
and therefore has little faith in the reforms to recognise the right to water 
and continues to persist with efforts to develop the DWC as the local 
water provider.  
We have a very beautiful constitution, which talks about the right 
to water and says that we all have the right to water. It’s very 
pretty. They say, ‘In Bolivia you must all be so happy they have 
recognised the right to water,’ but the reality is something else… 
What is written is one thing but the reality is different. People say 
but we have the right to water, but there is no water, we would 
like to be able to see the right to water in action, but how can we 
                                                
116 Pseudonym 
117 Treasurer Agua Sur DWC, Villa 15 de Febrero, June 1st 2010 
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when there is no water…We have all fought and blockaded for 
water, and now we have The Right, but now what do we do, and 
what does it mean? There is no water here, the state has not 
brought it, and so we have to do something in the meantime118. 
 
The DWC president’s reflections on the constitution highlight the failings 
of constitutional amendments to deliver water to the peri-urban interface, 
and how the language of rights that has been mobilised by the OTB 
undermines the work of the water committee. The futility of the rights-
based approach in the peri-urban interface, where the state has delivered 
very little, is clear here and demonstrates how the discourse of the 
human right to water can work against the culture of community-led water 
provision that the water committee has been building since 1999. The 
notion that water is free undermines a committee that hinges on 
mobilising vecinos to work for water, through mobilisations, participation 
in decision making processes, work days and financially, to collectively 
develop an effective system.   
 
To summarise, two diverging struggles are emerging in the peri-urban 
interface: some vecinos wanting the right to urban water, with minimum 
participation and equality with their urban counterparts, while others are 
keen to maintain the water committee and localised water governance.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has presented the history of the development of Villa 15 de 
Febrero in the Zona Sur. It has systematically considered the challenges 
and opportunities to build institutional sustainability, and to enhance local 
environmental integrity and social justice the peri-urban interface. These 
challenges and opportunities should be considered if DWCs are to go on 
to play a significant role in water provision and governance in the peri-
urban interface, as set in reforms to the water sector since 2006.  
  
                                                
118 Leader Agua Sur DWC, September 20th 2010 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
 
I began this process by reading extensively and engaging with theory 
about the right to water, the peri-urban interface and peri-urban water 
provision, community water providers and what sustainability means to 
different groups. I then made it to Bolivia, where I asked a lot of 
academics and activists what they thought about the right to water and 
peri-urban water provision. I spoke with planners and policy makers who 
gave me rather technocratic views on the challenge of water provision. I 
sat in on ASICASUDD-EPSAS meetings and was inspired by the rhetoric 
of DWC leaders. Eventually I found Dona Petra and Villa 15 de Febrero, 
and within a week I started to ‘get it’. The Zona Sur is a few miles from 
the centre of the city but socially and economically it is a world away. The 
land here is red and parched and its dust is always in the air. It feels dry. 
Water costs money and costs time, and the water systems that have 
emerged to provide water here are fragile. These organisations have 
brought some political visibility and agency to the DWCs, but a whole 
range of different processes and factors affects their sustainability. In 
sum, this thesis has allowed me to develop a grounded understanding of 
the challenges linked to recognising reforms around the right to water in 
the peri-urban interface, to explore some of the factors that challenge 
community-driven water provision in peri-urban areas and the potential of 
co-production strategies such as co-gestion in practice. 
 
The following chapter reflects and summarises the findings of the 
preceding chapters and how they answer the research questions set out 
in this thesis. Specifically, how the right to water has framed reforms to 
the Bolivian water sector since 2006; how and why the right to water has 
been contested in Bolivia; the impact of reforms to the water sector on 
peri-urban water committees, and emerging challenges and opportunities 
for sustainable water provision in peri-urban Bolivia. In doing this, this 
chapter reflects on how the findings inform wider debates on the right to 
water, ideas of the community and community water management, and 
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ideas of sustainable water provision in peri-urban areas. It then reflects 
on potential areas for further research. 
 
Developing and implementing the right to water in Bolivia 
This thesis began by exploring how the human right to water has been 
developed and implemented in Bolivia. It thus contributes to a small but 
growing body of literature that critically examines the empirical challenges 
of implementing the human right to water in the global south (see Loftus 
and Sultana 2012). It is estimated that there are over 28,000 formal and 
informal water providers in Bolivia (Campanini, 2007). This thesis has 
demonstrated that amongst these diverse providers there are many rural 
and peri-urban community water providers that subvert the established 
municipal system of water provision in Bolivia. Furthermore, some are 
willing to fervently defend their local water systems and the uses and 
customs that they have developed around these systems. The state has 
attempted to develop a new institutionality for the water sector that 
accommodates and incorporates the plurality of formal and informal 
providers that exist. This is part of a process of state consolidation and 
the development of the pluri-national state of Bolivia. Chapter 4 
demonstrates that the right to water remains a fairly nebulous concept in 
Bolivia but that it has become a banner under which the Bolivian water 
sector has been reformed. This reflects the reaction to the privatisation 
agenda of the 1990s embodied by the Water War and the election of 
President Morales. As of yet, there are no plans to develop the right to 
water into a justiciable right based on entitlements to quantities of water. 
In principle, the right to water is a commitment on the part of the state to 
guaranteeing water provision through established municipal providers, 
but also by developing, supporting and regulating cooperatives, and 
community water providers like the peri-urban DWCs. Chapter 4 
demonstrates that these reforms include the centralisation of state control 
by the Ministry for Water and the Environment and the simultaneous 
recognition and incorporation of non-state providers such as the peri-
urban DWCs by the state. This involves developing an extensive new 
institutionality to capacity-build and regulate water providers that operate 
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on diverging scales through capacity building organisations such as 
SENASBA and the national regulator AAPS.  
 
Water provision is being (re)nationalised by incorporating local water 
providers. This could be framed as a manifestation of the alter-
globalization ideals for water provision that have been discussed, 
theoretically, by Bakker (2007). These are based on “…reforming rather 
than abolishing state governance, while fostering and sharing alternative 
local models of resource management.” (446), thus creating a more 
integrated relationship between structures of water governance and the 
hydro-social cycle (ibid: 448). Or perhaps, this could also be understood 
as a part of the efforts to consolidate state control over a fragmented 
water sector in which the state has limited legitimacy. It could also be 
seen as part of the process to extend the reach of the state and build the 
pluri-national state of Bolivia. As the state seeks to assert control over the 
sector, there has been some resistance from the community providers 
whose systems of provision and uses and customs are under threat. This 
sort of resistance has historically been observed in light of attempts to 
enclose water provision as part of initiatives to privatise water provision in 
urban areas, as observed during the Water War. This thesis has reflected 
on the challenges facing ‘post-neoliberal’ states as they attempt to 
(re)nationalize water provision following the failures of privatization, in a 
country where the water sector is physically and ideologically fragmented 
and where state-citizen bonds are historically weak.  
 
It has been argued that urbanization leads to the periphersalisation and 
marginalization of poverty, including exclusion from access to basic 
services such as water and sanitation. This thesis has demonstrated that 
these processes of peripheralisation are not uniform in Bolivia. Chapter 5 
demonstrates that water provision in Cochabamba is fragmented and 
uneven, and while the poorest Cochabambinos continue to rely on 
aguateros, water provision does not strictly reflect the socio-economic 
inequalities that characterize the city. This is principally of the failure of 
SEMAPA to provide effective water provision in all of the areas in which it 
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operates combined with the efficiency of some suburban and peri-urban 
community water systems (discussed in chapter 5). This thesis has also 
highlighted how, the social fabric of peri-urban Cochabamba, the political 
motivation to introduce the right to water and to some extent the 
effectiveness of the water committees, are rooted in the socio-economic 
and cultural history of Bolivia. This history, and the patterns of migration 
to the cities which came with it, also affects the nature of the resistance to 
the reforms and the political mindset of those on the peripheries. 
 
Contesting the right to water in Bolivia 
From the 1980s to the 2000s there have been numerous examples of 
social conflicts in Latin America that have been fuelled or exacerbated by 
the privatisation of water services and liberalization of the water sector, 
but which have also failed to universalize access to water (Castro 2003). 
There have consequently been calls for more public-public initiatives and 
the democratisation of water governance (Castro 2007:115). Chapter 4 
demonstrates that in principle post-neoliberal reforms around the right to 
water appear to be building more democratic structures of water 
governance where the state and established community providers work 
together to universalise access to water and thus realise the right to 
water. However, Chapter 4 and 6 demonstrates that there are concerns 
amongst activists and peri-urban DWCs that these reforms do not 
democratise the water sector sufficiently. The state does not have the 
capacity or the resources to develop effective partnerships with 
community providers so that they are able to provide universally.  
 
Chapter 4 demonstrated that some water activists in Bolivia have 
contested the international idea of the right to water on two fronts. First, 
implementing the human right to water is premised on extending 
functioning state-citizen relationships and the remit of citizenship to 
incorporate social and welfare rights. Activist contend that in light of 
persisting juridical plurality around water provision, and extensive failures 
of the state to defend human rights and to provide basic services, there 
have been no struggles on the part of social movements and activists for 
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the realisation of the human right to water in Bolivia. They have instead 
tended to focus on the defence of local water rights in rural areas and 
environmental injustices in mining areas (Comisión para la Gestión 
Integral del Agua en Bolivia 2009). This in turn echoes some of the 
philosophical arguments that have been made about the right to water, 
namely that it is based on western liberal conception of the state. These 
do not necessarily exist in countries like Bolivia where the state is weak, 
and non-state forms of provision, which reflect the socio-economic 
context and necessities, are prevalent. Instead it has been challenged 
and contested. Second, in principle, reforms around the human right to 
water in Bolivia endeavour to develop community water providers through 
capacity building and regulation. However, some activists and social 
organisations are concerned about the impact that these reforms will 
have on established community water providers, the way they operate, 
and the potential for co-option by the state. These concerns highlight how 
diverse water rights are contested over time, and how reforms to the 
water sector can affect the roles of the state and community water 
providers. These reflections are increasingly pertinent in light of on-going 
reforms to the water sectors of countries where water provision and rights 
are diverse and fragmented, but in which the state is attempting to 
develop a sector that incorporates and develops diverse providers, as is 
on-going in Venezuela, Colombia and Ecuador. 
 
In Bolivia, there is evidently concern that reforms to the water sector 
might affect the social and political agency and capabilities that informal 
water providers have harnessed. This agency was demonstrated during 
the Water War, but also through the establishment of the irrigators’ law 
and the accumulative achievements of ASICASUDD-EPSAS, through 
their participation in practical and strategic developments within the water 
sector (discussed in chapter 6). Reforms that seek to regulate these 
entities could run the risk of co-opting them, thus weakening the social 
and political agency that these organisations, and the marginalised peri-
urban communities of the Zona Sur, have developed. 
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This thesis also demonstrated how the established model of water 
governance has been contested and subverted by activists, social 
movement leaders and DWC leaders. However, on a day-to-day basis 
the continued presence of hundreds of community water providers in and 
around the municipality of Cochabamba undermines the established 
municipal system. Informal water provision exists in many different forms 
in Cochabamba; some serve the needs of middle class suburbs, while 
others have emerged as the result of community or NGO-led initiatives. 
Chapter 5 demonstrates how local social dynamics, and the availability 
and quality of water resources influence the form and capacity of these 
community water providers. This research has attempted to contribute to 
understandings of community water providers in urban and peri-urban 
settings. It demonstrates that community-led provision is not restricted to 
marginalised peri-urban communities as a coping mechanism. Indeed, 
informal providers resist being incorporated into the larger municipal 
system (as evidenced by the experiences of the mining barrio Villa Juan 
23).  
 
The peri-urban communities set to benefit from the JICA119-funded water 
project have similarly requested that they retain a role in water provision, 
(as discussed in chapter 6). The municipal model continues to be 
contested as community providers continue to operate as water 
providers, but also through explicit acts in the face of projects such as the 
JICA funded expansion discussed in chapter 6. This illustrates the 
difficulty of implementing state driven right to water reforms in peri-urban 
communities in countries with weak state-citizen bonds and limited 
resources. The findings of this thesis also draw into question the 
applicability of the right to water in this context, or at the very least, the 
challenges of adopting the right to water in these contexts. 
 
 
 
                                                
119 The Japanese state development agency 
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How reforms since 2006 have affected peri-urban DWCs  
In order to understand the effect of reforms linked to the right to water this 
thesis has discussed and profiled water provision in the Zona Sur. This in 
turn contributes to discussions around water provision and governance in 
peri-urban areas. Chapter 6 and 7 provided an in-depth analysis of the 
social, political and environmental challenges to improving water 
provision in peri-urban areas.  
 
Chapter 6 specifically, explores the idea of co-gestion as a form of co-
production in peri-urban areas, which has been advocated by the 
community through ASICASUDD-EPSAS. In doing so, this thesis 
contributes to empirical understandings of co-production. It demonstrates 
that grass-roots organisations like ASICASUDD-EPSAS are lobbying for 
co-gestion, which can be framed as a form of coproduction. This is 
because the continued participation of DWCs in the water system has 
created some political legitimacy and agency amongst member DWCs. 
Co-gestion also allows community members to retain control of water 
provision in the region, which is important to them seeing as they have 
been let down by SEMAPA in the past. It also illustrates the mistrust that 
marginalised peri-urban communities have for state interventions and 
their quest for legitimacy.  However, chapter 6 demonstrates 
coproduction requires the enduring political support and participation of 
the state over time, and commitment from central and municipal 
government. Consequently one-off projects such as PASAAS that was 
only partially supported by the state have had a limited impact. 
 
Chapter 6 also began to outline some of the limitations to the right to 
water approach in peri-urban areas. It demonstrates that there has been 
limited local take up of the discourse of the right to water. ASICASUDD-
EPSAS representatives and members have limited faith in the idea of the 
right to water and continue to lobby for co-gestion.  Chapter 7 similarly 
contends that the right to water has limited meaning for the vecinos of 
Villa 15 de Febrero. Instead it is used to fuel local conflict around who 
controls water provision in the region.   
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Community water systems have been widely advocated as a solution to 
water provision in peri-urban areas by NGOs, social organisations and 
even the state. This thesis demonstrated that community-led water 
management is opaque and complicated. Chapter 7 demonstrates that 
peri-urban communities are fragmented, and that DWC-led provision can 
be unequal. The physical and social dynamics of the peri-urban interface 
mean that most services are bought in, and mutual aid through workdays 
and participation is limited. Chapters 6 and 7 also demonstrate that the 
ideas of ‘the community’ and ‘community water management’ are used in 
a somewhat uncomplicated and romanticised fashion by NGOs, social 
organisations, and some academics, as alternatives to state provision. 
However, peri-urban DWCs are far from autonomous. Chapter 6 and 7 
demonstrate that the Zona Sur community water providers have always 
been dependent on the support of NGOs, the church and social 
organisation, or even decentralised funds from the state.  
 
Chapters 6 and 7 demonstrate some of the challenges facing the state, 
and any initiatives to address water provision in the peri-urban interface. 
The state has limited information on the peri-urban interface, and does 
not have the resources or capacity to engage with the 149 DWCs in the 
Zona Sur. The state’s failure to provide water in the peri-urban interface 
means that communities can be mistrustful of initiatives. ASICASUDD-
EPSAS thus provides a platform by which the new state institutions such 
as SENASBA can engage with the DWCs. It has also provided a conduit 
by which funding can be administered to DWCs, and a method by which 
the state can consult with DWCs about reforms to the water sector. 
ASICASUDD-EPSAS is not representative of all DWCs and state 
initiatives in the peri-urban interface have admittedly been limited. 
However, this thesis has focussed on the organisation because its role 
reveals the challenges facing the state as it seeks to address water 
provision in peri-urban areas. These interactions have the potential to 
subvert and adapt the established scale of water provision in the region. 
In light of the failings of the municipal water system to provide universally 
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in Cochabamba, this thesis demonstrates that there are emerging 
movements and the potential to develop a distinctively peri-urban system 
of water governance premised on collectively organised DWC-led 
provision, with the support of the state.  To date the state has not had 
sufficient resources to support the DWCs, and consequently DWC water 
provision in peri-urban areas is still more expensive, dirtier and less 
reliable than in the centre of the city.  
 
 
The sustainability of the right to water approach 
This thesis has linked reforms around the right to water with 
sustainability. This thesis contributes to the work of the STEPS centre 
which recognises that these framings of sustainability are normative. 
Frameworks relating to the sustainability of water provision have been 
developed by development agencies and NGOs over time. These have 
tended to focus on ideas of institutional sustainability, local environmental 
integrity (Wateraid 2011, UNICEF-WHO 2011) and sometimes ideas of 
equity (UNICEF-WHO 2011). These frameworks in themselves are 
normative and reflect the politics, experiences of development agencies 
and NGOs over time.  
 
By setting out the experiences of Villa 15 de Febrero, chapter 7 
demonstrated that as the state seeks to develop DWCs to be sustainable 
water providers in peri-urban areas, there are various processes that 
affect the sustainability of water provision in the peri-urban interface, 
which have to be reconciled. This includes enhancing local environmental 
integrity, developing institutional sustainability, building equity and also 
tackling the different power relations that are symptomatic of the juridical 
and institutional plurality that characterise the peri-urban interface.  
 
There are specific and serious challenges relating to DWC led water 
provision and local environmental integrity. Government reforms that 
focussed on low-level capacity building and infrastructural projects have 
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yet to tackle sources of biological or chemical contamination to the 
aquifer, or to secure access to water sources other than the aquifer.  
 
While chapter 5 has demonstrated that there are disparities between 
urban and peri-urban water provision, chapter 7 demonstrates that water 
provision within the barrio is also unequal. DWC access does not 
necessarily mean equitable access. Indeed the socio-political context and 
piecemeal development of the barrio has led to unequal provision and 
access. Indeed, the peripheralisation of poverty that characterises the 
peri-urban interface as a whole is also mirrored at the level of the barrio.  
 
The institutional sustainability is affected by a lack of community cohesion. 
There is an evident split between residents who remember and recognise 
the value of the DWC, and members who have more urban aspirations 
and are averse to participating in the DWC, or who don't mind stealing 
from the DWC. DWCs are dependent on participation and are premised 
on ideas of mutual aid and trust, without this their institutional 
sustainability is undermined. 
 
Finally, there is an on-going struggle for control over water provision in 
the barrio between the formal residents’ association and the DWC. This 
has been on-going, but of late it has been exacerbated as the residents’ 
association has started mobilising the discourse of the right to water. This 
struggle for control de-legitimises the DWC at the local level, which 
impacts on the sustainability of an already fragile institution. 
 
These are just some of the elements that affect the sustainability of water 
provision in the peri-urban interface, which emerged through the research 
undertaken for this thesis. This thesis does not endeavour to, nor does it 
have the scope to, comprehensively explore and develop a framework 
that set out all the elements and factors that influenced and shaped the 
sustainability of water provision in the peri-urban interface. Instead, it 
discussed the institutional sustainability and local environmental integrity, 
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and the two lesser-explored elements including building equitable access, 
and the impact of local power relations. 
 
Further Research and Investigation 
This thesis set out to establish a broad understanding of reforms to the 
water sector under the banner of the human right to water, before 
narrowing the focus to the level of the peri-urban interface, and then 
specifically to the experiences of one DWC, Agua Sur in Vila 18 de 
Febrero. While I adopted this approach with the intention of developing a 
broad understanding of how the right to water developed and influenced 
water provision on many levels, it also presents opportunities for further 
research. As previously noted, the Bolivian government has and 
continues to undertake rounds of assessments and planning specifically 
to improve water provision in peri-urban communities across Bolivia 
(SWP I and II). However, planning for water provision in the peri-urban 
interface has identified the need to build environmental sustainability and 
tackle sources of contamination to water sources in peri-urban areas, 
although no firm initiatives have been rolled out yet, particularly in terms 
of tackling sanitation in peri-urban areas. These assessments do not 
have the scope to explore some of the social dynamics that affect the 
institutional sustainability of DWCs, their capacity to provide equitable 
water distribution or the impact of local power relations. Meanwhile the 
role of DWCs has been recognised, and challenges to institutional 
sustainability have been recognised to some extent a more integrated 
development-planning model might consider the impact of declining 
levels of participation on the institutional sustainability of DWCs, as an 
example. 
  
The DWCs of Cochabamba are distinctive, because of their numbers, 
their organisation and the support they have had in light of the numerous 
NGOs that have taken an interest in Cochabamba since the Water War. 
State organisations such as SENASBA are seeking to encourage the 
development of community-led water providers in rural and peri-urban 
areas as part of their plans to improve access to water with funding 
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recently received from the IADB. It would thus be valuable to undertake 
further research into the role and sustainability of the community 
managed water systems in other peri-urban regions of Bolivia. This could 
be complemented by comparative research into the affect of on-going 
endeavours by the state to support community water providers in different 
parts of Bolivia. 
 
Furthermore, community-led water provision has increasingly been 
advocated by regional platforms of water providers (CLOCSAS 2012) in 
Latin America as an alternative to state and/or private water provision. 
This is in light of the failure of the uniform nationalisation or privatisation 
of water provision to meet the water needs of marginalised groups. These 
platforms could provide entry points to explore and compare the potential 
of community-led water provision to address the water needs of rural and 
peri-urban communities, across the Andes and Latin America.  
 
This thesis has demonstrated that community led water provision, and the 
co-production of water services has the capacity to do more than meet 
the water needs of peri-urban communities. Indeed, as demonstrated in 
this thesis peri-urban DWCs often cannot meet the local water needs of 
communities (as outlined in chapter 6 and 7). Nonetheless, some 
community members continue to participate in their DWCs and defend 
their right to provide water locally, because these organisations serve a 
social and political function. Despite the fact that the water service 
provided by DWCs is often more expensive, intermittent and 
contaminated, member continue to defend these institutions. Perhaps this 
is because these institutions have brought some socio-political agency to 
peri-urban communities that have historically been marginalised by the 
state. 
 
In light of the growing Latin American platforms for community-led water 
providers, and their increasing visibility (in events such as FAME 2012) 
and agency, further regional research could be undertaken. This could 
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look into the emancipatory potential of community-led or co-produced 
water systems for marginalised communities. 
 
Chapter 7 of this thesis explored some of the elements that offer up 
challenges and opportunities to enhance the sustainability of water 
provision in peri-urban areas. This thesis reflected on frameworks that 
reflected the experiences of NGOs and development agencies working 
with rural community water providers. It also reflected on the specific 
social dynamics and juridical plurality of the peri-urban interface that 
affected the DWCs. This thesis did not have the scope to 
comprehensively explore all the factors that might affect the sustainability 
of water provision in the peri-urban interface. However, while undertaking 
my fieldwork and analysing the data it became evident that there are 
specific peri-urban dynamics that are poorly understood, but which affect 
the sustainability of water provision in the Zona Sur. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 
of this thesis demonstrate how rapidly peri-urban communities change 
over time. Chapter 7 demonstrates how over time, developing urban 
aspirations can undermine community structures of water management. 
Further research could be undertaken to develop a more detailed 
understanding of the factors that influence the sustainability of water 
provision in the peri-urban interface.   
 
Finally, while beyond the capacity of this thesis, there is a real shortage of 
accurate demographic and cartographic data on the peri-urban Zona Sur 
of Cochabamba. It became evident through the course of my fieldwork 
that neither the municipality nor the state had up to date information on 
these rapidly expanding regions of the peri-urban interface. Population 
figures were based on projected, and often contested census figures, that 
were over a decade old and did not incorporate data from informal 
settlements. Meanwhile maps of settlements showed huge disparities 
with the satellite images, where more settlements appeared or 
settlements had significantly grown (see annex 1). The municipality did 
not know where every well, or community water system was. 
Furthermore, the state and social movements had limited or no 
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understanding of the aquifers that they were exploiting. NGOs, research 
institutions, or academics often produced some data or maps on the 
region, but often this data wasn’t shared with the other organisations 
working in the area. Researchers, planners and communities alike would 
benefit from good basic cartographic, demographic and geographical 
data that was readily available to all. 
 
Postscript  
I returned to Villa 15 de Febrero in July 2011 to find out whether the new 
pipeline that had been under construction while I was in the barrio had 
been completed and inaugurated. I found that infighting within the 
committee meant that most of the work was now being undertaken by the 
DWC treasurer, who would still attend ASICASUDD-EPSAS workshops 
on system maintenance, even though there wasn’t any water in the 
system. I met the water secretary Doña Petra to ask what had happened, 
and she told me that people had not paid their inscription fees and so the 
committee hadn’t paid her salary for several months. The water levels 
had declined further, and in light of the report commissioned by 
ASICASUDD-EPSAS, they felt it would be better to buy water in bulk 
every 2 weeks. As the community members were refusing to pay their 
bills they could not afford to pay to bring water in, so the water committee 
had stopped functioning. Doña Petra had been to ASICASUDD-EPSAS 
to ask for help and was told that the committees must now work together 
to tackle administrative issues, and that there was no funding available to 
support the DWC. While there was new infrastructure in place, there was 
insufficient water to supply it. Furthermore, declining levels of 
participation and willingness to pay for the service provided had 
undermined the DWC.  
 
A few kilometres to the north of Villa 15 de Febrero President Evo 
Morales inaugurated the JICA pipeline that connects 50,000 people to the 
mainline water supply. A network delivers water to the pre-existing OTB 
of committee systems. The system promises to supply water to this 
region, once the Misicuni project is complete. Residents in the region 
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were given a choice, would they like to be direct customers of SEMAPA, 
or would they prefer that the DWCs or OTBs bought the water in block 
and continued to manage and distribute the water, a continuation and 
development in the model of co-gestion promoted by the committees of 
ASICASUDD-EPSAS. The communities have for the time being 
requested to manage the distribution of water themselves, as they don't 
trust SEMAPA. 
 
The JICA project was completed as relationships between ASICASUDD-
EPSAS and the state cooled (for reasons outlined in chapter 6), meaning 
that there was no funding for new projects on the horizon. Consequently 
some members of the barrio 15 de Febrero and surrounding areas are 
now open to the idea that SEMAPA will come to provide water to the 
region, either by providing water in bulk or supplying water to the 
community as a whole. The future of the DWC, Agua Sur, is in the 
balance. 
 
It would be better if semapa came, if they took charge of all of 
this, I have always said I hope that semapa comes, then the 
people won’t have to participate in the meetings, in the marches, 
they wont have to do a thing. Semapa works like that, so I think 
the people really want that, they just want to pay and that’s the 
end of it. Only then will the vecinos learn, they will realise that 
they will have to pay their bills on time, and here they don't pay, 
the system doesn’t work, they don’t value this system, they 
don't realise the work the meetings the hours that we have put 
towards this, they don’t care.120 
 
DWCs continue to operate in the Zona Sur in light of the failure of the 
municipal water utility. DWCs and ideas of co-gestion present 
opportunities and challenges not only to develop and co-produce 
sustainable water provision in the peri-urban interface but also to create 
spaces for marginalised groups to participate in local water governance. 
Nonetheless, overcoming many of these challenges linked to developing 
sustainable water provision requires partnerships between the community 
and the state to be developed further. To date state and NGO initiatives 
                                                
120 DWC secretary, Cochabamba, September 20th 2011. 
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have only addressed some of the challenges that undermine the 
sustainability of DWC-led provision. Reforms under the banner of the 
right to water have the potential to support and develop peri-urban DWCs, 
but Agua Sur’s recent history reveals how fragile DWC-led water 
management can be in the peri-urban interface.   
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